This book shows that evolutionary game theory can unravel how mutual cooperation, trust, and credit in a group emerge in organizations and institutions. Some organizations and institutions, such as insurance unions, credit unions, and banks, originated from very simple mutual-aid groups. Members in these early-stage mutual-aid groups help each other, making rules to promote cooperation, and suppressing free riders. Then, they come to “trust” not only each other but also the group they belong to, itself.
The division of labor occurs when the society comes to have diversity and complexity in a larger group, and the division of labor also requires mutual cooperation and trust among different social roles. In a larger group, people cannot directly interact with each other, and the reputation of unknown people helps other decide who is a trustworthy person. However, if gossip spreads untruths about a reputation, trust and cooperation are destroyed. Therefore, how to suppress untrue gossip is also important for trust and cooperation in a larger group. If trustworthiness and credibility can be established, these groups are successfully sustainable. Some develop and evolve and then mature into larger organizations and institutions. Finally, these organizations and institutions become what they are now. Therefore, not only cooperation but also trust and credit are keys to understanding these organizations and institutions.
The evolution of cooperation, a topic of research in evolutionary ecology and evolutionary game theory, can be applied to understanding how to make institutions and organizations sustainable, trustworthy, and credible. It provides us with the idea that evolutionary game theory is a good mathematical tool to analyze trust and credit. This kind of research can be applied to current hot topics such as microfinance and the sustainable use of ecosystems.
Author(s): Mayuko Nakamaru
Series: Theoretical Biology
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 330
City: Singapore
Preface
Abilities Unique to Humans
Why Animals Live in Groups
Groups of Human Beings
Organizations and Institutions
Trust in Organizations and Institutions
Chapters
Acknowledgments
Contents
Part I: Introduction to the Evolution of Cooperation
Chapter 1: What Is ``The Evolution of Cooperation``?
1.1 Cooperation in Our Lives
1.2 What Is Evolutionary Game Theory?
1.3 Evolutionary Stable Strategy
1.4 Games Between Two Players
1.4.1 Prisoner´s Dilemma Game
1.4.2 Chicken Game
1.4.3 Snowdrift and Blizzard Game
1.4.4 Which Is an ESS, Cooperation or Defection?
1.5 Why We Can Analyze Our Society by Means of Evolutionary Game Theory
1.6 How to Make a Mathematical Model or an Agent-Based Model of Our Society by Means of Evolutionary Game Theory
1.7 The Mechanisms to Promote the Evolution of Cooperation Between Bilateral Players
1.7.1 Kin Selection
1.7.2 Group Selection
1.7.3 Direct Reciprocity
1.7.4 Indirect Reciprocity
1.7.5 Social Network
1.7.6 Punishment
1.8 Games Among Three or More Players
1.9 The Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Our Society
References
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Cooperation in a Lattice-Structured Population Under Two Different Updating Rules
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Completely Mixed Population
2.3 One-Dimensional Lattice Under the Score-Dependent Viability Model
2.3.1 Computer Simulations on a One-Dimensional Lattice Model
2.3.2 The Dynamics of Density
2.3.2.1 Mean-Field Approximation
2.3.2.2 Pair Approximation
2.3.3 Invasion Success Probability in the One-Dimensional Lattice Model
2.3.4 The Pair-Edge Method
2.4 Two-Dimensional Lattice Under the Viability Model
2.4.1 Mean-Field Approximation in the Two-Dimensional Lattice
2.4.2 Pair Approximation in the Two-Dimensional Lattice Model
2.4.3 Computer Simulations
2.5 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
2.5.1 Computer Simulations on a One-Dimensional Lattice
2.5.2 Mathematical Analyses in a One-Dimensional Lattice
2.5.2.1 Mean-Field Dynamics
2.5.2.2 Pair Approximation
2.5.2.3 Invasion Success Probability
2.5.2.4 The Pair-Edge Method
2.5.3 Two-Dimensional Model
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
2.6.1 The Lattice-Structured Population vs. Completely Mixing Population
2.6.2 Comparison Between the Viability Model and the Fertility Model
2.6.3 Coexistence of Cooperators and Defectors
References
Chapter 3: The Effect of Peer Punishment on the Evolution of Cooperation
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Two Updating Rules, Viability Model and Fertility Model
3.2.1 Model
3.2.2 The Completely Mixing Model
3.2.2.1 Score-Dependent Viability Model
3.2.2.2 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
3.2.3 The Lattice Model
3.2.3.1 Score-Dependent Viability Model
3.2.3.2 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
3.2.4 Summary
3.2.5 Expansion of This Study: Do Empty Sites Influence the Evolution of Cooperation and Punishment?
3.2.5.1 Model and Results
3.3 If Anti-Social Punishers Exist in the Population
3.3.1 Strategies and Payoffs
3.3.2 Z-Mixed Population Model
3.3.3 Lattice Model When Anti-Social Punishment Is Allowed
3.4 Which Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation, Strict or Graduated Punishment?
3.4.1 What Is Graduated or Strict Punishment?
3.4.2 Models
3.4.3 Results
3.4.3.1 Agent-Based Simulations
3.4.3.2 The Mathematical Model of the Random-Matching Condition
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
3.5.1 Spiteful Behavior in Social Sciences and Evolutionary Evolution
3.5.2 Graduated or Strict Punishment in Society
3.5.3 Anti-Social Punishment in Society
3.5.4 Other Types of Punishment Beside Peer Punishment
References
Part II: Cooperation, Trust, and Credit in the Early-Stage Mutual-Aid Systems
Chapter 4: Rotation Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) as Early-Stage Credit Systems
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Models and Results
4.2.1 Model 1: Baseline Evolutionary Simulation Model of Rotating Indivisible Goods Game
4.2.2 Results of Model 1
4.2.3 Model 2: Rotating Indivisible Goods Game with the Peer Selection Rule
4.2.4 Results of Model 2
4.2.5 Model 3: A Forfeiture Rule Is Introduced
4.2.6 Results of Model 3
4.2.7 Effect of Labeling Rules
4.2.8 Effect of Reputation Levels
4.3 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Chapter 5: Tanomoshi-ko Field Study and Subjective Experiment
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Ko on Sado Island
5.2.1 Tanomoshi-ko in Fukura-District
5.2.2 Tanomoshi-ko in Ogi-District
5.2.3 Nenbutsu-ko
5.2.4 Michibushin
5.2.5 Summary: Ko in Sado
5.3 Experimental Study of ROSCA
5.3.1 Experiment
5.3.1.1 Design
5.3.1.2 Treatment B (Base)
5.3.1.3 Treatment P (Punishment)
5.3.1.4 Treatments V (Voting) and VP (Voting With Punishment)
5.3.2 Theoretical Predictions
5.3.3 Results
5.3.3.1 Average Contribution Rates Over Time and Distribution of Total Profit
5.3.3.2 Why Did the Voting System Work Well?
5.3.3.3 Why Did the Punishment Rule Not Work Well?
5.3.3.4 Order Effect for the Receipt of Payouts
5.3.3.5 Panel Regression of Average Contribution Rates
5.3.4 Conclusions of the Experiment
References
Chapter 6: Who Does a Group Admit into Membership or Which Group Does a Player Want to Join?
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Models
6.3 Results
6.4 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Chapter 7: The Mutual-Aid Game as an Early-Stage Insurance System
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Model
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Eight Strategy Sets Are Categorized into Two
7.3.2 Calculating the Expected Payoffs
7.3.3 What Happens When S-J Players Are the Majority?
7.3.4 Can Rare S-J Players Invade the Population Occupied by AllD Players?
7.3.5 The Effect of Large Group Size
7.3.6 Reputation vs. Experience
7.3.7 Why Cannot Conditional Cooperators Except S-J Players Invade the Population in n 4?
7.3.8 Perception and Implementation Errors
7.3.9 If Pure Cooperators Are Added in the Population
7.4 Discussion and Conclusions
7.4.1 Comparison with the Previous Studies About the Mutual-Aid Game
7.4.2 The Mutual-Aid Game as an Institution
References
Part III: Cooperation, Trust, and Credibility in Society
Chapter 8: Cooperation and Punishment in the Linear Division of Labor
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 The Linear Division of Labor
8.1.2 The Industrial Waste Treatment Process in Japan
8.2 Models
8.2.1 Baseline System in the Three-Role Model
8.2.2 Actor Responsibility System in the Three-Role Model
8.2.3 Producer Responsibility System in the Three-Role Model
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Comparison with the Results of Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014)
8.3.2 Comparison with Empirical Reality
8.3.3 Comparison Between the Three-Role and Two-Role Models
8.4 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Chapter 9: Can Cooperation Evolve When False Gossip Spreads?
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 Comparison with Previous Studies About Indirect Reciprocity
9.1.2 Comparison with Nakamaru and Kawata´s Gossip Model
9.1.3 Unification of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity
9.2 Models
9.2.1 Strategies
9.2.2 Definition of the P-Score
9.2.3 The Giving-Game Session
9.2.4 The Gossip Session
9.2.5 The Updating Rule Through Generations
9.2.6 Parameter Settings
9.3 Competition Among Gossiping Reciprocators with Various Criteria
9.3.1 Fair Gossipers with Various Criteria for Giving-Games (qG = qB = 0)
9.3.2 Biased Gossipers (qG = qB = k)
9.4 Effects of Different Types of False Gossip on the Evolution of Reciprocity
9.4.1 ZDISCs Versus Non-gossiping ALLDs
9.4.2 ZDISCs Versus Fairly Gossiping ALLDs
9.4.3 ZDISCs Versus Pure Self-Advertising ALLDs
9.4.4 ZDISCs Versus ALLB-ALLDs
9.4.5 ZDISCs Versus ALLG-ALLDs
9.5 Effects of Selecting Gossip Based on the Trustworthiness of Speakers
9.5.1 ZDISCs Versus Fairly Gossiping ALLDs
9.5.2 ZDISCs Versus Pure Self-Advertising ALLDs
9.5.3 ZDISCs Versus ALLB-ALLDs
9.5.4 ZDISCs Versus ALLG-ALLDs
9.6 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Part IV: Ecological Sustainability, Institutions, and Cooperation
Chapter 10: Field Abandonment Problem in Rice Paddy Fields
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Models
10.2.1 Baseline Assumption in a Well-Mixed Population
10.2.2 Consideration of Spatial Structure
10.3 Results
10.3.1 Simulations for a Well-Mixed Population
10.3.2 Simulations for a Spatially Structured Population
10.3.2.1 Comparison Between Population Applying (*, Global, *) and (*, Local, *) Schemes
10.3.2.2 The Effect of Various (*, Local, *) Schemes
10.3.2.3 Parameter Regarding Cultivation Effort in the (*, Local, *) Schemes: a, b, and cclt
10.3.2.4 Parameter Regarding Collective Action in the (*, Local, *) Schemes
10.3.2.5 Parameters Regarding Two Side Effects of Cultivation Effort in the (*, Local, *) Schemes
Water-Use Competition, β3
Land Abandonment, β1
10.4 Discussion and Conclusions
10.4.1 Summary of the Results
10.4.2 Method of Validating the Model Results
10.4.3 Game Structure and Its Effect on the Dynamics
10.4.4 Application of the Current Model and Future Research
10.4.5 Implications
References
Chapter 11: Ecological Features Benefiting Sustainable Harvesters in Socio-Ecological Systems: A Case Study of Swiftlets in Ma...
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 An Appropriate Example: Swiftlets´ Nests in Sarawak, Malaysia
11.1.2 Comparison with the Previous Theoretical Studies About the Social and Ecological Dynamics
11.1.3 The Findings of This Chapter
11.2 Models and Results
11.2.1 Model 1: The Baseline Model
11.2.2 Result 1: The Population Dynamics of Swiftlets in the Habitat Without Harvesters
11.2.3 Model 2: The Open-Access Model
11.2.4 Result 2: The Results of the Open-Access Model
11.2.5 Model 3: The Property Rights Model
11.2.6 Result 3: Results of the Property Rights Model
11.3 Discussion and Conclusions
11.3.1 Application of Our Model
11.3.2 One Direction of Our Future Work
11.3.3 The Effect of the Price of a Nest
11.3.4 Back to the Reality About Swiftlets
11.3.5 Comparison with Theoretical Studies About Socio-Ecological Dynamics
References
Epilogue
Searching for tanomoshi-ko in Micronesia
The World´s First Credit System Was Established in Japan
Revival of Mutual-Aid Organizations in Japan?
References
