This book provides an updated authoritative survey of the quantities of fissile material produced for nuclear weapons and in the civilian fuel cycle. The control of fissile materials and associated technologies are at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The authors demonstrate that despite technical, political and economic difficulties, a fully effective material control regime is feasible. The main steps towards realisation of such a regime are identified.
Author(s): David Albright; Frans Berkhout; William Walker
Series: World inventory of plutonium and highly enriched uranium
Edition: 1
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1996
Language: English
Pages: 534
City: Oxford
Tags: Accounting; Compiled Data; Data Compilation; Economics; Highly Enriched Uranium; Inventories; Nuclear Materials Management; Nuclear Weapons; Plutonium; Political Aspects; Reprocessing; Safeguards; Technology Impacts
Contents......Page 5
Preface......Page 15
Acknowledgements......Page 16
Glossary......Page 17
Acronyms and conventions......Page 28
Part I. Introduction......Page 33
I. Introduction......Page 35
II. Four security contexts......Page 36
III. The need for greater transparency......Page 38
IV. The limits to accuracy......Page 40
V. The scope of the book......Page 41
VI. Sources......Page 42
II. Highly enriched uranium......Page 44
III. Plutonium......Page 50
Part II. Military inventories in the nuclear weapon states......Page 59
I. Introduction......Page 61
II. The production process......Page 62
III. Methods of estimating military plutonium inventories......Page 65
IV. The United States......Page 69
V. The former Soviet Union......Page 82
VI. The United Kingdom......Page 91
VII. France......Page 98
VIII. China......Page 108
II. Overview of enrichment programmes......Page 111
III. The United States......Page 113
IV. The former Soviet Union......Page 126
V. The United Kingdom......Page 148
VI. France......Page 153
VII. China......Page 158
Part III. Principal civil inventories......Page 163
I. Introduction......Page 165
II. The fuel cycle in civil reactor systems......Page 167
III. Fuelling strategy and fuel burnup......Page 168
IV. A sketch of methods......Page 170
V. Discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from civil reactors......Page 173
VI. Conclusions......Page 179
I. Reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle......Page 180
II. The evolution of fuel-cycle strategies......Page 182
IV. Overview of power-reactor fuel reprocessing......Page 187
V. Commercial reprocessing programmes......Page 189
VI. Summary of power- and fast-reactor fuel reprocessing, 1960–2000......Page 215
VII. Projections of plutonium separation to 2010......Page 222
VIII. Conclusions......Page 224
I. Introduction......Page 225
II. Fast-reactor fuel cycles......Page 226
III. Plutonium use in fast reactors......Page 227
IV. Past and projected plutonium use in fast reactors......Page 229
V. Plutonium use in thermal reactors......Page 241
VI. National programmes for thermal plutonium recycling......Page 244
VII. Summary of plutonium use in thermal reactors: past and projected......Page 255
VIII. Commercial and R&D plutonium use compared with quantities separated......Page 261
IX. Conclusions......Page 269
I. Introduction......Page 270
II. Civil suppliers of highly enriched uranium......Page 271
III. Civil reactors using HEU fuels, 1995......Page 273
IV. Converting to low-enriched uranium fuels......Page 274
V. Spent fuel take-back and reprocessing of HEU fuels......Page 277
VI. US exports of highly enriched uranium......Page 280
VII. Civil inventories of highly enriched uranium......Page 285
Part IV. Material inventories and production capabilities in the threshold states......Page 287
I. Israel......Page 289
II. India......Page 296
III. Pakistan......Page 303
II. An unsafeguarded reactor emerges......Page 314
III. Initial safeguards declaration......Page 315
IV. Reactor defuelling......Page 320
V. Plutonium production reactors......Page 327
VI. Plutonium separation......Page 335
VII. How much plutonium does North Korea have?......Page 338
IX. Has North Korea built nuclear weapons?......Page 339
I. Introduction......Page 341
II. The Iraqi nuclear weapon programme......Page 343
III. Summary of Iraqi fissile material production plans before 1991......Page 345
IV. The Iraqi enrichment programme......Page 349
V. Projected indigenously produced weapon-grade uranium inventory for Iraq......Page 373
VI. The Iraqi plutonium programme......Page 374
VII. The crash programme......Page 376
VIII. Post-war activities......Page 381
I. Introduction......Page 383
II. Iran......Page 384
III. Algeria......Page 395
IV. South Korea......Page 397
V. Taiwan......Page 398
II. Argentina and Brazil......Page 401
III. South Africa......Page 409
Part V. Conclusions......Page 425
II. Inventories at the end of 1994......Page 427
III. Types of inventory......Page 429
IV. Military inventories in nuclear weapon states......Page 430
V. Weapon-related inventories and capabilities in countries other than the acknowledged nuclear weapon states......Page 433
VI. Civil inventories of plutonium and HEU......Page 436
VII. Material under international safeguards......Page 438
VIII. Possible future trends in plutonium and HEU inventories......Page 443
I. Introduction......Page 448
II. Two industrial and regulatory systems......Page 450
III. Contemporary pressures to achieve universality and transparency......Page 453
IV. Measures against undeclared activities in NNWS parties to the NPT......Page 456
V. Bilateral initiatives to strengthen controls in the FSU......Page 459
VI. Extending the multilateral framework for material controls......Page 462
VII. The disposition of excess plutonium and HEU......Page 469
IX. Plutonium disposition......Page 478
X. Obstacles to an international disposition strategy......Page 485
XI. Conclusions: moving towards the framework of control required for complete nuclear disarmament......Page 486
Appendices......Page 491
I. Weapon-grade plutonium production......Page 493
II. Highly enriched uranium production......Page 496
Appendix B. Calculation of plutonium production in power reactors......Page 504
Appendix C. Separation of plutonium from power reactor fuel at reprocessing plants......Page 511
Appendix D. Research reactors (>l MWth) using HEU fuel......Page 518
Index......Page 523
