The Logic of Theory Change: Workshop, Konstanz, FRG, October 13–15, 1989 Proceedings

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The logic of theory change, or the theory of belief revision, is a growing area of research in artificial intelligence. The papers in this volume, mostly arising from a workshop held in Konstanz in October 1989, chart out the current state of research in this area and indicate the directions of future research. Connections to other areas of AI research are emphasized throughout the book. All the contributions are original research papers and most of them are self-contained, so that the collection will be of interest not only to researchers but also to all those who seek an introduction to the state of the art in this area. The fourteen contributions are organized into five sections: - Foundations - Models of theory change - The Ramsey test for conditionals - Theory change and nonmonotonic reasoning - Reformulations and extensions.

Author(s): Risto Hilpinen (auth.), André Fuhrmann, Michael Morreau (eds.)
Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 465
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year: 1991

Language: English
Pages: 340
Tags: Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); Models and Principles

Inquiry, argumentation and knowledge....Pages 1-18
Rational control of reasoning in artificial intelligence....Pages 19-48
Computational issues in belief revision....Pages 49-71
Some results on theory revision....Pages 72-92
Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision....Pages 93-126
The negative Ramsey test: Another triviality result....Pages 127-134
A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision....Pages 135-181
Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic....Pages 183-205
Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning....Pages 206-222
Preferential cumulative reasoning and nonmonotonic semantic nets....Pages 223-240
Propositional logic based on the dynamics of disbelief....Pages 241-258
On the modal logic of theory change....Pages 259-281
Discourse representation theory and belief dynamics....Pages 282-321
Multiple contraction a further case against gärdenfors' principle of recovery....Pages 322-334