Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science)

This document was uploaded by one of our users. The uploader already confirmed that they had the permission to publish it. If you are author/publisher or own the copyright of this documents, please report to us by using this DMCA report form.

Simply click on the Download Book button.

Yes, Book downloads on Ebookily are 100% Free.

Sometimes the book is free on Amazon As well, so go ahead and hit "Search on Amazon"

In the past thirty years, two fundamental issues have emerged in the philosophy of science. One concerns the appropriate attitude we should take towards scientific theories--whether we should regard them as true or merely empirically adequate, for example. The other concerns the nature of scientific theories and models and how these might best be represented.In this ambitious book, da Costa and French bring these two issues together by arguing that theories and models should be regarded as partially rather than wholly true. They adopt a framework that sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate. The new machinery of "partial structures" that they develop offers a new perspective from which to view the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development. Their conclusions will be of wide interest to philosophers and historians of science.

Author(s): Newton C. A. da Costa, Steven French
Year: 2003

Language: English
Pages: 270

Contents......Page 11
Introduction: Aims and Overview......Page 14
1. Truth, the Whole Truth, and Partial Truth......Page 19
2. Theories and Models......Page 32
3. Models and Models......Page 51
4. Acceptance, Belief, and Commitment......Page 72
5. Inconsistency in Science......Page 95
6. Partiality, Pursuit, and Practice......Page 118
7. Quasi Truth and the Nature of Induction......Page 141
8. From Pragmatic Realism to Structural Empiricism......Page 171
9. Extensions......Page 206
Notes......Page 212
References......Page 246
B......Page 264
E......Page 265
K......Page 266
N......Page 267
R......Page 268
S......Page 269
W......Page 270