Space is a crucial variable in any economic activity. Spatial Economics is the branch of economics that explicitly aims to incorporate the space dimension in the analysis of economic phenomena. From its beginning in the last century, Spatial Economics has contributed to the understanding of the economy by developing plenty of theoretical models as well as econometric techniques having the “space” as a core dimension of the analysis.
This edited volume addresses the complex issue of Spatial Economics from a theoretical point of view. This volume is part of a more complex project including another edited volume (Spatial Economics Volume II: Applications) collecting original papers which address Spatial Economics from an applied perspective.
Author(s): Stefano Colombo
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2020
Language: English
Pages: 358
City: Cham
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Part I Classic Models
1 Classic Spatial Models
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Linear Model
1.3 The Circular Model
1.4 Spatial Price Discrimination
1.5 Spatial Models with Elastic Demand Functions
1.6 The “Barbell” Model
1.7 Vertical Differentiation
1.8 Conclusions
References
2 Spatial Cournot Competition
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Attempts to Save the Hotelling (1929) Model
2.2.1 Non-Cournot Models
2.2.2 Spatial Cournot Models
2.2.2.1 Linear Models
2.2.2.2 Circular Markets
2.2.3 Linear Plus Circular Markets
2.3 Conclusions
References
3 Models of Spatial Competition: A Critical 2012 –2018 Update
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Critical Update 2012–2018—A Bibliometric Exercise
3.3 Classification of the Papers
3.4 Co-authorship Patterns: A Social Network Analysis
3.5 Conclusion
References
Part II Reviews of Literature
4 New Economic Geography: Economic Integration and Spatial Imbalances
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Spatial Economics Before NEG
4.2.1 Urban Economics and Location Theory
4.2.2 The Spatial Impossibility Theorem
4.2.3 Comparative Advantages, Externalities and Imperfect Competition
4.3 Scale Economies: From Trade to Geography
4.3.1 Preferences and Increasing Returns
4.3.2 Transport Costs and the Home Market Effect
4.4 The Core-Periphery Model
4.4.1 A Simple CP Model
4.4.1.1 The Model and Short-Run Equilibrium
4.4.1.2 Long-Run Equilibria and Qualitative Results
4.5 Developments in New Economic Geography
4.5.1 Early NEG Models
4.5.2 NEG and the Internal Structure of Regions and City Formation
4.5.3 Regional Growth
4.5.4 Beyond the CP Model
4.6 Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward
References
5 Location Games
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Setups
5.3 Simultaneous Location Games
5.4 Sequential Location Games
5.4.1 Uniform Distribution
5.4.2 Classes of Non-uniform Distributions
5.5 Discussion
References
6 Non-localised Spatial Competition: The ``Spokes Model''
6.1 Background
6.2 Motivating Examples
6.3 The Spokes Model
6.3.1 Demand Specification
6.4 Pricing
6.5 Location Choice
6.5.1 Location as Specialisation
6.5.2 Location and Product Line Design
6.6 Entry and Variety Supply
6.6.1 Under or Over Provision of Variety?
6.6.2 Variety Provision and Market Structure
6.6.3 Limiting Properties of the Spokes Model
6.7 Further Applications of the Spokes Model
6.8 Concluding Remarks
References
7 Patent Licensing in Models of Spatial Competition: A Literature Review
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Main Achievements in Non-Spatial Literature
7.3 Patent Licensing in the Shopping Hotelling Models
7.3.1 The Benchmark Model of Poddar and Sinha (2004)
7.3.2 The Role of Cost Asymmetries and Market Coverage
7.3.3 The Literature Achievements Under Endogenous Locations
7.4 Patent Licensing in Shipping Models of Spatial Discrimination
7.5 The Alternatives to Licensing and the Optimal Mode of Technology Transfer
7.6 Conclusions
References
Part III Models of Spatial Economics
8 Zoning Regulations and Firms' Corporate Social Responsibility
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Review of the Literature on Zoning in Linear Cities
8.3 The CSR Linear City Model
8.4 Firms' Locations Without Regulation
8.5 The Design of Zoning by the Regulator
8.6 Conclusions
References
9 Optimal Privatization in a Vertical Chain: A Delivered Pricing Model
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Model Setup and Solution
9.2.1 Equilibrium
9.3 Implications of Proposition 2
9.4 An Extension: Examining When the Market Would Be Cut
9.4.1 When the Private Firm Is Critical
9.4.2 When the Mixed Ownership Firm Is Critical
9.4.3 When Both Firms Are Critical (Exclusive Territories)
9.5 Conclusions
A.1 Appendix 1
B.1 Appendix 2
C.1 Appendix 3
References
10 Informative Versus Persuasive Advertising in a Dynamic Hotelling Monopoly
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Setup
10.3 Informative Advertising
10.4 Persuasive Advertising
10.5 Comparing Equilibria
10.6 Concluding Remarks
References
11 Quality Preference, Congestion, and Differentiation Strategy
11.1 Introduction and Background
11.2 The Model
11.3 Equilibrium Outcomes
11.4 Social Welfare
11.5 Concluding Remarks
Appendix
References
12 Quality and Price Competition in Spatial Markets
12.1 Introduction
12.2 A Spatial Duopoly Model of Quality and Price Competition
12.2.1 Qualities and Prices in the Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
12.2.2 Effects of Increased Competition
12.2.2.1 No Income Effects in Demand and Risk-Neutral Providers
12.2.2.2 Income Effects in Demand and Risk-Neutral Providers
12.2.2.3 No Income Effects in Demand and Risk-Averse Providers
12.2.2.4 The General Case
12.2.3 Dynamic Quality and Price Competition
12.2.3.1 Open-Loop Solution
12.2.3.2 Feedback Closed-Loop Solution
12.3 A Spatial n-Firm Model of Quality and Price Competition
12.3.1 Entry
12.3.2 Merger
12.4 Conclusions
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Open-Loop Solution
Feedback Closed-Loop Solution
Appendix 3
References
Index (Spatial Economics I: Theory)