In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin.
Author(s): Ora John Reuter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2017
Language: English
Pages: 336
Cover
Half-title
Title page
Copyright information
Table of contents
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgments
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
1.2 What Are Dominant Parties?
1.3 Authoritarian Survival and the Puzzle of Dominant Party Formation
1.4 Alternative Explanations of Dominant Party Emergence
1.5 The Setting of the Argument: Leaders and Elites
1.6 The Argument in Brief
1.7 Why Russia? The Origins of United Russia
1.8 United Russia as a Dominant Party
1.9 Post-Soviet Russia and Authoritarian Institutions
1.10 Dominant Parties and the New Institutionalism
1.11 Dominant Parties and the Study of Democratization
1.12 Research Design, Methodology, and the Plan of the Book
2 A Theory of Dominant Party Formation
2.1 The Actors: Building a Theory of Dominant Party Formation
Elites, Society, and Dominant Party Formation
Elite Commitment and the Study of Political Parties
2.2 Dominant Party Formation as a Two-Sided Commitment Problem
The Leader’s Commitment Problem, Part 1: Benefits of Cooperating with Elites
Ensuring Loyalty to the Regime
Controlling Legislatures and Making Policy
Generating Regime Support and Winning Elections
Coordinating Pro-regime Candidates during Elections
Routinization of Political Appointment Processes
The Leader’s Commitment Problem, Part 2: Costs of Cooperation and Incentives to Renege
The Elites’ Commitment Problem, Part 1: Benefits of Reaching an Agreement with Leaders
Dependable Career Advancement
Securing Dependable Access to Spoils and Policy Influence
Reducing Transaction Costs
The Elites’ Commitment Problem, Part 2: Costs of Cooperation and Incentives to Renege
Summing Up: A Two-Sided Commitment Problem
2.3 Overcoming the Commitment Problem
Part 1: Dominant Party Institutions
Dominant Parties and the Leader’s Credible Commitments
Dominant Parties and Elite Credible Commitments
Summary
Overcoming the Commitment Problem, Part 2: Changes in the Balance...
Explaining Variation in the Emergence of Dominant Parties: The Limitations of Institutional Explanations
Reducing the Severity of the Leader’s Commitment Problem
Reducing the Severity of the Elite’s Commitment Problem
Balanced Resources: Maximizing the Likelihood of a Dominant Party
Theory and Practice: Institutional Evolution in Nascent Dominant Party Systems
3 False Starts
3.1 The Absence of a Ruling Party in the First Russian Republic: 1990–1993
Summary: The First Russian Republic
3.2 Russia’s Choice: The Failure of Russia’s First Party of Power
Why Yeltsin Failed to Invest in Russia’s Choice
Why Elites Failed to Invest in Russia’s Choice
Summary: The Failure of Russia’s Choice
3.3 Our Home Is Russia: Russia’s Second Failed Party of Power
The Immediate Causes of Our Home’s Failure: Presidential and Regional Neglect
National Elites and Our Home Is Russia
Regional Elites and Our Home Is Russia
The Kremlin and Our Home Is Russia
Why Yeltsin Did Not Invest in Our Home
Why Elites Did Not Invest in Our Home Is Russia
Kremlin Signals and Elites’ Reluctance to Invest in Our Home
3.4 Conclusion
4 The Emergence of a Dominant Party in Russia
4.1 Initial Failures: The Story of Unity, 1999–2001
From Our Home Is Russia to Unity
The Kremlin and Unity
Elites and Unity
Why Elites Were Hesitant to Invest in Unity
Why the Kremlin Was Hesitant to Invest in Unity
Summary
4.2 The Formation of a Dominant Party in Post-Soviet Russia: The Story of United Russia, 2001–2010
The Kremlin and United Russia
Elites and United Russia
4.3 Conclusion
5 United Russia as the Dominant Party
5.1 United Russia’s Role: Benefits to Elites
Access to Policy and Spoils
Reducing Uncertainty and Securing Dependable Career Advancement Opportunities
Electoral Benefits
5.2 United Russia’s Role: Benefits to the Kremlin
Ensuring Elite Loyalty and Controlling Legislatures
Winning Elections and Mobilizing Popular Support
5.3 Commitment Problems and United Russia
Russia’s Leaders and United Russia
Elite Commitments and United Russia
5.4 Conclusion
6 United Russia and Russia’s Governors
6.1 Individual Elites, Dominant Party Affiliation, and Russia’s Governors
6.2 Alternative Explanations
6.3 The Dependent Variable: Governors’ Decisions to Join UR
6.4 Independent Variables: The Governors’ Resources
Inherited Political Resources
Economic Resources
Ethnic Resources
Geographic and Administrative Resources
Controls
Statistical Method
6.5 Results
Robustness Checks
6.6 Conclusion
7 Economic Elites and Dominant Party Affiliation
7.1 The Dependent Variable: Regional Legislators
7.2 Resource Ownership and United Russia Faction Membership
7.3 Models and Results
7.4 Discussion and Conclusion
8 Dominant Party Emergence around the World
8.1 Dependent Variable
8.2 Independent Variables
8.3 Modeling Strategy
8.4 Results
8.5 Discussion and Conclusion
9 Conclusion
9.1 Summary
9.2 A New Era? United Russia after the 2011–2012 Elections
9.3 Dominant Parties and Regime Breakdown
9.4 Implications for Russian Politics
References
Index
