Power and Responsibility: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century in Honor of Manfred J. Holler

Preface
Contents
Manfred on His 75th Birthday
Economics and Philosophy
Three Types of Dramatic Irony
1 The Definitions of Dramatic Irony
2 The Limits of Doxastic Theory
3 The Meaning Theory of Dramatic Irony: Sophocles’ Ajax
4 The Irony of Missed Ironies in Euripides
5 The Two Functions of Dramatic Irony
6 The Roots of Dramatic Irony
References
Defence is of Much More Importance than Opulence—Adam Smith on the Political Economy of War
1 Introduction
2 Stages of Civilization and Ways of Accumulating Wealth
3 A Short History of Warfare and the Process of Civilization
4 On the “Wisdom of the State”
5 Heroic Characters and the Demise of the “Impartial Spectator”
6 Concluding Remarks
References
Labor Economics
Relative Absence Concerns, Positional Consumption Preferences and Working Hours
1 Introduction
2 Related Contributions
3 Model
4 Comparisons of Outcomes
4.1 Working Hours as Sole Choice Variable
4.2 Absence of Absence Externality
4.3 Simultaneous Existence of Consumption and Absence Externalities
5 Conclusions
Appendix
1. Utility Maximum
2. Stability of Market Equilibrium
3. Pareto-Efficient Allocation
4. Alternative Specification of Preferences
5. Proof of Proposition 2
6. Sick Pay
7. Proof of Proposition 3
References
Power, Responsibility and Social Policy: The Impact of Basic Income in a Competitive Experimental Labor Market
1 Introduction
2 Investigating the Impact of Basic Income in Experimental Labor Markets
2.1 Results From the Field and From the Lab
2.2 Competition in Gift Exchange Games
3 Modeling the Effect of Basic Income on Wages and Effort Under Competition
4 Experimental Design
5 Results and Analysis
5.1 Description of the Dataset
5.2 Wage Offers and Effort Levels
6 Discussion
Appendix 1. Instructions, Control Session
Appendix 2. End Questionnaire
References
Voting and Voting Power
Computing the Public Good Index for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions Using Dynamic Programming
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games, Simple Games and Precoalitions
2.2 The Public Good Index and Its Variants with Precoalitions
3 Dynamic Programming for Computing the Public Good Index
3.1 Counting Winning and Losing Coalitions via Dynamic Programming
3.2 Computing the Public Good Index via Dynamic Programming
4 Computing Public Good Indices with Precoalitions via Dynamic Programming
5 Numerical Results and Software
6 Outlook and Conclusions
References
The Art and Beauty of Voting Power
1 Introduction
2 Weighted Committees and Scoring Rules
3 Voting Power and Color
4 Simplex Maps of Equivalence Classes
5 Concluding Remarks
References
An Application of Power Indices for the Family of Weighted Majority Games in Partition Function Form
1 Introduction
2 Simple Games in Characteristic and Partition Function Form
2.1 Simple Games in Characteristic Function Form
2.2 Simple Games in Partition Function Form
3 Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games in Partition Function Form
4 A Political Example: The National Assembly of Ecuador
4.1 Original Formation of the National Assembly of Ecuador: May 2021
4.2 Formation of the National Assembly of Ecuador: From Jun 2021 to Dec 2021
5 Conclusions
References
Measuring Voting Power in Complex Shareholding Structures: A Public Good Index Approach
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries and Notation on Simple Games and Power Indices
2.1 Power Indices
2.2 Some Properties of Power Indices in Simple Games
2.3 Comparison of the Shapley and Shubik and PGI Indices
3 Indices for Measurement Indirect Control
3.1 Karos and Peters Approach
3.2 Holler-Based Estimation of Firm's Control Power
4 An Example
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Voting On or About God
1 Theological Disputations
1.1 The Khazar Conversion Debate
1.2 The Theological Debate at the Mongol Court
2 Voting Over the Adoption of a New Religion
3 Voting About God in Early Church Councils
4 Conclusion
References
Probabilistic Study of Voting Rules: A Tale of Two Volumes
1 Introduction
2 The Principles of Probability Modeling of Voting Rules
3 Common Themes in the Two Volumes
3.1 Cyclic Majorities
3.2 The U.S. Political Institutions
4 Non-overlapping Themes
5 Progressive Program
6 What Do We Learn from Probability Models?
7 By Way of Conclusion
References
The Liblice Castle Story
1 Introductory Notes
1.1 Objectives
1.2 A Historiographical Note
1.3 A Methodological Note
2 Political Economy of an Institutional Change
2.1 Policy/Responsibility No. 1: Transformation Versus Reform
2.2 Policy/Responsibility No. 2: Social Order “By Design”
2.3 Policy/Responsibility No. 3: Variant Targets of the Institutional Change
2.4 Policy/Responsibility No. 4: Efficiency Versus Justice/Fairness
2.5 Policy/Responsibility No. 5: Scholar Turned Politician
3 Social Science for Practical Use And-Or its Own Sake
3.1 Theme No. 1: Convergence of an Auction
3.2 Theme No. 2: The True Nature of Central Planning
3.3 Theme No. 3: Analytical Blocks for Inter-disciplinary Bridges
3.4 Theme No. 4: Rationality
4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Revisited
4.1 A Social Economic Organization (“SEO”)
4.2 The Case of a Plaintiff and a Defendant
4.3 Comments
5 Summary and Conclusions
References
Lexicographic Ranking Based on Minimal Winning Coalitions
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries and Notation
3 A Ranking Solution and the Desirability Relation
4 An Axiomatic Characterization of the LRM Solution
5 Duality
6 Conclusions
References
The Public Good Index for Games with Several Levels of Approval in the Input and Output
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
1.2 Generalizing the Public Good Index to (j,k) Simple Games
References
Public Economics, Politics and Responsibility
Why Did Japan Attack Pearl Harbor?
1 Introduction
2 Some Common Explanations for the Attack
3 The Argument Here: Quasi Theocracy
4 Other Examples? Ottoman Empire, Iran
5 Pearl Harbor
6 Conclusion
References
Inflated Expectations of Democracy: Towards a Systematic Explanation
1 Introduction
2 The Enduring Appeal of Democracy
3 A Litany of Complaints Against Democracy
4 A Choice-Theoretic Explanation of the Disappointments from Democracy
4.1 Aggregation of Voter Preferences
4.2 Unarticulated Voter Preferences and Incomplete Voter Information
4.3 Impossibility of a Social Choice Equilibrium
4.4 The Agency Nature of Political Representation
4.5 Political Inequality
4.6 Democracy and Ethical Behaviour
5 Conclusions
References
Electoral Competition, Political Promises and the “Responsible Party Government” Hypothesis
1 Introduction
2 Political Strategies in the Short Run
2.1 Office-Motivated Politicians
2.2 Ideological Candidates
2.3 Endogenous Entry of Candidates
3 Political Strategies in the Long Run
3.1 When Voting is Retrospective
3.2 When Voters Are Forward-Looking
3.3 When Voting is Prospective
4 Political Misinformation
4.1 Strategic Ambiguity
4.2 False Promises and Dishonesty in Politics
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Is Convergence of Policies Observed?
5.2 Do Parties Keep Their Political Promises?
5.3 Is There a Link Between Economic Performance and Incumbents’ Popularity?
5.4 Does Party Identification Matter for Voting Choices?
5.5 Are Voting Behaviors Impacted by Irrelevant Factors?
6 Conclusion
7 Discussion
References
The Effect of Social Interaction and Cultural Consumption on Voting Turnout
1 Introduction
2 Group-Based Models of Voting, Social Capital, and Cultural Capital
3 Data Description
4 Model Specification
5 Results
6 Concluding Comments
References
The Political Economy of Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma
1 Introduction
2 Market Failures, Cooperation, and Numbers
3 Different Strategies in Different Types of Groups
4 When is There a Samaritan's Dilemma?
5 Toward the Samaritan's Dilemma
6 Conclusion
References
Felwine Sarr’s Afrotopia—An Utopian Vision Fruitful for Africa?
1 Introduction
2 Sarr’s Identification of the Problems Africa is Facing
3 Sarr’s Cause Analysis
4 The Aim of Sarr’s Afro-Utopia
5 The Necessary Measures
6 The Effects of a Realized Afro-Utopia on the Entire World
7 An Appraisal
References
When Census is an Election: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Over-Reporting of Headcount
1 Introduction
2 The Setting
3 Census Games
4 Concluding Remarks
References