Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, social action theorists, and social philosophers, this collection provides the first comprehensive and critical treatment of Tuomela's outstanding contribution to social ontology and collective intentionality.
Author(s): Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin
Series: Philosophers in Depth
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 277
City: Cham
Acknowledgements
Contents
List of Contributors
1: Introduction
1 Raimo Tuomela on Sociality
2 Chapter Summaries
2: We-mode in Theory and Action
1 Introduction
2 Tuomela’s Career
3 Our Research Group and the Establishment of the Field
4 Our Collaboration with Raimo
4.1 Kaarlo: We-Intentions, Practical Reasoning and Joint Action
4.2 Raul: We-Reasoning
4.3 Pekka: Collective Responsibility
5 Future Endeavours
6 Concluding Remarks
References
3: Tuomela and the Unity of Belief
1 Introduction
2 The Bulletin Board View
3 Group Belief and Its Importance
4 Tuomela and Group Belief
4.1 Interactive Knowledge
4.2 The Simple We-Belief Account
4.3 The Positional Acceptance Account
5 Tuomela on Mutual Belief
6 Answering the Level Problem
7 Risk and the Cost of Communication in Collective Belief
8 The Holistic Approach
9 Conclusion
References
4: Joint Actions: We-Mode and I-Mode
1 Introduction
2 Tuomela on Collective Intentions and Collective Reasoning
3 Relational Individualism: A Strict Individualist Account
3.1 Acting Qua Member of a Group
3.2 Collective Reasoning
References
5: Towards a Situated Approach of Tuomela’s Theory of Social Practices
1 Introduction
2 The Importance of Our Starting Point
3 Social Practices: Pattern-Governed Behaviors and We-Attitudes
3.1 Pattern-Governed Behavior
3.2 We-Attitudes and Social Practices
3.3 Routine and We-Attitudes
3.4 Mind-Dependency and Realism of Sociality
4 Emergent Coordination and Agentic Control
4.1 Emergent and Spontaneous Action
4.2 Habits, Meshed Cognition, and Agentic Control
5 Conclusion
References
6: What Is Collective Acceptance and What Does It Do?
1 Introduction
2 Which Aspects of Social Reality Are Socially Constructed?
3 Puzzles about Collective Acceptance
4 Answering the Puzzles about Collective Acceptance
5 Conclusion
References
7: Can There Be Institutions Without Constitutive Rules?
1 Introduction
2 The Transformation View
3 Criticisms of the Transformation View
4 Social Practices and Institutions
5 Conclusion
Appendix: Tuomela on the Transformation View
Constitutive Rules Are Not Reducible to Regulative Ones
References
8: Institutional Proxy Agency: A We-Mode Approach
1 Introduction
2 Ludwig’s Account of Proxy Agency in Collective Action
2.1 What Is Proxy Agency?
2.2 What Makes An (individual or collective) Agent a Proxy?
2.3 How Does Proxy Agency Work?
2.4 What Is Involved in Proxy Action?
3 Conditional We-Intentions
4 Strong We-Commitment in Institutional Action Contexts
5 Collective Intentionality and Group Reasons
6 Institutional Proxy Agency
7 Conclusions
References
9: From We-Mode to Role-Mode
1 Introduction
2 Content vs. Mode vs. Subject Approaches to Collective Intentionality
3 The Subject Mode Account
4 Introducing Role-Mode
5 10 Theses About Role-Mode and We-Mode
6 Conclusion
References
10: Group Morality and Moral Groups: Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-Mode
1 Introduction
2 Autonomy in Tuomela’s We-mode Groups?
3 Tuomelian Meta-ethics?
4 Summary
References
11: Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social Normativity
1 Introduction
2 Tuomela’s Early I-mode Normative Attitude Account
2.1 The Problem of Justification
3 I-mode Intention-based Accounts
4 Tuomela’s Irreducibly Collectivistic We-Mode Account
5 Conclusion
References
12: Cooperation Rests on Trust—But What Is Trust and How Do We get There?
1 Introduction
2 Part I: What Is Trust and How Does It Come About?
2.1 Social Normative Trust (Genuine Trust) versus Predictive “Trust”
2.2 Rational Social Normative Trust, viz. Rational Genuine Trust
2.3 The Theory of (RSNTR) Rational Social Normative Trust (Rational Genuine Trust)
2.4 Terminology Used for Trust—Examples and Discussion
To Trust, to Predict, to Depend/Rely on Someone, to Entrust Someone
An Example of Genuine Trust
The Relationship of Mutual Respect for Rights in Rational genuine Trust
Predictive Trust
Trust as a Gift that Needs to Be Accepted; and Thick and Thin Genuine Trust
General Trust, Mutuality, and Power
Prediction, Predictive Reliance, Trustworthiness, Risk, Degree, and Decision
2.5 On Subjective and Objective Rationality in the Context of Trust
2.6 A Basic Moral We-perspective
3 Part II: Cooperation Rests on Trust
References
Index
