This book analyzes the United States and Russia’s nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics.
Author(s): Stephen J. Cimbala
Edition: 1st Edition
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2020
Language: English
Pages: 263
Tags: Russian And Post-Soviet Politics
Acknowledgments......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
List of Figures......Page 9
List of Tables......Page 10
List of Charts......Page 11
Introduction......Page 13
1.2 Operation “RYAN”......Page 19
1.3 Intermediate Missiles......Page 21
1.4 Defense Shield......Page 22
1.5 Korean Airliner......Page 24
1.6 False Warning......Page 25
1.7 NATO Exercise......Page 26
1.8 The Sister Services......Page 28
1.9 Soviet Nuclear Perspectives......Page 30
1.10 Force Balances and Outcomes......Page 32
1.11 Conclusions......Page 36
2.1 Introduction......Page 42
2.2 Caveats......Page 43
2.3 Reasons for Optimism?......Page 45
2.4 Analysis Near and Far......Page 49
Evaluating the Forces......Page 50
Preliminary Verdict......Page 55
2.5 Conclusion......Page 57
3.1 Introduction......Page 65
Putin’s Challenge......Page 66
Drifting Toward Controversy......Page 68
3.3 Technology and Defenses......Page 69
3.4 Conclusions......Page 74
4.1 Introduction......Page 83
4.2 Chinese Military Modernization and Nuclear Weapons......Page 84
Perspectives......Page 91
Data Analysis......Page 93
Implications......Page 95
4.4 Conclusion......Page 96
5.1 Introduction......Page 104
5.2 Actors and Strategies......Page 105
5.3 What to Do About North Korea: Denuking and What Else?......Page 110
Forces and Outcomes......Page 114
Preliminary Findings and Indications......Page 117
5.5 Conclusions......Page 118
6.1 Introduction......Page 123
6.2 The Trump Nuclear Posture Review......Page 124
6.3 Restraining Presidential Power: Nuclear First Strike and North Korea......Page 129
Preemption or Prevention?......Page 130
Decision-Making and Constitutional Process......Page 133
6.4 Conclusion......Page 135
7.1 Introduction......Page 140
7.2 Deterrence: How Reliable?......Page 141
7.3 Escalation Control: Principles......Page 147
7.4 Escalation Control: New Challenges......Page 150
Approach......Page 155
Analysis......Page 157
7.6 Conclusions......Page 160
8.1 Introduction......Page 167
8.2 Cyber Wars and Information Operations: Perspectives......Page 168
8.3 Information and Infrastructure Operations......Page 170
8.4 Analysis......Page 174
8.5 Conclusion......Page 180
9.1 Introduction......Page 186
9.2 Realism and International Politics......Page 187
Independent or Dependent Variables?......Page 188
Formal or Efficient Causes......Page 189
Deterrence Rationality......Page 192
Historical Perspective......Page 194
9.5 Conclusion......Page 198
10.1 Introduction......Page 205
10.2 Minimum Deterrence: The Larger Context......Page 206
10.3 Alternative Nuclear Futures and Minimum Deterrence......Page 208
Measuring Minimum Deterrence......Page 211
10.5 Conclusion......Page 218
Chapter 11: Conclusion......Page 222
Appendix: Cold War and Present Requirements for US Nuclear C3 System......Page 233
Bibliography......Page 240
Index......Page 258
