Public Law and Economics

Cover
Public Law and Economics
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Detailed Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes by Chapter
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction to Public Law and Economics
I. Positive Law and Economics
II. Normative Law and Economics
III. Interpretive Law and Economics
IV. Making Economics Relevant to Public Law
V. Organization of the Book
2. Theory of Bargaining
I. Positive Theory of Bargaining
A. Conflict versus Cooperation
B. Mixed Bargains
Box: Settle or Litigate?
C. Vote Trading
D. Sphere of Cooperation
E. Private Coase Theorem
Box: Bargaining and Norms
F. Public Coase Theorem
Box: Everyday Politics?
G. Coase Theorem as a Rule of Thumb versus Law of Nature
II. Normative Theory of Bargaining
A. Efficiency
B. Representation
Box: Majority Rule and Minority Rights
C. Distribution and Social Welfare
Box: Efficient Redistribution
III. Bargaining Failures
A. Externalities, Public Goods, and Free Riding
Box: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Box: The Articles of Confederation
B. Information Asymmetry
Box: Optimism: A Menace in Court
C. Monopoly
Box: Madison and the Sphere of Democracy
IV. Interpretive Theory of Bargaining
A. The Problem of Legislative Intent
B. The Bargain Theory of Interpretation
Box: The Hierarchy of Legislative History
Conclusion
3. Bargaining Applications
I. On Regulation
A. Congestion and Externalities
Box: Marginal Costs and Benefits
B. Regulation and Information
Box: Cost-​Benefit Analysis in the Administrative State
C. The Market Mechanism
Box: Collusion and Conservation
D. Coase or Hobbes?
E. On Liability
II. Federalism
A. Legal Externalities
B. The Internalization Principle
C. Introduction to Article I, Section 8
D. Collective Action Federalism
E. Commerce Revisited
Box: The Dormant Commerce Clause
III. Separation of Powers
A. Forms of Separated Powers
B. Separation and Competition
C. Checks and Balances
Box: The Line-​Item Veto
D. Bargaining across Branches
E. Take It or Leave It
F. A Cooling Saucer?
Conclusion
4. Theory of Voting
I. Positive Theory of Voting
A. Why Vote?
B. Why Abstain?
C. Representing a Voter’s Preferences
D. Aggregating Votes: Majority Rule
E. The Median in Governing Bodies
Box: The Median Justice
F. Intransitivity
G. The Chaos Theorem
H. Why So Much Stability?
I. Alternative Voting Procedures
Box: Five Voting Rules, Five Winners
II. Normative Theory of Voting
A. Pareto Efficiency
B. Social Welfare
C. No Equilibrium
III. Interpretive Theory of Voting
A. Median and Bargain Democracy
Box: The Unbundled Executive
B. Intentionalism and Intransitivity
C. The Median Theory of Interpretation
Box: The Highest Vote Rule
Conclusion
Appendix: Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
5. Voting Applications
I. The Right to Vote
A. Inclusive Voting
Box: Election Administration
B. Exclusive Voting and Externalities
C. Offsetting Errors
D. The Optimal Political Community
Box: The Twenty-​Sixth Amendment
E. Voter Information
Box: Heuristics on the Ballot
F. Disclosure
Box: Disclosure and Corruption
G. Voter Fraud
II. Structures of Representation
A. The Size of Legislatures
B. Bicameralism
C. Plurality Rule and Proportional Representation
Box: Minor Parties and Stability
D. One Person, One Vote
Box: One Person or One Voter?
E. Gerrymandering
Box: Term Limits
F. The Electoral College
III. Government Competition
A. Direct Democracy
B. What’s a Subject?
Box: Prescription or Description?
C. Mobility
D. Local Governments and Home Rule
Conclusion
6. Theory of Entrenchment
I. Positive Theory of Entrenchment
A. Credible Commitments
Box: Parchment Barriers
B. Entrenchment and Equilibria
C. Entrenchment and Incrementalism
D. Generalizing from Supermajority Rule
Box: Unpopular Constitutionalism
E. Entrenchment and Instability
Box: Amend or Convene?
II. Normative Theory of Entrenchment
A. Welfare and Democracy
B. Welfare and Minorities
Box: Voting Externalities
Box: “Peculiarly Narrow” Governments
C. Stability and Transition Costs
Box: The Paradox of Compensation
D. Stability and Rationality
E. On Optimal Entrenchment
III. Interpretive Theory of Entrenchment
A. On Precedent
B. The Transitions Theory of Interpretation
Box: Statutory Stare Decisis
Conclusion
7. Entrenchment Applications
I. Rights
A. Definitions of Rights
B. Rights and Entrenchment
C. Transaction Costs and Rights
Box: Democracy and Distrust
D. Coase versus Hobbes Revisited
Box: “Proportionate Interest Representation”
E. Rights for Sale
F. Unconstitutional Conditions
Box: “A Gun to the Head”
G. Local or Universal Rights
H. Balancing Rights
II. Equality
A. Discrimination by the State
B. Tiers of Scrutiny
C. Discrimination in a Perfect Market
D. Discrimination in an Imperfect Market
E. Discriminatory Signals
Box: Ban the Box
III. Speech
A. Speech and Monopoly
B. Speech and Positive Externalities
C. Speech and Congestion
D. Harmful Speech
Box: The Captive Audience Doctrine
E. Commercial Speech
F. Defamation
Box: Fake News and the First Amendment
IV. Constitutional Updating
A. Updates Constrain Amendments
B. Institutional Advantage and Constitutional Change
C. Entrenchment and Updating
Conclusion
8. Theory of Delegation
I. The Delegation Game
A. Principals and Agents
B. The Strategic Game
C. When to Delegate
D. How Much to Delegate
Box: The President’s Removal Power
E. Accountability versus Expertise
Box: Delegation and Courts
F. Unilateral Oversight
G. Multiple Principals
Box: The Legislative Veto
II. Rule Game
A. Rules, Standards, and Delegation
B. Strategic Game
C. When to Use Rules and Standards
Box: Does Vagueness Cause Litigation?
D. Continuous Precision
E. Drafting and Applying—​Invest Now or Later?
Box: Vagueness or Ambiguity?
III. Normative Analysis of Delegation
A. Delegation as Offer or Command
B. Externalization and Allies
Box: Is Your Lawyer Your Ally?
C. Delegation and Representation
IV. Interpretive Theory of Delegation
A. The Canons of Construction
B. The Delegation Canon
C. Applying the Delegation Canon
Conclusion
9. Delegation Applications
I. Agencies and Administrative Law
A. The Chevron Doctrine
B. What Do Agencies Maximize?
Box: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
C. Institutional Competence
D. Chevron Revisited
II. Legal Limits on Delegation
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Box: Void for Vagueness
B. The Cost of Prohibiting Delegation
C. Nondelegation and Representation
III. Lobbying, Rent-​Seeking, and Agency Capture
A. Subsidies and Regulations
Box: Professionalism or Monopoly?
B. Lobbying
Box: Unions and Free Riding
C. Lochnerism
IV. Corruption and Campaign Finance
A. Bribery Law
B. Bargaining and Bribes
Box: “Bob’s for Jobs”? Or for Bribes?
C. Campaign Contributions
Box: Aggregate Corruption
D. Independent Expenditures
Box: Public Financing of Elections
Conclusion
10. Theory of Adjudication
I. Positive Theory of the Legal Process
A. The Value of a Legal Claim
Box: Who Pays the Lawyers?
B. Settlement Bargaining
C. No Settlement
Box: Discovery
D. Litigation Externalities
Box: Playing for the Rule
E. Trial
Box: Juries and the Wisdom of the Crowd
F. Appeal
II. Judicial Behavior
A. The Legal Model
Box: What Sustains Judicial Independence?
B. The Attitudinal Model
C. The Strategic Model: Separation of Powers
Box: Strategic Interpretation
D. The Strategic Model: Judicial Hierarchy
Box: Panel Effects
III. Normative Theory of Adjudication
A. Accuracy in Fact-​Finding
Box: Procedural Due Process
B. Accuracy in Interpretation
C. Indeterminacy and Default Rules
Box: Optimal Independence
IV. Interpretive Theory of Adjudication
A. Purposivism
B. The Incentive Principle of Interpretation
Conclusion
11. Adjudication Applications
I. Methods of Interpretation
A. Text versus Intent
B. Law and Coordination
Box: A High Bar for Scrivener’s Errors
Box: Finding the Common Law
C. Communication in the Long Run
Box: Who Reads the Law?
D. Transition Costs
E. Justice and Exceptions
Box: Minimizing Errors, Maximizing Justice
F. Epilogue on Interpretation
II. Legal Doctrine
A. Revisiting Rules versus Standards
B. Cycles in Doctrine
Box: Cycles of Interpretation
C. Prophylactic Rules
D. On Precedent and “Slippery Slopes”
Box: The End Game
E. Acquiescence to Precedent
III. Puzzles and Paradoxes
A. The Marks Rule
B. The Doctrinal Paradox
C. Intransitivity in Court
Box: Bargaining among Judges
Conclusion
12. Theory of Enforcement
I. Positive Theory of Enforcement
A. The Costs and Benefits of Lawbreaking
Box: Why Punish?
B. The “Law” of Deterrence
C. Law in Books and Law in Action
D. Enforcement through Settlements
Box: Agency Costs in Enforcement
E. Irrationality and Discounting
II. Normative Theory of Enforcement
A. Enforcement and Social Welfare
Box: Enforcement and the Rule of Law
B. Social Welfare and Deterrence
C. Optimal Deterrence
Box: The Excessive Fines Clause
D. Fines versus Imprisonment
Box: Economics and Animus
III. Interpretive Theory of Enforcement
A. On Remedies
B. Introduction to Contempt
C. Economic Theory of Contempt
Box: A License for Crime?
D. Contempt in Public Law
Conclusion
13. Enforcement Applications
I. The Law of Enforcement
A. Introduction to the Fourth Amendment
Box: “Shoot First and Think Later”
B. Economic Analysis of Search
C. Exclusion and Immunity Revisited
II. Enforcement and Legal Design
A. Enforcing Rules and Standards
B. Insincere Rules
Box: Proxy Crimes
C. Standards of Proof
III. Beyond Deterrence
A. Law as Information
Box: Enforcement as Information
B. Law and Reputation
Box: Enforcing International Law
C. Law and Coordination
Box: Coordinating against the State
D. Re-​Coordination and Corner Equilibria
E. Preference Change
IV. Judicial Legitimacy
A. Defining Legitimacy
B. The Passive Virtues
C. Modeling Compliance
Box: Active Virtues
Conclusion
Index