The interesting aspect of Fortescue's book is how he manages to present the Russian oligarchs in a somewhat more favourable light. By now, the predominant view inside and outside Russia is that the oligarchs acquired their assets by virtually looting the new post-communist nation. When ownership and rules were extremely vague.
The book steps through the 90s, looking at the top companies ruled by the oligarchs. Like Yukos or Norilsk Nickel. The author describes numerous managerial decisions made, like centralising authority, or continuing to open or close mines. The mechanisms of transfer pricing are explained. Where often value was extracted from the companies and then moved overseas.
A key part of the book is how taxes are paid (or not) to the government. The minimisation of this was a major charge against them, in the eyes of the government.
The book does suggest that some of the oligarchs' actions were reasonable business decisions, in the context of their environments.
Author(s): Stephen Fortescue
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 250
Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
List of Tables......Page 10
Preface......Page 12
1 Introduction......Page 18
A comparative historical perspective......Page 19
Historical overview of the Russian oligarchs......Page 25
Enemies of all......Page 26
Western investors......Page 34
Review of the evidence......Page 35
The samples......Page 38
The possibilities......Page 41
The 'Gang of Seven'......Page 42
The 'new oligarchs'......Page 47
Conclusions......Page 52
3 How Did They Get Rich?......Page 57
The financial sector......Page 58
Privatization......Page 60
Spontaneous privatization......Page 61
Mass privatization......Page 62
Corporate governance......Page 69
Shares-for-credit......Page 71
The second peredel......Page 77
Use of the courts, civil and criminal......Page 82
The use of criminal 'authorities'......Page 84
Corporate governance 'enlightenment'......Page 88
Socially responsible business......Page 90
Conclusions......Page 92
4 The Economic Performance of the Barons and Magnates......Page 94
Are oligarch companies worse off than they were before?......Page 98
Norilsk Nickel......Page 103
Apatit......Page 104
North Urals Bauxite Mine (SUBR)......Page 105
Yukos......Page 106
Extraction of excessive returns......Page 109
Investment......Page 110
Conclusions......Page 115
5 Oligarchy and Political Power......Page 116
1991–95......Page 117
1996–98......Page 118
1998–2000......Page 124
2000–03......Page 125
Tax in the mid-1990s......Page 129
Tax in the late 1990s and beyond......Page 134
The arrest of Lebedov......Page 138
The arrest of Khodorkovsky......Page 140
The threat to Yukos......Page 143
The sale of Yuganskneftegaz......Page 147
What was it all about?......Page 153
The Yukos effect: good or bad?......Page 166
Investment and growth......Page 169
Increased tax burden......Page 172
Was justice done?......Page 174
New concepts in tax law......Page 180
Yukos, tax and democracy......Page 185
9 Conclusion......Page 190
Notes......Page 197
Bibliography......Page 237
B......Page 243
F......Page 244
L......Page 245
O......Page 246
P......Page 247
S......Page 248
Y......Page 249
Z......Page 250
