The Calculus of Consent:

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Author(s): Gordon Tullock, James M. Buchanan
Edition: 3
Publisher: Liberty Fund Inc.
Year: 1999

Language: English
Pages: 384

Front Matter......Page 1
Photograph of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Blacksburg, Virginia......Page 3
Title Page......Page 5
Copyright and Publishing Details......Page 6
Table of Contents, pp. vii-viii......Page 7
Foreword, pp. ix-xi......Page 9
Gordon Tullock......Page 13
Preface, pp. xv-xx......Page 15
Part One: The Conceptual Framework, p. 1......Page 21
1. Introduction, p. 3......Page 23
2. The Individualistic Postulate, p. 11......Page 31
3. Politics and the Economic Nexus, p. 16......Page 36
4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice, p. 31......Page 51
Part Two: The Realm of Social Choice, p. 41......Page 61
5. The Organization of Human Activity, p. 43......Page 63
6. A generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions, p. 63......Page 83
7. The Rule of Unanimity, p. 85......Page 105
8. The Costs of Decision-Making, p. 97......Page 117
Part Three: Analyses of Decision-Making Rules, p. 117......Page 137
9. The Structure of the Models, p. 119......Page 139
10. Simple Majority Voting, p. 132......Page 152
11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games, p. 149......Page 169
12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality, p. 172......Page 192
13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution, p. 190......Page 210
14. The Range and Extent of Collective Action, p. 200......Page 220
15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables, p. 210......Page 230
16. The Bicameral Legislature, p. 231......Page 251
17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule, p. 247......Page 267
Part Four: The Economics and the Ethics of Demorcracy, p. 263......Page 283
18. Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency, p. 265......Page 285
19. Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution, p. 282......Page 302
20. The Politics of the Good Society, p. 295......Page 315
Appendix 1. Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy, by James M. Buchanan, p. 305......Page 325
Appendix 2. Theoretical Forerunners, by Gordon Tullock, p. 326......Page 346
Name Index, p. 351......Page 371
Subject Index, p. 353......Page 373
End of the Book, p. 359......Page 379