One of three volumes in honour of the teaching and scholarship of the late Michael I. Handel, this book details the universal logic of strategy and the ability of liberal-democratic governments to address this logic rationally.Treating war as an extension of politics, the diverse contributors (drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel) explore the difficulties in matching strategy to policy, especially in free societies.
Author(s): Bradford Lee
Edition: 1
Year: 2003
Language: English
Pages: 288
Book Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 2
Title......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgements......Page 9
Notes on Contributors......Page 11
Introduction......Page 14
PART I: STRATEGIC LOGIC......Page 38
1 Strategy in War and Sports: A Comparison......Page 39
Battles and Broader Objectives......Page 40
Fundamentals of Strategy......Page 42
The Emotional Demands of War and Sport......Page 44
NOTES......Page 46
2 What is a Military Lesson?......Page 48
Extracting Military Lessons......Page 51
Fallacies and Receptivity: Linear Projection......Page 55
Fallacies and Receptivity: The Significant Exception......Page 59
Ex Post Facto Lessons......Page 61
NOTES......Page 63
Introduction......Page 69
Power: Resources, Outcomes and Strategy......Page 70
Strategy and Comparative Advantage......Page 72
Establishing favorable initial conditions......Page 73
Controlling escalation......Page 75
Using material resources effectively......Page 77
Convincing the adversary it cannot win......Page 78
Implications......Page 79
NOTES......Page 80
4 Attrition in Modern and Post-Modern War......Page 83
The difference between attrition and Blitzkrieg......Page 84
Models of attrition......Page 85
From a strategy of the weak to one also attractive to the strong......Page 88
Attempts to alter the nature of the conflict......Page 90
Attrition that Develops by Itself......Page 91
Symmetry in capabilities......Page 92
Doctrinal factors......Page 93
Prolongation of conflict and the impact on its nature and management......Page 94
A levels-of-war perspective......Page 95
Winning a war of attrition—from battlefield decision to grand-strategic decision andlor victory......Page 96
Conclusion......Page 99
NOTES......Page 101
5 Sunzi Bingfa as History and Theory......Page 108
Conclusion......Page 122
NOTES......Page 125
6 Policy, Strategy, and Operations......Page 127
Policy and Strategy......Page 128
Strategy and Operations......Page 132
Strategy-Operations-Tactics......Page 138
Conclusion......Page 140
NOTES......Page 141
PART II: POLITICAL RATIONALITY......Page 145
7 Thucydides on Democratic Politics and Civil-Military Relations......Page 146
Civil-Military Relations Prior to the Sicilian Expedition......Page 149
The Decision to Go to Sicily......Page 153
Athens and Syracuse......Page 158
Nicias and the Debacle at Syracuse......Page 161
Implications for Our Time......Page 165
NOTES......Page 168
8 Winning without Fighting: British Grand Strategy and its Application to the United States, 1815–651......Page 170
British Strategy......Page 171
British Strategy and the United States 1815–1861......Page 178
Conclusion......Page 192
NOTES......Page 194
9 British Strategy and Winning the Great War......Page 201
NOTES......Page 216
The Origins and Objectives of Israeli Grand Strategy......Page 220
Israeli Strategy: Key Constraints and Fundamental Principles......Page 223
The Principles Underlying Israeli Strategy......Page 224
The Body of Israeli Politics and the Making of Strategy......Page 228
The Territorialization of Strategic Thinking......Page 230
The Social Leg in the Foundations of Strategy......Page 234
The Arms of Strategy: the Consequences of Imbalance......Page 237
Conclusion......Page 241
NOTES......Page 245
11 Winning the War but Losing the Peace? The United States and the Strategic Issues of War Termination......Page 254
From Clausewitzian Theory to US Practice......Page 256
Problems and Patterns......Page 260
Conclusion: Strategic Logic and Political Rationality......Page 268
NOTES......Page 272
Appendix: leading questions about US war-termination strategies......Page 276
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)......Page 278
The Industrial Revolution and the Improvement in Military Transportation......Page 279
The French Revolution and the Expansion of Mass and Maneuver......Page 280
The British and American Revolutions and the Limitation of Expenditures and Casualties......Page 281
The Dialectics of Low-Cost Naval and Air Strategies......Page 283
The Spread of Military Revolutions and the Dynamics of Uneven Development......Page 284
Discerning the Consequences of Military Revolutions: Lost in the Fog and Friction of War......Page 285
The Post-Modern Transformation and the Culmination of the Low-Casualty Imperative......Page 288
The Two Military Revolutions and the Army......Page 289
The Two Military Revolutions and the Navy......Page 290
The Two Military Revolutions and the Air Force......Page 291
The future of the Kosovo strategy......Page 292
Clausewitz and the Two Contemporary Military Revolutions......Page 293
The Clausewitzian Renaissance: Clausewitz Survives the Nuclear Revolution......Page 294
The Clausewitzian Resilience: Clausewitz Thrives in the RMA and the RAM......Page 295
NOTES......Page 299
Index......Page 301
