The series of essays that comprise The Federalist constitutes one of the key texts of the American Revolution and the democratic system created in the wake of independence. Written in 1787 and 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the proposed Constitution, these papers stand as perhaps the most eloquent testimonial to democracy that exists. They describe the ideas behind the American system of government: the separation of powers; the organization of Congress; the respective positions of the executive, legislative, and judiciary; and much more. The Federalist remains essential reading for anyone interested in politics and government, and indeed for anyone seeking a foundational statement about democracy and America. This new edition of The Federalist is edited by Robert Scigliano, a professor in the political science department at Boston College. His substantive Introduction sheds clarifying new light on the historical context and meaning of The Federalist. Scigliano also provides a fresh and definitive analysis of the disputed authorship of several sections of this crucial work. Since 1917 The Modern Library prides itself as The modern Library of the world s Best Books . Featuring introductions by leading writers, stunning translations, scholarly endnotes and reading group guides. Production values emphasize superior quality and readability. Competitive prices, coupled with exciting cover design make these an ideal gift to be cherished by the avid reader.
Author(s): Alexander Hamilton, etc.
Publisher: Random House Inc
Year: 1999
Language: English
Pages: 688
Tags: papers; the federalist papers
COVER PAGE
Bust of Alexander Hamilton
TITLE PAGE
CONTENTS
HISTORICAL NOTICE
RESOLUTION FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION OF THE STATES
HAMILTON TO GOVERNOR CLINTON
RESOLUTIONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION
ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT
RESOLUTION FOR AN ACT BY CONGRESS RECOMMENDING THE HOLDING A CONVENTION
RESOLUTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT BY NEW YORK OF DELEGATES TO THE GENERAL CONVENTION
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
HAMILTON'S FIRST PLAN OF GOVERNMENT
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
THE FEDERALIST
I. Introduction
II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
III. The same Subject continued
IV. The same Subject continued
V. The same Subject continued
VI. Concerning Dangers from War between the States
VII. The Subject continued, and Particular Causes Enumerated
VIII. The Effects of Internal War in Producing Standing Armies,
and other Institutions unfriendly to Liberty
IX. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
X. The same Subject continued
XI. The Utility of the Union in respect to Commerce and a Navy
XII. The Utility of the Union in respect to Revenue
XIII. The same Subject continued, with a View to Economy
XIV. An Objection drawn from the Extent of Country answered
XV. Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation, in Relation to the Principle of Legislation for the States in their Collective Capacities
XVI. The same Subject, continued, in Relation to the same Principles
XVII. The Subject continued, and Illustrated by Examples, to show the Tendency of Federal Governments, rather to Anarchy among the Members, than Tyranny in the Head
XVIII. The Subject continued, with farther Examples
XIX. The Subject continued, with farther Examples
XX. The same Subject continued, with farther Examples
XXI. Further Defects of the Present Constitution
XXII. The same Subject continued and concluded
XXIII. The Necessity of a Government at least equally Energetic with the one proposed
XXIV. The Subject continued, with an Answer to an Objection concerning Standing Armies
XXV. The Subject continued, with the same View
XXVI. The Subject continued, with the same View
XXVII. The Subject continued, with the same View
XXVIII. The same Subject continued
XXIX. Concerning the Militia
XXX. Concerning Taxation
XXXI. The same Subject continued
XXXII. The same Subject continued
XXXIII. The same Subject continued
XXXIV. The same Subject continued
XXXV. The same Subject continued
XXXVI. The same Subject continued
XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties which the Convention must have experienced in the Formation of a Proper Plan
XXXVIII. The Subject continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the Plan exposed
XXXIX. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: An Objection in Respect to the Powers of the Convention examined
XL. The same Objection further examined
XLI. General View of the Powers proposed to be Vested in the Union
XLII. The same View continued
XLIII. The same View continued
XLIV. The same View continued and concluded
XLV. A further Discussion of the Supposed Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments
XLVI. The Subject of the Last Paper resumed; with an Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and State Governments
XLVII. The Meaning of the Maxim, which requires a Separation of the Departments of Power, examined and ascertained
XLVIII. The same Subject continued, with a View to the Means of giving Efficacy in Practice to that Maxim
XLIX. The same Subject continued, with the same View
L. The same Subject continued, with the same View
LI. The same Subject continued, with the same View, and concluded
LII. Concerning the House of Representatives, with a View to the Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and Time of Service of the Members
LIII. The same Subject continued, with a View of the Term of Service of the Members
LIV. The same Subject continued, with a View to the Ratio of Representation
LV. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the total Number of the Body
LVI. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the same Point
LVII. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the Supposed Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to Elevate the Few above the Many
LVIII. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the Future Augmentation of the Members
LIX. Concerning the Regulation of Elections
LX. The same Subject continued
LXI. The same Subject continued and concluded
LXII. Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, with Regard to the Qualifications of the Members; the Manner of Appointing them; the Equality of Representation; the Number of the Senators, and the Duration of their Appointments
LXIII. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard to the Duration of the Appointments of its Members
LXIV. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard to the Power of Making Treaties
LXV. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Relation to its Capacity as a Court for the Trial of Impeachments
LXVI. The same Subject continued
LXVII. Concerning the Constitution of the President: A Gross Attempt to Misrepresent this Part of the Plan detected
LXVIII. The View of the Constitution of the President continued, in Relation to the Mode of Appointment
LXIX. The same View continued, with a Comparison between the President and the King of Great Britain on the one Hand, and the Governor of New York on the other
LXX. The same View continued, in Relation to the Unity of the Executive, with an Examination of the Project of an Executive Council
LXXI. The same View continued, in Regard to the Duration of the Office
LXXII. The same View continued, in Regard to the Re-eligibility of the President
LXXIII. The same View continued, in Relation to the Provision concerning Support, and the Power of the Negative
LXXIV. The same View continued, in Relation to the Command of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning
LXXV. The same View continued, in Relation to the Power of Making Treaties
LXXVI. The same View continued, in Relation to the Appointment of the Officers of the Government
LXXVII. The View of the Constitution of the President concluded, with a further Consideration of the Power of Appointment and a Concise Examination of his Remaining Powers
LXXVIII. A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour
LXXIX. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Provisions for the Support and Responsibility of the Judges
LXXX. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Extent of its Powers
LXXXI. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Distribution of its Authority
LXXXII. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Reference to some Miscellaneous Questions
LXXXIII. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Trial by Jury
LXXXIV. Concerning several Miscellaneous Objections
LXXXV. Conclusion
COLLATED TEXTS
PHILO PUBLIUS
NUMBER I.
NUMBER II.
NUMBER III.
INDEX TO THE FEDERALIST
