This book analyzes Chinese influence on Soviet policies toward Vietnam and shows how China, beginning in the late 1940s, was assigned the role as the main link between Moscow and Hanoi.
Drawing on new information on Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relationship in the early 1960s this volume offers a fascinating insight into communication within the communist camp. As long as this functioned well, Beijing's role as Moscow's major partner in Vietnam was a success. Moscow could focus on other, more pressing, issues while Beijing took care of Vietnam. With the Sino-Soviet split in the open, especially from 1963 onwards, Moscow was forced to make the vital decision on whether to support the Vietnamese communists. This book shows how the Soviet failure to understand the Vietnamese commitment to reunification, combined with the growing tensions between Moscow and Beijing, reduced Soviet influence in Hanoi in a significant period leading up the U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
The author has used two particular approaches, the leverage of smaller states on superpower politics and the validity of ideology in foreign policy analysis, to explain the dynamics of Soviet perceptions of the Chinese role in Vietnam, as well as to determine from what point Moscow began to perceive Beijing as a liability rather than an asset in their dealings with Vietnam.
This book will be of great interest to students of Cold War history, International History and Asian politics in general.
Author(s): Mari Olsen
Series: Cold War History
Edition: 1
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2006
Language: English
Commentary: 40439
Pages: 225
Tags: Международные отношения;Международные отношения;История международных отношений;
Half Title: Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949–64......Page 2
Title Page......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 6
Acknowledgements......Page 10
Abbreviations......Page 12
Introduction......Page 14
1 Choosing sides......Page 22
2 Setting the stage......Page 34
3 The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954......Page 49
4 Together for Communism?......Page 69
5 Reunification by revolution?......Page 93
6 The fight over Laos, 1961–1962......Page 115
7 From disinterest to active support, 1962–1965......Page 134
Conclusions: Changing alliances......Page 157
Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong Central Committee......Page 172
Appendix 2: Economic assistance and specialists from the Socialist camp to the DRV, 1955–19621......Page 176
Appendix 3: Soviet ambassadors to Vietnam, 1954–1965......Page 178
Archives in Moscow, Russia......Page 180
Notes......Page 182
Bibliography......Page 214
Index......Page 220
