The WTO Case Law of 2001: The American Law Institute Reporters' Studies (The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law)

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Foreword......Page 9
American Law Institute Reporters......Page 12
1 The project......Page 13
2 The Reporters’ Studies on the WTO Case Law of 2001......Page 15
1 EC – Asbestos as Watershed......Page 26
2 Three methodologies for dealing with regulation under GATT 1994......Page 28
2.1 Methodology I: the “Objective” approach......Page 30
2.2 Methodology II: the “Effect and Purpose” approach......Page 35
2.3 Methodology III: the “Alternative Comparators” approach......Page 37
2.4 Reflections on the three methodologies: what’s in the choice?......Page 40
3.1 The Panel report......Page 44
3.2 The AB report......Page 45
3.2.1 Which interpretation did the AB employ?......Page 46
3.3 Concluding remarks......Page 49
2.1 Protection of sea turtles by the United States......Page 53
2.2 The original Panel and Appellate Body rulings......Page 55
2.2.1 Negative findings......Page 56
2.2.2 The positive findings......Page 57
3 The Compliance Panel and Appellate Body ruling......Page 58
3.1.1 Jurisdiction of the 21.5 Panel; the threshold question......Page 59
3.1.2 Country-by-country vs. shipment-by-shipment inspection......Page 60
3.1.3 Article XX GATT as an emergency clause......Page 62
3.2.1 Scope of the review......Page 63
3.2.2 Requirements of the chapeau......Page 64
3.3 Issues raised by AB ruling......Page 66
4 Imports contingent on environmental measures......Page 67
4.1 A simple model......Page 68
4.2 Commercial policy without abatement......Page 70
4.3 Contingent imports with abatement technology......Page 73
5 Conclusion......Page 76
References......Page 81
Appendix......Page 82
1 Background......Page 84
2.1 The case for safeguards......Page 86
2.1.1 Safeguards as means to reduce adjustment costs......Page 88
2.1.2 Safeguards and the incentive to liberalize......Page 91
2.2 Potential drawbacks of safeguards......Page 92
2.3 Conclusion......Page 94
3 The legal setting......Page 95
4 “…unforeseen developments…”......Page 96
4.1.1 Unforeseen means “unlikely” and not “unforeseeable”......Page 97
4.1.2 Unforeseen implies “not being the deliberate cause of”......Page 98
4.3 How to establish what was unforeseen......Page 100
4.4 An awkward feature of safeguard investigations......Page 101
4.5 Were “unforeseen developments” established in US – Lamb?......Page 102
5.1 The definition of “serious injury”......Page 103
5.2 The choice of explanatory variables......Page 104
5.3 “Increased imports” as cause of injury......Page 105
5.4 When is a change in imports a legitimate ground for a safeguard?......Page 107
5.5 Methods for attributing injury......Page 109
5.5.1 Econometric attribution analysis......Page 110
5.5.2 “Injury accounting”......Page 111
5.6 Imports as cause of injury threat in US – Lamb......Page 112
5.6.1 Differences in the criteria employed by the US International Trade Commission, the Panel and the AB to determine the legitimacy of safeguards......Page 115
5.6.2 “…threat of …”......Page 119
6 “…necessary…”......Page 120
7 “…of the effect of obligations incurred under this Agreement…”......Page 122
8 Concluding remarks......Page 123
References......Page 125
1 Introduction......Page 127
2 General economic analysis......Page 129
3.1 Introduction and overview......Page 135
3.2 A key issue: the practice of zeroing......Page 136
3.3 Methods for calculating margins under Article 2.2.2 of the Agreement......Page 140
3.4 Legal and policy questions......Page 142
4 Specific economic analysis......Page 145
5 Concluding observations on the legal tests and economic analysis......Page 149
References......Page 150
1 Introduction and summary of main legal issues......Page 152
2.1 Background......Page 153
2.2 The alleged restraint agreement......Page 156
2.3 Market segmentation......Page 158
2.5 Consultations......Page 159
2.6 Member self-restraint in recourse to dispute settlement......Page 161
2.8 Significance of the Panel’s statement that it might be possible to arrive at the result of the Mexican agency on the facts of the case......Page 163
2.9 Parallel proceedings under the NAFTA: a non-issue......Page 164
3 Conclusion......Page 165
References......Page 166
1 Introduction: general considerations on Anti-dumping and WTO law and summary of the legal issues in this case......Page 167
2 “Facts available”: Article 6.8 of the Anti-dumping Agreement......Page 173
3 Failure to calculate individual margins of dumping......Page 177
4 Adjustments for differences in physical characteristics......Page 178
5 Article 6.9: requirement of disclosure of facts on which the agency relies......Page 179
6 Conclusion......Page 180
References......Page 181
1 Facts of the case......Page 182
2 Issues raised before the WTO Panel......Page 183
3 Decision of the Panel......Page 185
4 The US appeal and the Appellate Body’s decision......Page 186
5 The standard of review......Page 187
6 The “pass through” of non-recurring subsidies......Page 191
6.1 Objectives of the SCM Agreement......Page 192
6.2 Subsidy benefits and changes in ownership......Page 198
6.3.1 Market effects of recurring subsidies......Page 201
6.3.2 Market effects of non-recurring subsidies......Page 203
6.3.3 Injury determination......Page 205
6.3.4 Administrative review......Page 206
6.3.5 Where did the Appellate Body go wrong......Page 208
6.3.6 Must the SCM Agreement be modified?......Page 209
7 Conclusions......Page 210
8 Postscript......Page 211
References......Page 212
1 Introduction......Page 213
2 General economic analysis......Page 214
2.1 Part II of the SCM Agreement......Page 215
2.1.1 Article 3.1(a)......Page 216
2.1.2 Article 3.1(b)......Page 217
2.2 Part III of the SCM Agreement......Page 219
2.2.1 Subsidies and the relationship between tariff bindings and market access......Page 220
2.2.2 Challenging a “new” subsidy under Part III of the SCM Agreement......Page 222
2.2.3 Challenging an “existing” subsidy under Part III of the SCM Agreement......Page 223
2.2.4 Part III of the SCM Agreement and the relationship between tariff bindings and market access......Page 224
2.2.5 Agreements to limit subsidies and “efficient” trade agreements......Page 225
2.3 Part V of the SCM Agreement......Page 226
3.1 Introduction......Page 227
3.2 The purpose of the SCM Agreement and the treatment of export restraints under the SCM: is this a financial contribution?......Page 228
3.3 The Panel’s interpretation of the SCM Agreement......Page 230
3.4 Mandatory versus discretionary actions......Page 231
3.5 US measures......Page 232
3.7 Interpretative legal and policy issues......Page 236
4 Specific economic analysis......Page 241
5 Concluding observations on the legal tests and economic analysis......Page 244
References......Page 247
1 Introduction......Page 248
2 General economic analysis......Page 250
2.1 The economic puzzle of international agreements to limit export subsidies......Page 251
2.2 What is wrong with the standard argument against export subsidies?......Page 257
2.3 Interpretation 1: rethink economic explanations of export subsidy agreements......Page 258
2.4 Interpretation 2: rethink WTO efforts to limit export subsidies......Page 260
3.1 Introduction and overview......Page 263
3.2 Phase I: the Panel and the AB report......Page 266
3.3 Phase two: the 21.5 Panel determinations and AB reviews thereof......Page 270
4 The second 21.5 Panel and AB rulings......Page 274
4.1 The question of payments redux......Page 275
5 Specific economic analysis......Page 280
5.1 What is wrong with average total cost as a measure of proper value?......Page 281
5.2 What is wrong with world market prices as a measure of proper value?......Page 288
6 Concluding observations on the legal tests and economic analysis......Page 289
References......Page 292
1 Facts of the case......Page 293
2 The WTO Arbitration process......Page 296
3.1 The parties’ arguments......Page 297
3.2 The Arbitrators’ reasoning......Page 298
3.3 The Arbitrators’ calculations......Page 300
3.4 No punitive compensation and no retroactive payments......Page 301
4.1 Potential revenues or legitimate expectations?......Page 302
4.2 The calculations......Page 306
4.3 Punitive compensation......Page 308
4.4 Retroactive compensation......Page 309
5 Conclusions......Page 310
References......Page 311
INDEX......Page 312