The nature of scientific explanation has been an important topic in philosophy of science for many years. This book highlights some of the conceptual problems that still need to be solved and points out a number of fresh philosophical ideas to explore.
Author(s): Johannes Persson (Editor), Petri Ylikoski (Editor)
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 225
Contents......Page 6
Contributors......Page 8
Acknowledgements......Page 9
Preface......Page 10
Part 1: Theory of Explanation......Page 14
EXPLANATIONS ARE ABOUT CONCEPTS AND CONCEPT FORMATION......Page 15
WHAT TO ASK OF AN EXPLANATION-THEORY......Page 24
THE IDEA OF CONTRASTIVE EXPLANANDUM......Page 38
THE PRAGMATIC-RHETORICAL THEORY OF EXPLANATION......Page 54
CAUSAL EXPLANATION PROVIDES KNOWLEDGE WHY......Page 80
CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND MANIPULATION......Page 104
ASSESSING THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS......Page 119
SOME NOTES ON UNIFICATIONISM AND PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION......Page 129
Part 2: Issues in Explanation......Page 139
SELECTION AND EXPLANATION......Page 140
IBE AND EBI: ON EXPLANATION BEFORE INFERENCE......Page 146
EXPLAINING WITH EQUILIBRIA......Page 157
EXPLANATION AND ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF PSYCHOLOGY......Page 171
BIOLOGICAL NOTIONS OF INNATENESS AND EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION......Page 184
ASPECT KINDS......Page 200
E......Page 211
R......Page 212
W......Page 213