This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the nonspecialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a "representation theorem" that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. In providing the most complete and robust defense of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers in philosophy, economics, psychology, mathematics, and artificial intelligence.
Author(s): James M. Joyce
Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 1999
Language: English
Pages: 284
COVER......Page 1
HALF-TITLE......Page 3
SERIES-TITLE......Page 5
TITLE......Page 7
COPYRIGHT......Page 8
DEDICATION......Page 9
CONTENTS......Page 11
PREFACE......Page 13
INTRODUCTION A CHANCE TO RECONSIDER......Page 15
1.1 PASCAL AND THE “PROBLEM OF THE POINTS”......Page 23
1.2 WAGERS, PROBABILITIES, AND EXPECTATIONS......Page 28
1.3 A SHORT DIGRESSION: AGAINST BEHAVIORISM......Page 33
1.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR PASCAL’S THESIS......Page 37
1.5 THE CRAMER/BERNOULLI THESIS......Page 46
1.6 INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AS SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION......Page 53
1.7 LIFE OUTSIDE THE CASINO......Page 60
2.1 SAVAGE’S MODEL OF DECISION PROBLEMS......Page 62
2.2 OUTCOMES......Page 66
2.3 STATES......Page 71
2.4 ACTIONS......Page 75
2.5 DECISION PROBLEMS......Page 81
2.6 “SMALL WORLDS” AND THE “GRAND WORLD”......Page 84
3 Savage’s Theory......Page 92
3.1 REPRESENTATION THEOREMS......Page 93
3.2 THE SAVAGE AXIOMS......Page 97
3.3 THE STATUS OF SAVAGE’S AXIOMS......Page 111
3.4 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL WORLDS IN SAVAGE’S THEORY......Page 124
4 Evidential Decision Theory......Page 128
4.1 THE NEED FOR EVIDENTIAL DECISION THEORY......Page 129
4.2 JEFFREY’S THEORY......Page 133
4.3 NON-UNIQUENESS......Page 136
4.4 BOLKER’S REPRESENTATION THEOREM......Page 141
5.1 NEWCOMB PROBLEMS......Page 160
5.2 RATI.CATIONISM......Page 168
5.3 CAUSAL DECISION THEORY......Page 175
5.4 SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS AND IMAGING......Page 186
5.5 A GENERAL VERSION OF CAUSAL DECISION THEORY......Page 190
6 A General Theory of Conditional Beliefs......Page 195
6.1 THE CONCEPT OF A SUPPOSITION......Page 196
6.2 SUPPOSITION AND CONDITIONALS......Page 203
6.3 INDICATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE SUPPOSITION CHARACTERIZED......Page 209
6.4 RÉYNI–POPPER MEASURES AND THE PROBLEM O F OLD EVIDENCE......Page 214
6.5 MATTER- OF- FACT SUPPOSITION AND LEARNING......Page 229
6.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THEOREM 6.1, THEOREM 6.2, AND LEMMA 6.5......Page 234
7.1 THE WORK OF GIBBARD AND ARMENDT......Page 238
7.2 A STATEMENT OF THE THEOREM......Page 243
7.3 SECTIONS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIONS......Page 247
7.4 REPRESENTATIONS OF CONDITIONAL BELIEF AND DESIRE......Page 250
7.5 CONSTRUCTING THE REPRESENTATION......Page 253
7.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS......Page 256
8.1 TWO LESSONS......Page 266
8.2 THREE AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH......Page 268
REFERENCES......Page 272
INDEX......Page 279
