The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. Hossack provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. He also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of a content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, Hossack argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the "I"-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The Metaphysics of Knowledge concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.
Author(s): Keith Hossack
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 256
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Acknowledgements......Page 18
1 ‘S knows that A’......Page 20
1.1 Is Knowledge a Propositional Attitude?......Page 22
1.2 Knowledge is a Relation Between a Mind and a Fact......Page 26
1.3 Knowledge and Mental States......Page 29
1.4 Epistemic Faculties......Page 32
1.5 Defeaters......Page 37
1.6 Reliability......Page 41
1.7 Epistemic Priority......Page 45
1.8 Conclusion......Page 49
2 Facts......Page 51
2.1 Resemblance......Page 53
2.2 Combination......Page 64
2.3 Vector Logic......Page 66
2.4 The Problem of Sense and ‘Nonsense’......Page 74
2.5 Propositions and States of Affairs......Page 78
2.6 Negation......Page 81
2.7 Complex Facts......Page 87
2.8 ‘Variables Explained Away’......Page 92
2.9 The Adequacy Condition......Page 97
Appendix: Adequacy of the Semantics......Page 110
3 Concept and Content......Page 119
3.1 Mental Acts......Page 120
3.2 Apprehending a Fact......Page 124
3.3 Content......Page 126
3.4 Concepts......Page 130
3.5 Reference......Page 133
3.6 Epistemology of Definitions......Page 136
3.7 Thought and Language......Page 141
4 Necessity......Page 144
4.1 The A Priori......Page 146
4.2 The Strongest Modal Logic Consistent with Rationalism is S4......Page 150
4.3 Cartesian Counterexamples to the Rationalist Thesis......Page 156
4.4 Mathematical Counterexamples......Page 157
4.5 Identity Statement Counterexamples......Page 160
4.6 Descriptive Name Counterexamples......Page 167
4.7 Counterexamples with ‘Actually’......Page 175
4.8 Possible Worlds Discourse with Only One World......Page 180
5 Consciousness......Page 188
5.1 Self-knowledge by Consciousness......Page 189
5.2 What is Consciousness?......Page 194
5.3 The Problem of Qualia......Page 196
5.4 The Necessity of Co-occurrence......Page 199
5.5 The Identity Thesis......Page 200
5.6 Advantages of the Identity Thesis......Page 207
5.7 Are Functionalism and the Identity Thesis Compatible?......Page 210
6 Persons......Page 213
6.1 Unclarity of Personal Identity......Page 215
6.2 ‘I’—The ‘Essential’ Indexical......Page 219
6.3 How Do I Know I Exist?......Page 221
6.4 Beyond Solipsism of the Present Moment......Page 224
6.5 The Solipsist as Rational Agent......Page 226
6.6 A Functionalist Conception of Human Beings......Page 227
6.7 Other Minds Theory......Page 228
6.8 Is Personal Identity Indefinite?......Page 230
6.9 Conclusion......Page 232
Appendix: A Lichtenbergian Reconstruction of the Bafflement Argument......Page 233
7 Language......Page 235
7.1 Grammar......Page 237
7.2 Reading......Page 243
7.3 The Inferential Model of Testimony......Page 251
7.4 The Faculty Model of Testimony......Page 260
7.5 The Analogy Between Testimony and Perception......Page 262
7.6 Is Use a Regularity of Truthfulness and Trust?......Page 267
7.7 Use as a Regularity of Testifying—The Frequency Analysis......Page 269
7.8 Use as the Design End of an Artefact......Page 272
8 The Constitutive Thesis and the Causal Thesis......Page 277
8.1 Functionalism and the Faculty Theory......Page 279
8.2 Type Identity Versions of the Constitutive Thesis......Page 286
8.3 The Argument for the Constitutive Thesis from Functionalism......Page 294
8.4 A Completeness Argument from Physics......Page 298
8.5 An Inductive Argument Against the Constitutive Thesis......Page 310
Bibliography......Page 317
C......Page 324
I......Page 325
N......Page 326
T......Page 327
W......Page 328
