The idea that humans are by nature social and political animals can be traced back to Aristotle. More recently, it has also generated great interest and controversy in related disciplines such as anthropology, biology, psychology, neuroscience and even economics. What is it about humans that enabled them to construct a social reality of unrivalled complexity? Is there something distinctive about the human mind that explains how social lives are organised around conventions, norms, and institutions?
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind is an outstanding reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. An international team of contributors present perspectives from diverse areas of research in philosophy, drawing on comparative and developmental psychology, evolutionary anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioural economics. The thirty-two original chapters are divided into five parts:
The evolution of the social mind: including the social intelligence hypothesis, co- evolution of culture and cognition, ethnic cognition, and cooperation;
Developmental and comparative perspectives: including primate and infant understanding of mind, shared intentionality, and moral cognition;
Mechanisms of the moral mind: including norm compliance, social emotion, and implicit attitudes;
Naturalistic approaches to shared and collective intentionality: including joint action, team reasoning and group thinking, and social kinds;
Social forms of selfhood and mindedness: including moral identity, empathy and shared emotion, normativity and intentionality.
Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind is also suitable for those in related disciplines such as social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, economics and sociology.
Author(s): Julian Kiverstein
Series: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2016
Language: English
Pages: 590
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Notes on contributors
Acknowledgements
Introduction: sociality and the human mind
Part I The evolution of the social mind
1 The (r)evolution of primate cognition: does the social intelligence hypothesis lead us around in anthropocentric circles?
2 Pedagogy and social learning in human development
3 Cultural evolution and the mind
4 Embodying culture: integrated cognitive systems and cultural evolution
5 The evolution of tribalism
6 Personhood and humanhood: an evolutionary scenario
Part II Developmental and comparative perspectives
7 Pluralistic folk psychology in humans and other apes
8 The development of individual and shared intentionality
9 False-belief understanding in the first years of life
10 Cross-cultural considerations in social cognition
11 The social formation of human minds
12 Pluralism, interaction, and the ontogeny of social cognition
13 Sharing and fairness in development
Part III Mechanisms of the moral mind
14 Doing the right thing for the wrong reason: reputation and moral behavior
15 Is non-consequentialism a feature or a bug?
16 Emotional processing in individual and social recalibration
17 Implicit attitudes, social learning, and moral credibility
18 Social motivation in computational neuroscience: (or, if brains are prediction machines, then the Humean theory of motivation is false)
Part IV Naturalistic approaches to shared and collective intentionality
19 Joint distal intentions: who shares what?
20 Joint action: a minimalist approach
21 Commitment in joint action
22 The first-person plural perspective
23 Team reasoning: theory and evidence
24 Virtual bargaining: building the foundations for a theory of social interaction
25 Social roles and reification
Part V Social forms of selfhood and mindedness
26 Diachronic identity and the moral self
27 The embedded and extended character hypotheses
28 Mindshaping and self-interpretation
29 Vicarious experiences: perception, mirroring or imagination?
30 Phenomenology of the we: Stein, Walther, Gurwitsch
31 Social approaches to intentionality
32 Normativity
Index
