This book examines the political evolution of the judiciary – a usually overlooked political actor – and its capacity to contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Latin America during the 1990s. Calleros analyzes twelve countries in order to assess the independence, impartiality, political strength and efficiency of the judicial branch. The picture that emerges – with the one exception of Costa Rica – is the persistence of weak judicial systems, unable in practice to check other branches of government, including the executive and the military, while not quite effective in fully protecting human rights or in implementing due process of law guarantees. Aggravating issues, such as corruption, heavy case backlogs, overcrowding of prisons, circumvention of laws and personal vulnerability of judges, make the judiciary the least evolved of the three branches of government in the Latin American transitions to democracy.
Author(s): Juan Carlos Calleros-Alarcón
Edition: 1
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 242
Book Cover......Page 1
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Figures......Page 11
Tables......Page 13
Abbreviations......Page 15
Acknowledgments......Page 17
Introduction......Page 19
1 Democracy and the Rule of Law: A Theoretical Framework......Page 27
2 The (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A Weak Arena of Democratic Consolidation......Page 50
3 Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Towards More Independent, Efficient and Impartial Judiciaries in the Region......Page 66
4 Assessing Judicial Independence in Latin America During the 1990s......Page 87
5 The Judiciary’s Capacity to Check the Executive in Latin America During the 1990s......Page 105
6 The Judiciary’s Capacity to Bring the Military to Account in Latin America......Page 132
7 Judicial Systems’ Ability to Protect Human Rights in the New Democracies of Latin America......Page 154
8 Corruption, Inefficiency and Violence in Latin American Court Systems......Page 177
9 Conclusions......Page 198
Appendix 1......Page 207
Appendix 2......Page 211
Notes......Page 213
Bibliography......Page 231
Index......Page 243
