Soviet NewAsia-Pacific Policy: Motivation and Practice

Kurzfassung I
Introduction 1
I. Motivation for the Soviets to Formulate a New Asia-
Pacific Policy , 2
1. The Soviets need a peaceful peripheral environment in
the Asia-Pacific region to focus their efforts on domestic
perestroika and economic development 2
2. The steady rise of the Asia-Pacific region in its economic
and political status forced the Soviets to
change their rigid Asia-Pacific policy 4
3. The Soviets are anxious for economic assistance from
Asia-Pacific countries in opening up the Soviet Eastern
section and building up its overall national
strength 7
II. Practice of Soviet New Asia-Pacific Policy in Recent
Years 10
1. Giving priority to the improvement of relations with
major powers in the Asia-Pacific region 10
a) Normalizing relations with China 10
b) Seeking to lower military confrontation and establish
partnership with the U.S 12
c) Next target - making a breakthrough in relations with
Japan 14
2. Seeking an overall improvement of relations with the
Asian NIE's, the ASEAN and South Asian countries.. 16
a) Reaching a swift diplomatic breakthrough with South
Korea 16
b) Improving relations with the ASEAN countries by estranging
themselves from the Vietnamese . 19
c) Readjusting their policy toward India and Pakistan 20
3. Seeking participation in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation
and establishment of a security system favorable
to the Soviets 21
a) Seeking participation in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation
21
b) Putting forward proposals for establishing a security
system favorable to the Soviets in the Asia-Pacific
region 23
III. Restraints on the Implementation of Soviet New Asia-
Pacific Policy 24
1. Deteriorating domestic situation and political instability
weaken Soviet diplomatic capability 24
2. The worsening economic crisis and deteriorating investment
environment in the Soviet Far East are causing
doubts and hesitation on the part of foreign investors
26
3. Soviet military strength in the Far East remaining
powerful can hardly allay the alertness of some countries
in the region 29
IV. Conclusion 29
Summary 33