Why do states often fail to cooperate, using transboundary natural resources inefficiently and unsustainably? Benvenisti examines the contemporary international norms and policy recommendations that could provide incentives for states to cooperate. His approach is multi-disciplinary, proposing transnational institutions for the management of transboundary resources. Although global water policy issues seem set to remain a cause for concern for the foreseeable future, this study provides a new approach to the problem of freshwater, and will interest international environmentalists and lawyers, international relations scholars and practitioners.
Author(s): Eyal Benvenisti
Series: Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law 23
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2002
Language: English
Pages: 298
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 13
International Court of Justice......Page 15
WTO Appellate Body reports......Page 16
Selected cases of other national courts......Page 17
Abbreviations......Page 19
Transboundary resources: delineating the challenges......Page 23
The endogenous evolution of cooperation in small-scale common pool resources......Page 25
The inefficiency and inequity of national command and control institutions......Page 30
Internationalizing the management of natural resources......Page 37
The objectives of this book......Page 40
Sovereignty, political borders and transboundary commons: the ingredients of tragedies......Page 44
Nature, markets, and the state system......Page 47
The theory of collective action applied to transboundary resources......Page 53
The logic in practice......Page 61
Regional institutions for collective action: conclusions for an international agenda......Page 63
Absolute or relative gains?......Page 65
International or transnational competition?......Page 68
Shifting paradigms: from Westphalia to the transnational conflict paradigm......Page 70
Efficiency......Page 80
Democracy......Page 81
Human rights......Page 82
Social welfare......Page 84
Conclusions: The normative implications of the transnational conflict paradigm......Page 85
Treaty negotiation and ratification......Page 86
Ensuring treaty durability......Page 94
Providing escape clauses for unilateral defections......Page 97
A voice in international law-making......Page 103
Stock taking......Page 108
A definition......Page 109
Institutions and the emergence of collective action: a general theory......Page 111
Transnational institutions and democracy......Page 117
Setting up institutions......Page 119
The tasks of transnational ecosystem institutions......Page 123
Natural resources management......Page 124
Demand management......Page 126
Risk management......Page 130
The beneficiaries of transnational ecosystem institutions......Page 138
Normative constraints on transnational ecosystem institutions......Page 141
Meeting the tasks and the constraints through privatization?......Page 145
Conclusion: transnational ecosystem institutions as a remedy for market failures......Page 151
Introduction......Page 153
Supremacy of institutional policies......Page 154
Integration cum delegation of authority: the case for subsidiarity......Page 160
Decision-making procedures......Page 165
Flexibility and mutuality......Page 166
Data collection, analysis, and dissemination......Page 167
Public participation......Page 169
Control of the agenda......Page 172
Review procedures......Page 173
Institution formation and reformation......Page 175
Conclusion......Page 177
Law at the crossroads of two clashing philosophies......Page 178
Negotiation-enhancing norms......Page 180
Definition of allocation criteria: vague standards versus clear rules......Page 183
Needs versus nature in the analysis of entitlements......Page 190
Definition of the subject-matter: comprehensiveness versus particularism......Page 192
Definition of entitlements: shared versus privately owned resources......Page 198
Identifying the stakes: the triumph of the human over the statist dimension......Page 200
Identifying the goals of negotiations:dispute settlement versus establishment of institutions......Page 202
Supremacy of institutional policies......Page 207
Ensuring the flexibility of institutions......Page 210
Data collection and dissemination......Page 212
Public participation......Page 213
Representation of minorities......Page 215
Subsidiarity......Page 216
Conclusion......Page 220
Introduction......Page 223
Customary international law as a proxy for efficiency......Page 226
Custom and market failures......Page 229
Judicial findings on efficiency......Page 236
Efficiency and the contemporary crisis of customary law......Page 238
Efficiency, equity and fairness: contradiction or affinity?......Page 241
Equity as discretion......Page 243
Equity as an efficient incentive......Page 246
Efficiency, human rights, and self-determination......Page 251
Concluding observations......Page 252
9 Conclusion......Page 254
Bibliography......Page 258
Index......Page 286
