The book examines the prevalence of privatised violence in social, political and economic arenas in many countries despite different political settings, by focussing on the Indonesian case. By employing a critical political economy approach, this book offers a new interpretation of the phenomena made by extending the investigation not only into the nature of the state but also the nature of capital. Predominant studies either from ‘state weakness’ idea derived from Weberian theory or the ‘fragmented state’ thesis developed from Migdalian state-in-society approach pay too much attention to the nature of the modern state in understanding the phenomenon of privatised violence. Such analyses cannot be discarded, but by suggesting that privatised violence is a result of a certain feature of the state, they have placed the primacy of analysis on institutions, in the process inadvertently falling into an orientalist tendency. As a response, this book argues that the persistence of privatised violence is not solely related to the historical formation of the state, power and authority; it is also intricately related to predatory forms of capitalist development in the way understood by Marx as primitive accumulation. This form of capitalism is characterised by the prevalent use of extra-economic means—fusing political and economic forces—in the accumulation of power and wealth. Within this context, privatised violence is not an obstruction, but instrumental for the accumulation process, constituting the state of disorder. As another form of order found in the predatory capitalist context, this disorder has its own logics and is shaped as a result of historical conflicts over power and resources. The practice of privatised violence tends to be reproduced when predatory social relationships, a state of disorder, are prevalent in the workings of capitalism. As such, this book contributes to understanding not only Indonesia’s privatised violence but also the nature of Indonesian politics and the state. It reinforces critical political economy arguments that Indonesian politics is ruled by a state of disorder.
Author(s): Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2022
Language: English
City: Singapore
Acknowledgements
Abstract
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 Nature of the Indonesian State: Fragmentary or Predatory?
1.2 Methodology
1.3 Outline of the Book
References
2 Privatised Violence, the State and Primitive Accumulation: A Theoretical Discussion
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Critical Political Economy
2.2.1 Critique of the Separation of the Political and the Economy
2.2.2 Central Tasks of Critical Political Economy
2.3 Privatised Violence and Primitive Accumulation
2.3.1 Reproduction of Capitalist Social Relations
2.3.2 Reproduction of Privatised Violence
2.4 Nature of the State and Democracy in the Predatory Capitalist Context
2.4.1 Understanding the State Through Violence
2.4.2 Predatory Democracy
2.5 Conclusion
References
3 The Genesis of Indonesia’s Predatory Capitalism and the Evolution of Privatised Violence
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Birth of Predatory Capitalism in Indonesia
3.2.1 Colonial Plantation System and the Birth of Predatory Capitalism
3.2.2 Establishing Colonial Order Through the Jago
3.2.3 Facilitating Japanese Occupation Through the Mobilisation of Civilian Militias
3.3 Continuity of Predatory Capitalism in Post-Colonial Indonesia and the Military Control of Militias
3.3.1 Nationalisation and State Capitalism: The Road to Military Control of Politics and Economics
3.3.2 Rationalisation of the Army and the Proliferation of Civilian Militias
3.3.3 Protecting the Military’s Business Interests: Establishing the New Political Gangster
3.4 Reproduction of Predatory Capitalism and the Centralising Use of Privatised Violence
3.4.1 Mobilising Civilian Militias in Exterminating the Left: The Road to the Consolidation of State Capitalism
3.4.2 Disorganised Urban Poor and Their Engagement in Reactionary Politics
3.4.3 Mobilising Political Gangsters and Consolidating Authoritarian Power
3.4.4 Rise of Capital and Centralising Control of Political Gangsters
3.5 Conclusion
References
4 Exploiting the Void: Mobilising Disorganised Urban Poor for Reactionary Politics
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Exclusionary Urban Development
4.3 Disorganised Urban Poor Movement
4.4 Exploiting the Void and Establishing Social Legitimacy
4.4.1 Acting Like a State
4.4.2 Political Vehicle of the Poor?
4.5 Conclusion
References
5 Establishing Predatory Alliances and Reproducing Privatised Violence
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Reproducing the Communist Spectre
5.2.1 How Predatory Alliances Maintain Anti-Communist Narrative in the Democratic Context
5.2.2 How the Gangs Use Anti-Communist Narratives to Establish Predatory Alliances
5.3 Mobilising Political Support
5.3.1 Mobilising Ethic Sentiments
5.3.2 Mobilising Religious Identity
5.4 Protecting Business Interests
5.4.1 Weakening the Labour Movement
5.5 Conclusion
References
6 Gangsters, Local Politics and Rural Land Grabbing in North Sumatra
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Land Grabbing as Primitive Accumulation
6.2.1 Global Land Grabbing
6.2.2 Indonesia’s Extractive Regime
6.3 Land Conflicts in North Sumatra
6.3.1 Historical Background of the Land Conflicts in North Sumatra
6.3.2 PTPN II
6.3.3 Uncertainty of Land Distribution
6.3.4 Use of Violence in Land Exclusion
6.4 Land Mafia and Gangsters in North Sumatra
6.4.1 Anif Shah, the Godfather
6.4.2 Expanding Business Through Violence
6.5 Establishing Domination Over the Social and Political Arena
6.5.1 Domination of Shah Family and Conflicts Among Gangsters
6.5.2 Establishing Domination Over the Political Arena to Further Capitalist Expansion
6.6 Conclusion
References
7 The Islamisation of Privatised Violence in Post-authoritarian Indonesia
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Islam as a Powerful Source of Mobilisation
7.2.1 Changing Political Alignment
7.2.2 New Environment: Increasing Islamic Piety
7.2.3 Enhancing Prowess
7.2.4 Establishing Predatory Alliances
7.3 Insights from Other Countries
7.3.1 State Formation and Predatory Capitalism in Turkey and Iran
7.3.2 Different Features of Islamic Populist Alliances
7.3.3 Serving Predatory Interests Under the Banner of ‘Defending Islam’
7.4 Conclusion
References
8 Conclusion
8.1 Comparative Insights
8.2 Implications for Indonesian Democracy
References
Glossary
Index
