This book answers why anti-trade forces in developing countries sometimes fail to effectively exert pressure on their governments. The backlash against globalization spread across several Latin American countries in the 2000s, yet a few countries such as Peru doubled down on their bets on free trade by signing bilateral agreements with the US and the EU. This study uses evidence from three Latin American countries (Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia) to suggest that geography can play a significant role in shaping trade preferences and undermining the formation and clout of distributional coalitions that seek protectionism. Because trade liberalization can have uneven distributional impacts along regional lines, trade liberalization losers can find themselves in unfavorable conditions to associate and engage in collective action. Under these circumstances, few coalitions emerge to battle for protection in the policy arena, and when they do, geographic distance from decision-makers in the capital city can be a significant barrier to realizing their interests. As a result, even where a majority of the population living in regions that have not benefitted from trade elect a leftist president, trade reform reversal will not occur unless protectionist interests are close to the capital city. The contrast between Peru, on one side, and Argentina and Bolivia, on the other, highlights the powerful influence geography can have on reversing trade policy or preserving the status quo.
Author(s): Omar Awapara
Series: Latin American Political Economy
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 255
City: Cham
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Argument in Brief
Key Concepts—Free Trade and Protectionism
Theoretical Relevance
Research Design
References
2 A Geography-Based Theory of Trade Policy
Globalization and Trade Preferences in Commodity-Rich Countries: A Regional Perspective
The Case for Trade Liberalization in Latin America
The Insufficiency of Labor Market and Consumer-Oriented Theories
The Regional Impact of Trade Reform in Commodity-Rich Countries
The Problem with Alternative Geography-Based Approaches
How Anti-trade Preferences Aggregate into Social Mobilizations
The Initial Impact of Trade Liberalization on Societal Forces
The Argument—New Vehicles for Experienced Actors
Experienced Actors in More Industrialized Countries
Experienced Actors in Less Industrialized Countries
The Geographical Limits to Interest Representation
How the Strategic Setting Affects Interest Representation
Silent (Electoral) Majorities and Vocal (Mobilized) Minorities—What It Takes to Unravel Trade Reform
The Electoral Geography of the Left Turn
The Distance Factor: How Proximity Enforces Mandates
Summary
References
3 The Regional Impact of Free Trade: An Empirical Analysis
Data and Measurement
Peru
From Asparagus to Zinc—The Varying Effects of Commodities on Trade Preferences in Peru
Argentina
Trade Preferences and Commodities in Argentina: An Empirical Analysis
Bolivia
Trade Preferences and Commodities in Bolivia: An Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
References
4 Trade-Related Protests in Post-reform Latin America
Peru
Traditional Labor Unions
Domestic Agrarian Producers
Statistical Analysis
Argentina
Organizational Experience
Geographic Concentration
Statistical Analysis
Bolivia
Urban Unrest Fueled by Migration
Cocaleros in Rural Areas
Statistical Analysis
Conclusion
References
5 Geography and Trade Reform in Latin America
Cross-Country Evidence
Peru
Regional Trade Preferences in the 2006 Election
The Fateful Remoteness of Protectionist Forces
Argentina
The Weak Mandate of the 2003 Election
The Siege of Buenos Aires—Distorting Trade to Quell Protests
Bolivia
Policy Contestation (2000–2005): Governing Behind Enemy Lines
Policy Reversal (2006–Present): Unraveling Free Trade Policies in Bolivia
Conclusion
References
6 Conclusion
The Aftermath of the Cases
Theoretical Issues and Avenues for Further Research
Reform Sustainability
State and Society in Latin America
The Political Economy of Trade and Democratic Regimes
References
Index
