Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America’s Longest War examines the lessons of how America’s “longest war” came to an ignominious end with staggering consequences for the United States and the Afghan nation. Afghanistan today faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, looming threat of a civil war and a resurgence of violent extremism organizations similar to pre-9/11. As the U.S. enters a new era in the strategic geopolitical Great Power Competition, an analysis of the original mission intent, shifting policy and strategic objectives, and ineffective implementation of security, political and economic programs reveal critical lessons and questions such as: What led to the “strategic failure” of the U.S. in Afghanistan? What decisions resulted in the present-day humanitarian, civil, and political crises in Afghanistan? Were these consequences in fact avoidable? Was there an alternative approach that could have maintained the hard-fought gains of the last two decades, and better demonstrated America's standing as a defender of global human rights?
Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: America’s Longest War further explores lessons of the past negotiations between the United States, Taliban, and former U.S. backed Afghan government to suggest alternative pathways that honor the original intent of the mission and meet present-day obligations to an Afghan nation in crisis.
Author(s): Adib Farhadi, Anthony Masys
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 465
City: Cham
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Editors
Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The Heavy Price of Treating Long-Term Strategic Issues with Short-Term Tactical Approaches
1 Introduction
2 Missed Opportunities: A Failure to Capitalize on Afghanistan’s Vast Natural Resources
3 A Devastating Misstep: A Failure to Win Hearts and Minds
4 A “Strategic” Way Forward
References
A Problem We Fueled: Learning Lessons from Corruption in Afghanistan
1 Understanding Corruption and Why It Persists
1.1 Foreign Interventions
2 Corruption and Anticorruption in Afghanistan, 2001–21
2.1 On Afghan Society and Politics
2.2 Influx of Money Amid Weak Controls
2.3 Corruption and Violence
2.4 Elections: Missed opportunities for legitimacy and accountability
3 U.S. and Afghan Anticorruption Efforts
3.1 The Surge Years
3.2 Declining Attention and the Ghani Years
4 Afghan Perceptions
5 Conclusion and Lessons
References
How America’s Great Power Competitors Privatized the GPC
1 Who is in Charge of the US DIME Elements?
1.1 Diplomacy
1.2 Information
1.3 Military
1.4 Economic
2 Russian and Chinese Use of DIME
3 Case Studies
3.1 The Wagner Group (Russia)
3.2 Frontier Services Group (China)
3.3 United Front Work Department (China)
4 Conclusion
5 Summary of the Problem and the Solution
References
Organizing US: Regime Theory for Integrated Statecraft
1 Introduction
2 Complexity Science and Interventions
2.1 “Stability” Through a Complexity Lens
2.2 The Topology of the System of Local Conditions
2.3 Evolutionary Governance, Development, and Legitimacy
3 Anarchy and Regime Theory for Statecraft
3.1 Reasons for the Condition
4 Why Regimes?
4.1 Why Integrated Statecraft Regimes for Strategic Competition?
5 Universities as Regimes for Wicked Problems
6 Conclusion
References
A Cyber Solarium Commission Approach to Cyber Security Cooperation
1 SC Explained
2 Using SC and SA Programs to Support Cyber Initiatives
3 Making Cyber Initiatives a Reality
4 Understanding the Risks
5 Conclusion
References
Putting the Afghan Puzzle Together: Afghan and U.S. Perspectives on Legitimacy
1 Theories of Legitimacy
2 Justice as a Case Study, and the Small but Important Missing Piece: Predictability
3 Bias in Building Legitimacy
4 The Afghan Perspective: The Puzzle Pieces
5 Implications for Legitimacy: How Those Puzzle Pieces Fit Together
6 America’s Reference Image for the Puzzle and Perspective on Legitimacy
7 Implications for the American Conception of Legitimacy
8 Conclusion: Putting the Puzzle Together
References
The Taliban’s Exploitation of Afghan Information and Information Systems
1 Introduction
2 Communications Technology: Opportunities for Collective Action
3 Information Convenience Over Information Security
4 Mobilization
5 Recruiting
6 Internal Influence
7 External Influence
8 Lessons Learned
9 Conclusion
References
500 Men: An Alternate Approach to America’s War in Afghanistan
1 Introduction
2 Prologue
3 What Really Happened: How Coalition Forces Planned and Executed the War
4 The Real World Results
5 The Light Footprint Approach: Definition, Applicability, Strengths, and Limitations
6 The Hypothetical Results
7 Conclusion
References
Reflections on the Fateful Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
1 Historical Background
2 Political Context of Building State Institutions in Afghanistan
2.1 A National Institution or an Attachment to Outside Partners?
3 The Dynamics of Civil-Military Leadership
4 Monumental Shifts in Political-Strategic Context—Beginning of the End
5 The Outlook
References
Restoring and Relinquishing Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Fundamental but Fragile Gains
1 Historical Background
2 Restoration of Women’s Rights: 2001–2021
3 The Victim Archetype as a Wartime Motif
4 Novel Approaches to Gender Based Violence: EVAW, Special Prosecution Units, and Women’s Shelters
5 Special Prosecution Units
6 Women’s Shelters
7 The Outlook
References
Was There Ever a Plausible Effort for “Peace Negotiations” in Afghanistan and What Went Wrong with the United States’ Approach to Afghanistan
1 Introduction
2 Ideology and Domestic Policies Under Its Rule
3 Analysis
4 What Went Wrong in Afghanistan and What Are Their Implications
5 The Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan
6 What Went Wrong?
7 Conclusion
References
The Afghan Evacuation: A Case Study, Observations and Ethical Strategies Going Forward
1 Introduction: A Human Perspective
2 Catastrophic Failure, Metrics for Success
3 The Upstream Fundamentals: Political Unwillingness, Lack of Planning, Disregarding Expertise
4 The Observed Components: Myriad of Operational Constraints, Lack of Resources, Ad Hoc Evacuation
4.1 Component 1: Time
4.2 Component 2: Partner and Host Countries
4.3 Component 3: Points of Egress
4.4 Component 4: Civilian Aircraft, Limited Aviation Infrastructure
4.5 Component 5: Civil Society, Privately Funded Evacuation Efforts
4.6 Component 6: Funding, Data Intake and Management
4.7 Component 7: Communication, State Department and USCIS Understaffing
5 The Downstream Results: Visibility, Harm to US Reputation, Vulnerability of Afghan Allies
5.1 Global Credibility, Realpolitik, Hearts and Minds
5.2 Public Service and Moral Injury
5.3 Past and Future Evacuation Events
6 Solving the Crisis: How to Build and Operationalize an Ethical Evacuation Strategy
7 Generating Solutions, Data-Driven Strategy, Political Will
7.1 Step 1: Expend Political Will, Recruit Partner and Host Countries
7.2 Step 2: Match Host Countries with Category-Specific Afghans
7.3 Step 3: Develop Specific Pipelines with Maximum Points of Egress from Quick Transit Countries to Host Countries, Activate Civil Reserve Air Fleet
7.4 Step 4: Convene Joint Task Forces to Execute
8 Summary
9 Recommendations
10 Addenda: No One Left Behind’s Permanent SIV Program Recommendation
References
Mission Creep on Repeat: Deconstructing U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
1 14 Days in August: A Microcosm of Nearly 20 Years in Afghanistan
2 Defining a Successful War Strategy: Theoretical and Doctrinal Roots
3 US Strategy in Afghanistan: A Muddle and a Mismatch
3.1 In Search of Consistency
3.2 Too Many Discrepancies
3.3 From the Horse’s Mouth
4 What Accounted for Strategic Failure?
4.1 Absence of Sustained Policy Focus
4.2 Lack of Consensus at the Top
4.3 An Unwillingness to Hear Bad News
4.4 Lack of Public Accountability
5 How Strategy Failures Undermined Core U.S. Goals
5.1 Botched Development Efforts
5.2 Counterinsurgency Failures
5.3 Counterterrorism Struggles
6 Lessons Learned
7 Conclusion
References
Afghanistan: A Case Study in Self-defeat
A Comparative Study on Iraq and Afghanistan: Two Nations, Similar Journeys, Different Destinations
1 Introduction
2 The Big Struggle: Nation-Building
3 Two Nation; Various Forces of Insurgency but Similar Modus Operandi
4 Different Predators, Different Targets, but Similar Target Selection
5 Two Attempts to Return, One Failed, the Other Succeeded, but Why?
5.1 Foreign Factors
5.2 Domestic Actors
6 Conclusion
References
Fratricide: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan
1 Introduction
2 Fratricide Overview
3 Actor Network Theory Overview
4 Case Studies
5 Discussion
6 Fratricide Case Study Description
7 Analysis: Fratricide Causes/Insights
8 Conclusion
References
The Spiritual Dimension of Moral Injury and PTSD
1 Introduction
2 PTSD: Definition and History
3 Moral Injury: Definition and History
3.1 Something Done by a Soldier
3.2 Something Not Done by a Soldier
3.3 Something Done to a Soldier
3.4 Something Witnessed by a Soldier
4 The Need to Distinguish PTSD and MI
5 Toward a Better Understanding of the Spiritual Dimension of MI and Its Association with Heightened PTSD Symptoms
5.1 The Need to Emphasize the Spiritual Dimension of Soldiers
5.2 The Need to Acknowledge the Spiritual Implications of MI and PMIEs
5.3 How to Alleviate Comorbid Cases of MI and PTSD Holistically
6 Suggestions for Future MI and PTSD Prevention
6.1 Preparing for Emotional Battles
7 Conclusion
References
Afghan Exit Punctuates a Pattern of Broken Promises and Instability in American Foreign Policy
1 Introduction
2 Methodology
3 Case Studies
4 U.S. Economic and Military Exit from Afghanistan
5 The Rise and Fall of U.S. New Silk Road
6 Decision-Making Models
7 U.S. Military Exit from Afghanistan
8 Iraq
9 Lessons Learned
10 Iran
10.1 Impact of Trump’s Exit from Nuclear Agreement
10.2 Betraying US Friends and Allies
11 Conclusion
References
Once and Future Great Power Competition in Afghanistan: An Interpretive History
References
Science of Decision-Making Related to Afghanistan and the CASA Region
1 Brief Synopsis
2 Foundations in Decision-Making
3 Traditional Planning Process
4 Foreign Policy
5 Planning Versus Strategy
6 Maintaining Strategic Consistency
7 Boyd Cycle
8 Decision Model
9 Decision Factors
9.1 Personal Factors
9.2 Motivation Factors
9.3 Preferences
9.4 Physical Cognitive Processes
10 External Factors
10.1 Situational Factors
10.2 Nature of the Decision
10.3 External Pressures
10.4 Temporal Factors
10.5 Influence from Time Constraints to Make Decisions
10.6 Potential Impacts (Positive or Negative Results from Decision)
10.7 Decision Making Model Summary
References
The 2021 Collapse: Lessons Learned from a Century of Upheavals and Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy Vortex
1 An Exceptional Case
2 Afghan Foreign Policy 1893–1978: From Isolation to Independence
3 The Unraveling Between 1978–2001
4 The Western Intervention 2001–2021
4.1 The External Pillar
4.2 The Internal Pillar
5 The Reconstruction Bonanza
5.1 The Regional Balancing Act
6 Centralization Versus Decentralization
7 The Peacebuilding Conundrum
8 Conclusion
References
Learning from Afghanistan and Beyond: Recent Developments in Operation Assessment
1 Introduction
2 Operation Assessment and the Failure Cycle
3 Breaking the Failure Cycle of Operation Assessment: An Assessment
3.1 Lack of Advocacy
3.2 Poor Doctrine
4 Inadequate Training
4.1 Poor Processes and Products
5 Commander Disinterest
6 Lessons Learned
6.1 Positive Lessons
6.2 Negative Lessons
7 Conclusion
References
