Author(s): Jon Elster
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2013
Language: English
Commentary: More best quality: added original cover like retail edition and second blanc page also like retail edition.
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making
I. introduction: individual choice
II. Collective Decisions
III. Collective Decision-Making Processes
IV. Good Collective Decisions
V. Good Collective Decision-Making Procedures
Arguing Toward Unanimity
Deciding by Aggregation
Deciding by Bargaining
VI. Strategic Behavior
Strategic Uses of Argument
Strategic Behavior in Aggregation
VII. The Benthamite Approach to Collective Decision Making
2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making
I. Introduction
II. Composing the Pool, the Panel, and the Jury
III. The Trial
IV. Jury Deliberation and Voting
Choice of Foreperson
Communication Among the Jurors
Recording Jury Deliberations
Giving Reasons
Revealing the Deliberations
Open or Secret Voting
Revealing the Number of Votes and the Identity of Voters
V. Conclusion
3 A Dialogue with Bentham
I. Introduction
II. Aptitude of Voters
III. Aptitude of Deputies
IV. Constitutionalism and Rights
V. Bentham and Condorcet
VI. Conclusion
4 The Optimal Design of Constituent Assemblies
I. Introduction
II. The Task of the Constituent Assembly
III. Location of the Assembly
IV. The Size and Duration of the Assembly
V. Elections to the Assembly
VI. Secrecy and Publicity – Interest and Passion
VII. Ratifying the Constitution
VIII. Conclusion
5 Cross-Voting: A Study in Failure
I. Introduction
II. Voters and Eligibles
III. Cross-Voting at the Estates-General
IV. Cross-Voting in the United States, 1787–1789
V. Some Contemporary Examples
VI. Conclusion: The Fragility of Incentive Systems
Conclusion
I. Costs
II. Diversity
III. Overrides
IV. Indeterminacy
V. Political Will
References
Index
