By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war.
Author(s): Stathis N. Kalyvas
Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2006
Language: English
Pages: 508
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 11
Tables and Figures......Page 14
Acknowledgments......Page 17
Abbreviations......Page 19
The Logic of Violence in Civil War......Page 21
1.1. four puzzles......Page 23
1.2. goals......Page 27
1.3. road map......Page 29
1.4. a note on the history of the project......Page 36
1.1. civil war......Page 38
1.2. violence......Page 41
1.2.1. Violence, Conflict, War......Page 42
1.2.2. Violence as an Outcome and as a Process......Page 43
1.2.3. Violence in Peace and in War......Page 44
1.3.1. The Aims of Violence......Page 45
1.3.2. The Production of Violence......Page 50
1.4. conclusion......Page 53
2.1. madness and "bloodless convention"......Page 54
2.2. partisan bias......Page 57
2.4. urban bias......Page 60
2.6. overaggregation bias and data problems......Page 70
2.7. conclusion......Page 73
3.1. barbarism and civil war......Page 74
3.2.1. Brutalization......Page 77
3.2.2. Revenge......Page 80
3.2.4. Medievalization......Page 83
3.3. transgression......Page 84
3.4. polarization......Page 86
3.5. the technology of warfare......Page 88
3.5.2. Irregular War as "Medieval" War......Page 90
3.5.3. Security......Page 91
3.6.1. Breakdown......Page 92
3.6.2. Transgression......Page 95
3.6.3. Polarization......Page 96
3.6.3.1. Inference Biases......Page 98
3.6.3.2. Endogenous Polarization......Page 99
3.6.3.3. Endogenous Violence......Page 104
3.6.4. The Technology of Warfare......Page 105
3.7. conclusion......Page 107
4.1. sovereignty in civil war......Page 109
4.2. the identification problem......Page 111
4.3. support......Page 113
4.4. forms of collaboration and defection......Page 126
4.5. the institutional setting of collaboration......Page 128
4.5.1. Militias......Page 129
4.5.2. Committees......Page 131
4.6. conclusion......Page 132
5.1. the allocation of collaboration......Page 133
5.2. survival......Page 138
5.3. how control shapes collaboration......Page 140
5.4. causal paths from control to collaboration......Page 146
5.5. the distribution of control......Page 154
5.6. constraints on military options......Page 160
5.7. violence and discrimination......Page 163
5.8. conclusion......Page 167
6 A Logic of Indiscriminate Violence......Page 168
6.1. the incidence of indiscriminate violence......Page 169
6.2. information and indiscriminate violence......Page 170
6.3. deterrence and indiscriminate violence......Page 171
6.4. counterproductive effects of indiscriminate violence......Page 173
6.4.1. Emotional Reactions and Norms of Fairness......Page 175
6.4.2. Ambiguous Structure of Incentives......Page 176
6.4.3. Reverse Discrimination......Page 178
6.4.4. Selective Incentives for Rivals......Page 179
6.4.5. Overestimating the Strength of Ties between Political Actors and Civilians......Page 180
6.5. why does indiscriminate violence occur?......Page 182
6.5.1. Artifact......Page 183
6.5.2. Ignorance......Page 184
6.5.4. Institutional Distortions......Page 187
6.6. accounting for the puzzle......Page 189
6.7. conclusion......Page 193
7 A Theory of Selective Violence......Page 195
7.1. information......Page 196
7.2. denunciation......Page 198
7.3. denunciation in ethnic civil wars......Page 203
7.4. is selective violence possible?......Page 205
7.5. a political economy of denunciation......Page 214
7.6. a model of selective violence in civil war......Page 217
7.6.1. Defection......Page 218
7.6.2. Denunciation......Page 219
7.6.3. Violence......Page 224
7.7. caveats......Page 229
7.8. conclusion......Page 231
8.1. measuring control......Page 232
8.2. how control shifts......Page 235
8.3. full control (zones 1 and 5)......Page 240
8.3.1. Violence under Full Control......Page 242
8.4. no control (zones 1 and 5)......Page 244
8.4.1. Violence under No Control......Page 245
8.5. contestation (zones 2, 3, and 4)......Page 246
8.5.1. Violence under Dominant Control (Zones 2 and 4)......Page 254
8.5.2. Violence under Parity (Zone 3)......Page 262
8.6. conclusion......Page 265
9 Empirics II......Page 268
9.1. research design......Page 269
9.2. the greek civil war......Page 270
9.3. the argolid: political, social, and economic background......Page 271
9.4. the civil war in the argolid......Page 276
9.4.1. From September 1943 to 15 May 1944 (t1)......Page 279
9.4.2. From 15 May to 31 June 1944 (t2)......Page 283
9.4.4. From 26 July to 5 October 1944 (t4)......Page 286
9.5. after the end of the occupation......Page 287
9.6. violence: descriptive statistics......Page 288
9.7. control: descriptive statistics......Page 297
9.8. quantitative evidence......Page 300
9.9. qualitative evidence......Page 312
9.9.1. Zone 5......Page 313
9.9.2. Zone 4......Page 314
9.9.3. Zone 3......Page 315
9.9.4. Zone 2......Page 319
9.10. return to manesi and gerbesi......Page 321
9.11. mispredictions......Page 324
9.11.1. Atypical Violence I (Zone 3, t1)......Page 325
9.11.3. Atypical Nonviolence (Zone 2, t2)......Page 326
9.11.4. Wrong Actors......Page 329
9.12. a replication: almopia......Page 332
9.13. out-of-sample tests in greece......Page 336
9.13.1. The Near East Foundation Study......Page 340
9.13.2. McNeill Study......Page 342
9.13.3. Ethnographies and Local Histories......Page 345
9.14. conclusion......Page 350
10 Intimacy......Page 352
10.1. intimate violence......Page 355
10.2. why denounce? a sociology of denunciation......Page 358
10.3.1. "Classic" Civil Wars......Page 365
10.3.3. Civil War during Occupation......Page 366
10.3.5. "Ethnic Conflict"......Page 367
10.3.6. Motives......Page 368
10.4. the dark face of social capital: the social basis of malicious denunciation......Page 373
10.4.1 Symmetry......Page 374
10.4.2 Concentration......Page 377
10.5. varying the institutional setting of denunciation......Page 380
10.6. conclusion......Page 384
11 Cleavage and Agency......Page 386
11.1. center and periphery......Page 387
11.2. kto kovo? the locus of agency......Page 398
11.3. alliance......Page 403
11.4. conclusion......Page 408
Conclusion......Page 410
a.1. archives......Page 415
a.2. oral sources......Page 417
A.2.1. Time......Page 425
A.2.2. Bias......Page 427
A.2.3. Memory......Page 430
a.3. memoirs, autobiographies, local histories......Page 432
b.1. villages......Page 434
b.2. civilians......Page 437
b.3. homicides......Page 441
b.4. type of violence......Page 442
b.5. control......Page 443
Appendix C: Timeline of Conflicts......Page 445
1.1 Archives......Page 449
2.1 General......Page 450
2.2 Local Studies and Local Memoirs......Page 452
2.3 North Peloponnese (Including the Argolid)......Page 455
3 General Secondary Sources......Page 456
Index......Page 501
