Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues that do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective that holds that virtue is simply a character trait that systematically produces good consequences.
Author(s): Julia Driver
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 160
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 11
Introduction......Page 15
1 The Aristotelian Conception of Virtue......Page 25
I. THE KNOWLEDGE CONDITION......Page 26
II. PLEASURE AND THE GOOD LIFE......Page 36
I. MODESTY......Page 40
II. WHY WE VALUE MODESTY......Page 48
III. BLIND CHARITY......Page 52
IV. TRUST......Page 54
V. FORGIVE AND FORGET......Page 55
VI. IMPULSIVE COURAGE......Page 57
VII. VALUING THE VIRTUES OF IGNORANCE......Page 60
I. THE VIRTUES AS CORRECTIVES......Page 66
II. ARISTOTLE AND KANT: CULTIVATED INCLINATION OR DUTY?......Page 69
III. GOOD INTENTIONS......Page 74
4 A Consequentialist Theory of Virtue......Page 87
I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM......Page 92
II. ACTUALISM AND COUNTERFACTUALISM IN VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 102
5 Virtue and the Will......Page 108
I. PSYCHOLOGY VERSUS MOTIVE......Page 110
II. VIRTUE AND THE GOOD......Page 113
III. FLOURISHING......Page 119
IV. PSYCHOLOGY AND VIRTUE......Page 130
Conclusion......Page 133
CHAPTER 1......Page 135
CHAPTER 2......Page 138
CHAPTER 3......Page 142
CHAPTER 4......Page 143
CHAPTER 5......Page 147
References......Page 149
Index......Page 155
