A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
Author(s): Thomas C. Schelling
Edition: Paperback
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Year: 1980
Language: English
Pages: 328
Tags: Game Theory; Strategy; Theory of conflict; Bargaining; Political game theory
Part I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
- 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
- 2. An Essay on Bargaining
- 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War
Part II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
- 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
- 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
- 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research
Part III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient
- 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
- 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
Part IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust
- 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
- 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament
Appendices
- A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
- B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
- C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games
Index
