The author describes the property rights that exist in different organizational forms and explains how these establish incentives for managerial decision behavior. She compares the rights, incentives, and corresponding decision behavior in for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations under conditions of unbounded rationality. She shows that managerial responses to regulation, tax, and industrial organization policies may differ from the usual predictions when property rights are considered. She also shows how property rights link economic and organization theory.
Author(s): Kathleen A. Carroll
Year: 2004
Language: English
Pages: 320
Cover......Page 1
Property Rights and Managerial Decisions in For-profit, Nonprofit, and Public Organizations......Page 4
Contents......Page 6
Preface......Page 10
1 Introduction and Overview......Page 14
Part I The Analytical Framework......Page 24
2 The Economic Theory of Organizations:What It Is and What It Isn’t......Page 26
3 Efficient Decisions in Organizations and Social Welfare......Page 40
4 Property Rights, Incentives, and Organizations......Page 58
Part II Managerial Decision Making in Alternative Organizations......Page 72
5 Private For-profit Organizations: the Firm......Page 74
6 Public Sector Organizations: the Bureau......Page 92
7 Nonprofit Organizations......Page 106
8 Comparative Organizational Structures and Managerial Decisions......Page 121
Part III Policy Implications......Page 140
9 Organizational Structure and Policy: Regulation and Taxation......Page 142
10 Organizational Structure and Policy: Industrial Organization......Page 161
11 Variations in Organizational Structures......Page 177
Part IV Additional Issues in Comparative Organizational Structure......Page 196
12 Economic Theory of Organizations as a Social Science......Page 198
13 Additional Issues in Economic Theory of Organizations......Page 212
Notes......Page 221
Bibliography......Page 228
Index......Page 239
