Nicholas Rescher presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, he rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, he opposes the rationalism inherent in neo-contractarian theory--both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by J;urgen Habermas, and in the idealized social contract version of the theory of political justice promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, Rescher's pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, he advocates incremental improvements within the framework of arrangements that none of us will deem perfect but that all of us "can live with." Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce--not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.
Author(s): Nicholas Rescher
Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1993
Language: English
Pages: 217
Cover......Page 1
Title......Page 2
Series......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Preface......Page 6
For Jürgen Habermas......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
Introduction......Page 10
1.1 The Problem of Consensus......Page 14
1.2 Is Consensus a Rational Imperative?......Page 16
1.3 Do the Limitations of Reason Demand Consensus?......Page 23
1.4 Is Consensus a Moral Imperative?......Page 25
2.1 The Philosophical Partisans of Cognitive Consensus......Page 30
2.2 The Critics of Cognitive Consensus......Page 37
2.3 Modern Limited Defences of Consensus......Page 42
2.4 Science and Consensus......Page 46
3.1 What Constitutes Consensus?......Page 53
3.2 Truth, Objectivity, and Consensus......Page 54
3.3 Ideality and Consensus......Page 62
3.4 The Consensus Theory of Truth......Page 66
3.5 A Constrast Case......Page 71
4.1 Rational Judgement and Experience......Page 73
4.2 Different Experiential Modes and the Prospect of Scientific Diversity......Page 76
4.3 Empiricism Entails Pluralism......Page 85
5.1 The Question of Pluralism......Page 88
5.2 The Defects of Scepticism......Page 89
5.3 Pluralism without Scepticism......Page 97
5.4 Syncretism and its Defects......Page 99
5.5 Pluralism without Syncretism......Page 104
5.6 Is Pluralism Self-Refuting?......Page 105
6.1 Against Indifferentist Relativism......Page 107
6.2 A Foothold of One's Own......Page 115
6.3 The Arbitrament of Experience......Page 123
6.4 Some Possible Objections to an Empiricist Approach......Page 126
6.5 Pluralism is Compatible with Rational Commitment......Page 128
7.1 Consensus and Evaluative Norms......Page 136
7.2 The Issue of Axiological Consensus: Value Diversity and the Key Role of Experience......Page 139
7.3 Is Evaluative Disagreement Irrational?......Page 141
7.4 Cognitive Ramifications of Value Disagreement......Page 144
7.5 Is Value Disagreement Communally Incapacitating?......Page 145
8.1 Is Communications Predicated on Consensus?......Page 146
8.2 The Communicative Dispensability of Common Conception......Page 147
8.3 The Presumption of Communicative Intent......Page 152
8.4 Communication Can Dispense with Shared Beliefs and Values......Page 156
8.5 Does Communication Presuppose a Pursuit of Consensus?......Page 160
9.1 The Question of Practical Consensus......Page 165
9.2 Some Examples of Productive Modes of Dissensus......Page 168
9.3 Productive Versus Unproductive Modes of Conflict......Page 170
9.4 Acquiescence and Controlled Conflict......Page 172
9.5 A Consideration of Some Objections......Page 178
9.6 The Rationale of an Acquiescence-Oriented Approach......Page 184
9.7 Is Consensus a Requisite for Co-operation?......Page 188
10.1 A Political Perspective......Page 195
10.2 Problems of Idealization and the Search for a Realistic Middle Way......Page 199
10.3 Is Consensus a Valid Ideal?......Page 204
Bibliography......Page 210
Index of Names......Page 216
