Author(s): James M.; Tullock, Gordon Buchanan
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Year: 1965
Language: English
Pages: 277
Buchanan and Tulloch, The Calculus oif Consent......Page 0
Table of Contents......Page 1
Foreword, p. 7......Page 7
Preface, p. 9......Page 9
1. Introduction, p. 3......Page 3
2. The Individualistic Postulate, p. 20......Page 20
3. Politics and the Economic Nexus, p. 24......Page 24
4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice, p. 34......Page 34
5. The Organization of Human Activity, p. 41......Page 41
6. A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions, p. 56......Page 56
7. The Rule of Unanimity, p. 71......Page 71
8. The Costs of Decision-Making, p. 80......Page 80
9. The Structure of the Models, p. 94......Page 94
10. Simple Majority Voting, p. 103......Page 103
11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games, p. 114......Page 114
12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality, p. 131......Page 131
13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution, p. 145......Page 145
14. The Range and Extent of Collective Action, p. 153......Page 153
15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables, p. 161......Page 161
16. The Bicameral Legislature, p. 177......Page 177
17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule, p. 189......Page 189
18. Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency, p. 200......Page 200
19. Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution, p. 212......Page 212
20. The Politics of the Good Society, p. 221......Page 221
Appendix 1. Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy by James M. Buchanan, p. 229......Page 229
Appendix 2. Theoretical Forerunners by Gordon Tullock, p. 244......Page 244
Footnotes, p. 261......Page 261
