Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? Looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa, this book advances a novel answer: communities are better able to coordinate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms. This book identifies the precolonial past as the driver of striking subnational variation in the present because these social institutions only encompass the many villages of the local state in areas that were once home to precolonial polities. The book develops and tests a theory of institutional congruence to document how the past shapes contemporary elite approaches to redistribution within the local state. Where precolonial kingdoms left behind collective identities and dense social networks, local elites find it easier to cooperate following decentralization. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Author(s): Martha Wilfahrt
Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 316
City: New York
Cover
Half-title
Series information
Title page
Copyright information
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The Millet Mills
Redistributive Dilemmas in Rural Africa
The Argument
Points of Departure
Local Narratives, Local Political Strategies
Rethinking Forms of Identity Politics in Africa
Revisiting the Question of State-Building in Rural Africa
Decompressing Historical Legacies
Empirical Strategy and Overview of the Book
Why Senegal?
Overview of the Book
1 A Theory of Institutional Congruence
Redistributive Dilemmas of Decentralization
A Theory of Institutional Congruence
Conceptualizing Social Institutions
Why Social Institutions Influence Elite Behavior
The Social Identity Mechanism
The Social Network Mechanism
Networks Circulate Information
Networks Generate External Costs and Rewards
Networks Reinforce the Internalization of Social Institutions
How Cross-village Social Institutions Generate Institutional Congruence
The Long-Run Effects of Precolonial Political Order on Prospects for Congruence
Conclusion
2 Bringing Old States Back In: Senegal's Precolonial Polities
Senegal's Precolonial Political Geography
Precolonial Kingdoms
Acephalous Polities
Measuring Precolonial States
Why Do Precolonial Identities Persist?
Social Shocks Predicting Erasure
Colonization: ''Association'' and Direct Rule
Religious Conversion and the Spread of Islam
Migration
The Mechanism of Persistence: Village Social Hierarchies
Why Village Social Hierarchies Survived Colonial-Era Shocks
The Costs of Elite Persistence
Conclusion
3 The Politics of Decentralization in Senegal
The Structure of Governance in Postcolonial Senegal
Centralizing Tendencies in the Senegalese State
Decentralization in Three Acts
Central-Local Relations under Decentralization
Drawing Boundaries in the Countryside
Colonial Boundary-Making
Delimiting the Postcolonial State
Conclusion
4 Political Narratives across Rural Senegal
Original Survey Data
Are These Narratives Accurate?
Narrating Local Politics in Decentralized Senegal
Narratives of Local Governance across Senegal's Precolonial Geography
Why Social Institutions Influence Local Governance
Exceptions to the Theory
The Mediating Effects of Social Shocks
In-Migration
Religious Conversion
Elite Assessments of Local Government Performance
Perceptions of Government Performance
Perceptions of Government Responsibilities
Perceptions of Equality
Assessing the Role of Local Government Resources
Conclusion
5 Delivering Schools and Clinics in Rural Senegal
Explaining Access to Basic Services in Senegal's Countryside
Top-Down Theories of Public Goods Delivery
Electoral Motivations
Central Government Relations
Bottom-Up Theories of Public Goods Delivery
Ethnicity Homogeneity
Associational Life
Data and Measurement
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Control Variables
Alternative Explanations
Estimation Strategy
The Delivery of Primary Schools and Basic Health, 2002-2012
Main Results
Alternative Explanations
Relative Placement Efficiency
Placebo Tests
Conclusion
6 Congruence and Incongruence in Action
Case Selection and Methodology
Assessing the Theory in Kebemer and Koungheul
The Identity Mechanism
The Network Mechanism
How the Mechanisms Support Cross-Village Social Institutions in Kebemer but Not Koungheul?
Social Institutions in Action: Evaluating the 2014 Local Elections
Representation and Redistribution across Social Networks
Representation
Redistribution
States without Legacies: The Example of Koumpentoum
Koumpentoum as a Case of Institutional Incongruence
Representation and Redistribution in Koumpentoum
Assessing Alternative Explanations
Conclusion
7 Decompressing Legacies of Public Goods Delivery, 1880-2012
When Does the Precolonial Past Matter?
Historical Data
Estimating the Legacy of Precolonial Statehood
What Precolonial Centralization's Intermittent Effects Say about Historical Legacies?
Assessing Alternative Historical Legacies: What Role for the Colonial State?
Did Early Colonial Exposure Drive Outcomes?
Are Colonial Development Policies Durable?
Colonial and Postcolonial Political Favoritism
Whither the Colonial State?
Discussion: Why Don't All Legacies Persist?
Conclusion
8 Institutional Congruence beyond Senegal
Legacies of Precolonial Statehood across West Africa
Decentralization in West Africa
Evidence from the DHS
Evidence from Attitudinal Data
Evidence of Institutional Congruence Following Decentralization
Assessing the Mechanisms beyond Africa
Evidence from Native American Reservations
Evidence from China's Local Governments
Evidence from India
Summarizing the Insights from Comparative Politics
Scope Conditions of the Argument
Conclusion
Conclusion
Summary of the Argument
Implications
Appendix
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Index
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