A picture of the world as chiefly one of discrete objects, distributed in space and time, has sometimes seemed compelling. It is however one of the main targets of Henry Laycock's book; for it is seriously incomplete. The picture, he argues, leaves no space for "stuff" like air and water. With discrete objects, we may always ask "how many?," but with stuff the question has to be "how much?" Laycock's fascinating exploration also addresses key logical and linguistic questions about the way we categorize the many and the much.
Author(s): Henry Laycock
Edition: First Edition
Year: 2006
Language: English
Pages: 224
Contents......Page 16
Introduction......Page 20
1.0 Metaphysics without bodies......Page 35
1.1 Metaphysics without physical objects......Page 40
1.2 Persistence, things, and stuff......Page 43
1.3 Unity, identity, and the semantic turn......Page 48
1.4 A proposed semantical solution to the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’......Page 50
1.5 Non-singular identities and definite non-count descriptions......Page 58
1.6 Syntax, semantics, metaphysics: bridging the apparent gaps......Page 61
1.7 Counting and measuring......Page 63
1.8 Post mortem on ‘mass nouns’......Page 67
2. In Thrall to the Idea of The One......Page 73
2.0 The supposed exhaustiveness of singular reference......Page 74
2.1 ‘The many’ bundled as ‘the one’......Page 77
2.2 Plurality and two conceptions of group-talk......Page 82
2.3 Two kinds of motivation for collections......Page 84
2.4 Collective reference......Page 87
2.5 Collective predication and ‘the class as many’......Page 92
2.6 Platonism: ‘the class as many’ as an object......Page 96
2.7 Nominalism: ‘the class as many’ as no object......Page 97
2.8 The variable of many values......Page 105
2.9 Collections born again......Page 111
3.0 ‘The much’ repackaged as ‘the one’......Page 116
3.1 Conditions of uniqueness......Page 120
3.2 The Theory of Descriptions (yet again) defended......Page 124
3.3 The mechanics of non-count descriptions......Page 127
3.4 Non-distributive predication......Page 130
4.0 The classical model......Page 134
4.1 Roadblocks to non-singularity; meaning and truth-conditions......Page 139
4.2 Non-singular quantification: the distinct semantic powers of ‘all’ and ‘some’......Page 141
4.3 Generality and distribution en masse......Page 147
4.4 The non-count cases......Page 152
4.5 Variables, instances, and samples......Page 155
5.0 Ideal languages......Page 160
5.1 Conditions for transparency......Page 162
5.2 Power versus clarity......Page 167
5.3 Reference and material ‘non-entities’......Page 170
5.4 The realms of multiplicity and unity......Page 174
5.5 Two kinds of plural sentences......Page 178
5.6 Concrete and generic non-count sentences and their material basis......Page 184
5.7 The reality of substances......Page 186
I: Atomism......Page 191
II: Substances and Physical Objects: Quine’s Labyrinth......Page 194
III: Reductive Mereological Approaches to Non-singularity......Page 197
IV: The Gradual Transition from Count Nouns to Pure Non-count Nouns......Page 205
Bibliography......Page 209
C......Page 216
I......Page 217
N......Page 218
Q......Page 219
U......Page 220
Z......Page 221
