Skewing Chaos: The Role of Political Parties in Paraguay's Legislature

Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 The Meaning of ``Chaos'' in Legislative Politics
1.2 Is Legislative Chaos Relevant?
1.3 Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay
1.4 The Conditions for Chaos May Exist Elsewhere if We Dare to Look
1.5 Does Assuming Chaos Destroy Political Science?
1.6 Who This Book Is For
Part I Legislative Chaos Exists in Paraguay
2 The Potential Causes of Legislative Stability
2.1 Sacrifices are Necessary to Solve Chaos
2.2 Solving Chaos I: Preference-Induced Equilibriums
2.3 Solving Chaos II: Structure-Induced Equilibriums
2.4 Solving Chaos III: Dictatorship
2.5 The Alternative to Solving Chaos: Describing Chaos
3 Preference-Induced Equilibriums I: Weak Ideologies Promote Chaos
3.1 Conceptualizing Preferences
3.2 Measuring Preferences
3.3 Hypotheses: Preference Structures and Legislative Stability
3.4 Analysis of True, Ideological Preferences in Paraguay
3.4.1 Unidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences
3.4.2 Discussion of Unidimensional Analysis
3.4.3 Multidimensional Analysis of True Ideological Preferences
3.4.4 Discussion About True Ideological Preferences
3.4.5 Conclusions About True Preferences
3.5 Analysis of Expressed Preferences
3.5.1 Results of Analysis of Expressed Preferences
3.5.2 Discussion of Structure of Expressed Preferences
3.5.3 Qualitative Analysis of Estimated Ideal Points
3.6 Correspondence Between True and Expressed Preferences
3.7 Discussion
3.8 Conclusions and Implications
4 Preference-Induced Equilibriums II: Electoral Incentives Promote Chaos
4.1 Replacement: Realignment Through Static Preferences
4.2 Modification: Realignment Through Preference Change
4.3 Institutional Expectations for Preference Change in Paraguay
4.4 Baseline of Static Preferences
4.5 Comparison Group of Time-Modeling Procedures
4.6 Comparison Groups of Independent Estimates
4.7 Comparing Five-Year, Local First Dimensions to the Global First Dimension
4.8 Comparing Yearly, Local First Dimensions to the Global First Dimension
4.9 Comparing the Yearly, Local First Dimensions to the Global First and Second Dimensions
4.10 Comparing Yearly, Local Second Dimensions to the Global First and Second Dimensions
4.11 Inspecting Temporal Salience of Each Dimension Using Cutline Angles
4.12 The Cartes Presidency (2013–2018): A Case Study of Preference Change Due to Intra-party Electoral Competition
4.13 Conclusions
5 Structure-Induced Equilibriums: Weak Agenda-Setting Powers Promote Chaos
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Weak Agenda-Setting Powers in Paraguay
5.2.1 Constitutional Limitations to Agenda-Setting Powers
5.2.2 Chamber Rules: Limits of Agenda-Setting in Both Chambers
5.2.2.1 Legislative Actors
5.2.2.2 Voting Procedures and Amendments
5.2.2.3 Motions
5.2.3 Conclusions About Agenda-Setting Powers in Paraguay
5.3 External Structures: Can Parties Induce Equilibriums?
5.3.1 The Fusion of Factions I: Party Institutions
5.3.2 The Fusion of Factions II: Primary, Municipal, and General Election Rules
5.3.3 The Fusion of Factions III: A Lack of Imperative Mandates
5.3.4 Conclusions About Partisan Institutions
5.4 Empirical Analysis of Unstable Legislative Institutions
5.4.1 Advantages to Identifying Institutional Instability in Paraguay
5.4.2 Leadership Change Through Replacement
5.4.3 Change Through Modifying Behavior: The Case of the Cartes Presidency
5.4.4 Conclusions About Institutional Instability
5.5 Conclusions
6 Nondictatorship: Paraguay's Weak Executive Promotes Chaos
6.1 Is the Paraguayan President a Dictator?
6.2 Can Weak Executive Powers Create Legislative Stability?
6.3 Veto Models in High Thresholds for Override: Anticipating Executive Preferences
6.4 Modeling Veto Dynamics Under Weak Thresholds for Override
6.5 Deriving Observable Implications from Theories
6.6 Data
6.7 Dependent Variable
6.8 Independent Variables
6.8.1 Retrospective Information Useful to Avoid Override
6.8.2 Prospective Information Useful to Avoid Overrides
6.9 Results: Ordinal Dependent Variable
6.10 Results: Binary Dependent Variable
6.11 Conclusion
7 Conclusions: Chaos Exists in Paraguay
Part II The Persistence of Parties Despite Chaos
8 What and Who Parties Are for
8.1 The ``Cleavage'' Theory: Primacy of Social-Identity Groups
8.2 John Aldrich's Theory: Primacy of Politicians
8.2.1 Parties in Government
8.2.2 Parties in the Electorate
8.2.3 Parties as Organization
8.3 UCLA School Theory: Primacy of Narrow-Interest Groups
8.4 Summary of Arguments for Why Parties Exist
9 Paraguayan Party Formation: Coalition-Building Among Narrow-Interest Groups
9.1 Background of the First Years of Paraguay: Independence, Consolidation, and Near-Annihilation
9.2 Two Myths About Party Formation in Paraguay
9.3 The Chaotic Origins of Parties in Paraguay's Liberal Period
9.4 Partisan (In)stability: Fragmented Military and Party Persistence
9.5 The Nationalization of the Military and the Move to Eradicate Parties
9.6 Single-Party Rule: Costs and Benefits of a Stationary Bandit
9.7 The Return of Intra-Party Factions
9.8 The New Constitution: Perpetuating Factions Under Democracy
9.9 Conclusions: The Long History of Instability, Chaos, and Parties in Paraguay
Part III Skewing Chaos: Party Power in a Chaotic Legislature
10 The Expected Effects of Parties on Legislative Outcomes
10.1 Pivotal Theory: Unidimensional and Non-partisan
10.2 Cartel Theory: Unidimensional and Partisan
10.3 Conditional Party Government (CPG): Unidimensional and Shifting Partisanship
10.4 Distributive Theory: Multidimensional and Non-partisan
10.5 How to Understand Paraguay: The Missing Multidimensional Theory of Parties
10.6 Multidimensional Foundations for a New Theory of Parties
10.7 Conclusion: The Need for New Theory
11 A Theory of Fractious Parties
11.1 Why Do Parties Develop? And Why Do Factions Exist Within Them?
11.2 The Model of Fractious Parties: Hierarchical Complications of the UCLA School Model
11.3 Chaotic Parties in the Legislature: Partisan and Non-partisan Outcomes
11.4 Agenda-Setting
11.5 Conclusions
12 Skewing Chaos: Partisan Benefits Without Legislative Stability
12.1 Unidimensional and Multidimensional Hypotheses
12.2 Visual Inspection of Data
12.3 The Partisanship of Outcomes I: Period-Level Regression Models
12.4 The Partisanship of Outcomes II: Multidimensional Year-Level Regression Models
12.5 Analyzing Instability I: Model Specifications
12.6 Analyzing Instability II: Year-Level Regression Models for Analyzing Short-Term Incentives
12.7 Analyzing Instability III: Nested Multilevel Models for Comparing Short- and Long-Term Incentives
12.8 Leadership Positions and Negative Agenda-Setting
12.9 Conclusions
13 Conclusions
13.1 It Can Be Useful to Describe Chaos in Models of Legislative Behavior
13.2 Parties, Coalitions, and Factions Should Often Be Considered in a Hierarchical Fashion
13.3 Future Research Avenues
13.3.1 Dimensionality Reduction: Agenda-Setting
13.3.2 Dimensionality Reduction: Information and Complexity
13.3.3 Spatial Models for Understanding Identity
13.4 Final Thoughts: Considering Chaos and Multidimensionality Can Expand Our Understanding of Legislative Processes
Appendix to Chap.3
Appendix to Chap.3
13.5 W-NOMINATE and Bayesian IRT Estimation Paradigms
13.6 Cutoffs for Yearly Roll-Call Data
13.7 Histograms of Estimated Cutting Line Angles
13.8 Skree-plots of Estimated Eigenvalues
Appendix to Chap.4
Appendix to Chap.4
Appendix to Chap.5
Appendix to Chap.5
13.9 Estimating Ideal Points for Dynamic, Multidimensional Preferences
Appendix to Chap.6
Appendix to Chap.6
Data Sources for Chap.6
Soft Merge Process
Implications of Case-Selection Process
Sequential Complication of Models to Show Stability of Estimates
Appendix to Chap.12
Appendix to Chap.12
Win-Rates Pooled, Yearly Models
Win-Rates Nested, Period/Year Models
Bibliography
Index