This book aims to explain why some presidents are more successful than others in winning the support of legislators during periods of unified government. This book covers five presidential and semi-presidential systems such as France, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and the U.S. with a wide variety of institutional arrangements and political dynamics. This book elaborates on explaining how institutional factors such as confidence vote, electoral system, candidate nomination and presidential unilateral power influence the ability of presidents to pass their legislative agendas through comparisons across presidential and semi-presidential systems.
Author(s): Jung-Hsinag Tsai
Series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2021
Language: English
Pages: 194
City: Cham
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Presidents, Unified Government, and Legislative Control
Introduction
Literature Review
Political Parties Under Unified Government
The Balance of Power Between the President and the Legislature
Confidence Vote and Cohesion
Electoral System and Cohesion
Nomination and Cohesion
Unilateral Presidential Power and Cohesion
The Structure of the Book
References
2 A Gently Slopped Leadership: Parliamentary Support for Presidents in France
Introduction
A Semi-Presidential System Driven by the President
A Strong Support, a Constant Decline
A Discussion of the Four Hypotheses for Parliamentary Support
Confidence Vote Procedures in the Hands of the President
A Candidate-Centered Electoral System
A Differentiated Capacity for Presidents to Select Candidates
Limited Decree Power but Strong Statutes
Three Determining Contextual Hypotheses
Popularity in Decline
The Uncertainty of Ideological Cohesiveness
The Crucial Micromanagement of the Majority
Conclusion
References
3 Power Scope and Party Disunity of Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan: The Perspective of Political Participation of Elites and the Masses
Introduction
Problem Awareness and Variable Definition in This Study
The Case Study of Taiwan
Political Elites: The Situations of the President of Taiwan or the President of the Executive Yuan as Party Leaders
Mass Participation: Comparison of Voter Turnout
Political Elites: Background and Political Career Plan of the Presidents of the Executive Yuan
Party Unity in Taiwan
Conclusion
References
4 President and Congress in the Period of Unified Government in America
Introduction
Legislative Defection in American Congress
Personal Connection and Party Connection
Electoral Demand and Party Demand
Unilateral Power: Decree Power and Veto Power
Decree Power
Veto Power
Unified Government
Party Leaders and Party Unity in Congress
President and Congress
Conclusion
References
5 Political Institutions, Democratization, and Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico
Introduction
Perspectives of New Institutionalism for Studying Legislative Behavior
Institutional Settings for Executive-Legislative Relations in Mexico
Centralized Constitutional Power of the Presidency
Party-Centered Electoral System and the Ban on Reelection
Centralized System of Candidate Nomination
Explaining the Dynamics of Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico
Party Cohesion of the PRI Before 1994
Democratization and the Changing Trend of the Candidate Nomination Procedure
Incumbent Party Cohesion Under the Unified Governments After 1994
Candidate Nomination Procedure and Party Cohesion of the MORENA
Conclusion
References
6 Consensual Decision-Making and No Rebels: Presidentialism in Indonesia
Introduction
Institutional Environment and Executive-Legislative Relations
Basic Patterns of Support for the President from Members of the President’s Party/Coalition
Legislative Rebels of Members of the President’s Party/Coalition Over Presidential Supporting Bills or Government-Initiated Bills
Discussion of the Effects of the Four Explanatory Variables on Legislative Support or Defection
Conclusion
References
7 Presidents, Unified Government, and Legislative Control: What Have We Learned?
Introduction
Case Studies
France
Taiwan
United States
Mexico
Indonesia
Conclusion
References
Index