Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities.
Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.
Author(s): Jaap Hage
Series: Law and Philosophy Library
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2005
Language: English
Pages: 343
1402035179......Page 1
CONTENTS......Page 6
INTRODUCTION......Page 15
1. Introduction......Page 21
2.1 Non-monotonicity and defeasibility......Page 22
2.2 Ontological and conceptual defeasibility......Page 23
2.3 Epistemic and justification defeasibility......Page 24
2.5 Absolute and relative justification......Page 25
2.6 Logical defeasibility......Page 28
3.1 Justification defeat and the burden of proof......Page 29
3.2 Justification defeat and the context of discovery......Page 31
3.3 The defeasibility of legal rules......Page 35
4.1 Alchourrón’s criticism of non-monotonic logic......Page 38
4.2 Soeteman on legal justification......Page 40
4.3 The nature of logic......Page 43
5. Conclusion......Page 45
1. Introduction......Page 47
2. Justification......Page 49
2.1 Acceptances......Page 50
2.2 Internal personal justification......Page 51
2.4 Broad coherentism......Page 54
3.1 Deductive support......Page 57
3.2 Coherence as constraint satisfaction......Page 59
4. A case study......Page 62
4.1 Contributive reasons......Page 63
4.2 Missing links......Page 64
4.3 Connections as elements of the theory......Page 65
4.4 Abstract reasons as elements......Page 66
5. Conclusions from the case study......Page 68
6. Integrated coherentism......Page 72
7. The relativity of justification......Page 74
8. The base of coherence......Page 76
9. Authority versus coherence?......Page 78
10. Conclusion......Page 81
1. Reason-based logic as an extension of predicate logic......Page 83
2.1 Sentences, states of affairs and facts......Page 86
2.2 Abstract states of affairs......Page 90
3.1 Kinds of reasons......Page 91
3.2 Decisive reasons......Page 92
3.4 Weighing contributive reasons......Page 93
3.5 Abstract reasons......Page 95
4. Reasoning with contributive reasons......Page 98
5.1 The representation of rules in RBL......Page 101
5.2 Rule application......Page 102
5.3 Applicability as a contributive reason to apply a rule......Page 104
5.4 Non-applicability as a contributive reason against application......Page 105
6. Reasoning with rules......Page 106
6.1 Simple rule application......Page 107
6.2 Rule conflicts......Page 108
7. Reason-based logic as a non-monotonic logic......Page 109
Appendix......Page 112
1. Right and better......Page 114
2. Qualitative comparative reasoning......Page 115
2.1 Comparing reason sets......Page 116
2.2 Degrees and probabilities......Page 117
2.3 The ‘logic’ of comparison......Page 118
2.4 Weak Transitivity......Page 120
3. Theory construction......Page 121
4. Comparing solutions for a case type......Page 123
5. Comparing goal sets......Page 125
6. Case-based reasoning as a form of comparative reasoning......Page 126
7. Qualitative comparative reasoning and legal proof......Page 132
8. Comparing sets of reasons......Page 135
9. Comparative reasoning about sets of contributive reasons......Page 140
10. Comparing alternatives......Page 142
11. Application of the formalization......Page 144
12. Related research......Page 147
1. Introduction......Page 148
2. Rules as conditionals......Page 149
3. Consistency, compatibility and constraints......Page 152
4. Rules as constraints......Page 155
5. Conditionless rules......Page 157
6. Exceptions to rules......Page 158
7. Model theory for rules......Page 160
8. Constraints......Page 162
9. Compatibility of states of affairs......Page 165
10. The consistency of rules......Page 166
11. Minimizing exceptions......Page 169
1. Introduction......Page 171
2. The command theory of norms......Page 173
3. Norms as effects of commands......Page 176
3.1 Searle's distinctions......Page 177
3.2 Constitutives, commissives, orders and obligations......Page 178
3.3 Conventional acts......Page 180
3.4 Conclusions concerning the command theory......Page 182
4.1 Linguistic evidence for the view that norms are deontic facts......Page 183
4.2 Searle on social and institutional facts......Page 185
4.3 Weinberger on the dual nature of norms......Page 186
4.4 A moderate form of idealism......Page 187
5. The correspondence theory of truth......Page 188
5.1 Criticisms of the correspondence theory......Page 189
5.2 Language-dependent entities......Page 190
5.3 The correspondence theory rehabilitated......Page 191
5.4 Ockam’s razor?......Page 192
6. Reason-based facts......Page 193
6.1 Dependent facts......Page 194
7. Deontic facts......Page 196
7.1 The gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’......Page 197
7.2 The social existence of rules......Page 198
7.3 Why the world is not inert......Page 200
7.4 Types of deontic facts......Page 203
8. Of rules......Page 204
8.1 The ontological effects of rules......Page 205
8.2 Legal rules......Page 206
8.3 The world-to-word fit of rules......Page 207
8.4 Deontic rules and commands......Page 208
8.5 The descriptive counterpart of deontic rules......Page 209
9. What is a norm?......Page 213
1. Modeling the law......Page 215
2. Two types of connections between states of affairs......Page 216
3.1 Temporary and durable states of affairs......Page 218
3.3 Modalities......Page 219
4. Events......Page 220
4.1 The effects of an event......Page 221
4.2 Supervenience of events......Page 223
5. Rules......Page 224
6. Signing a sales contract......Page 226
7. Classification......Page 228
8. Rights......Page 230
8.1 Claims......Page 231
8.2 Property rights......Page 232
9. Juridical acts......Page 234
10. Validity......Page 235
11. Juristic facts......Page 237
1. Introduction......Page 239
2. The pioneering work of Lorenzen and Lorenz......Page 240
2.1 Validity as the outcome of a winning strategy......Page 241
2.2 Dialectical characterization of logical operators......Page 242
2.3 Some characteristics of the Dialogische Logik......Page 243
3. Defeasibility and dialectics......Page 244
3.1 Battles of arguments......Page 246
3.2 Static dialectics......Page 249
3.3 Dynamic dialectics......Page 250
4.2 Dialectics as models of bounded rationality......Page 252
4.3 Dialectics as a theory of rational acceptance......Page 254
5. Truth and justification; a philosophical digression......Page 255
5.1 Habermas' consensus theory of truth......Page 256
5.2 Overcoming foundationalism......Page 257
5.3 Law as reason-based fact......Page 259
6. Gordon's Pleadings Game......Page 260
7. The procedural and rhetorical nature of the law......Page 263
8. The role of legal rules in law-establishing dialogues......Page 266
9. Reasoning about dialogue rules and dialogue moves......Page 268
10. The burden of proof and the role of the arbiter......Page 269
11. Mediating systems......Page 271
12. Concluding observations......Page 274
1. Introduction......Page 277
2. The case of the murderous spouse......Page 278
3. The law as an open system......Page 281
4. Of reasons and their logic......Page 282
4.1 Reasons......Page 283
4.2 Rules......Page 284
4.3 Principles......Page 285
5. The subsumption model of rule-based reasoning......Page 286
6.1 The first extension of the reason-based model of rule-application......Page 288
6.2 The second and third extension to the reason-based model of rule-application......Page 290
7. The two-layer model of the law......Page 291
8. The reason-based model of rule application and the open nature of the law......Page 293
9. The reason-based model of case-based reasoning......Page 296
10. Comparing case-based and rule-based reasoning......Page 300
11. The case of the murderous spouse revisited......Page 302
12. The possible and the actual......Page 305
13. Conclusion......Page 306
BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 308
B......Page 330
C......Page 331
F......Page 332
J......Page 333
M......Page 334
P......Page 335
R......Page 336
S......Page 337
W......Page 338
Z......Page 339
