This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.
Author(s): Frank C. Zagare, D. Marc Kilgour
Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2000
Language: English
Pages: 443
Tags: Международные отношения;Международные отношения;
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Figures......Page 15
Tables......Page 18
Preface......Page 21
Part I Theoretical underpinnings......Page 25
1 Classical deterrence theory......Page 27
1.1 Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications......Page 31
1.1.1 Structural deterrence theory......Page 32
1.1.2 Decision-theoretic deterrence theory......Page 40
1.2 Empirical anomalies......Page 48
1.3 Logical problems......Page 54
1.4 Coda......Page 56
2 Rationality and deterrence......Page 61
2.1.1 Procedural rationality......Page 62
2.1.2 Instrumental rationality......Page 63
2.2 Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality......Page 68
2.3 Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats......Page 73
2.4 Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance......Page 78
2.5 Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution......Page 82
2.6 Coda......Page 87
3 Credibility and deterrence......Page 89
3.1 On credibility......Page 90
3.2 Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats......Page 94
3.3 On capability......Page 105
3.4 Deterrence and uncertainty......Page 108
3.4.1 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with complete information......Page 110
3.4.2 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with one-sided incomplete information......Page 111
3.5 Coda......Page 117
Part II Direct deterrence......Page 121
4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence......Page 123
4.1 Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence......Page 125
4.2 Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence......Page 128
4.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game......Page 135
4.3.1 Class 1 equilibria......Page 138
4.3.1.1 The Sure-Thing Deterrence Equilibrium......Page 139
4.3.1.2 The Separating Equilibrium and the Hybrid Equilibrium......Page 145
4.3.2 Class 2A and 2B Attack Equilibria......Page 147
4.3.3 Class 3 Bluff Equilibrium......Page 150
4.4 Coda......Page 152
5 Unilateral deterrence......Page 157
5.1 Game form......Page 159
5.2 Unilateral deterrence under complete information......Page 163
5.3 Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information......Page 167
5.4 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game......Page 168
5.4.1 Deterrence equilibria......Page 172
5.4.1.1 Certain Deterrence Equilibrium......Page 173
5.4.1.2 Steadfast Deterrence Equilibrium......Page 175
5.4.2.1 Separating Equilibria......Page 177
5.4.2.2 Bluff Equilibria......Page 179
5.4.2.3 Attack Equilibria......Page 181
5.5 The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory......Page 182
5.6 Coda......Page 188
Part III Extended deterrence......Page 191
6 Modeling extended deterrence......Page 193
6.1 Preliminaries......Page 194
6.2 The Asymmetric Escalation Game......Page 199
6.3 Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation......Page 207
6.4 The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information......Page 211
6.4.1 Stability–instability paradox......Page 213
6.5 Subgame-perfect equilibria......Page 216
6.6 Coda......Page 219
7 Modeling Massive Retaliation......Page 221
7.1 Modeling all-or-nothing deployments......Page 224
7.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation......Page 227
7.2.1 Challenger-Soft Deterrence Equilibrium......Page 229
7.2.2 No-Response Equilibrium......Page 231
7.2.3 No-Limited-Response Equilibria......Page 233
7.2.3.1 Form I No-Limited-Response Equilibrium......Page 234
7.2.3.2 Form II No-Limited-Response Equilibrium......Page 236
7.2.3.3 Form III No-Limited-Response Equilibrium......Page 237
7.3 Coda......Page 238
8 Modeling Flexible Response......Page 243
8.1 Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions......Page 245
8.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response......Page 248
8.2.1 Escalatory Deterrence Equilibria......Page 251
8.2.2 All-or-Nothing Equilibria......Page 256
8.2.3 Flexible Response Equilibria......Page 258
8.2.3.1 Limited-Response Deterrence Equilibria: general characteristics......Page 259
8.2.3.3 Form II Limited-Response Deterrence Equilibria......Page 261
8.2.3.4 Escalatory Limited-Response Equilibria: general characteristics......Page 263
8.2.3.5 No-First-Use Escalatory Limited-Response Equilibria......Page 264
8.2.3.6 Warfighting Escalatory Limited-Response Equilibria......Page 266
8.3 Multiple equilibria......Page 267
8.4 Discussion......Page 270
8.5 Coda......Page 274
9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence......Page 279
9.1 Theory and evidence......Page 281
9.2 Assumptions......Page 282
9.3 Behavioral possibilities......Page 285
9.4 Deterrence and conflict spirals......Page 286
9.4.1 Traditional deterrence......Page 287
9.4.2 Non-traditional deterrence......Page 290
9.4.3 Conflict spirals......Page 294
9.5 Discussion......Page 296
9.6 Coda......Page 300
Part IV Implications......Page 307
10 Perfect Deterrence Theory......Page 309
10.1 Capability: a necessary condition......Page 314
10.2 Deterrence and the status quo......Page 317
10.3 Credibility and deterrence......Page 320
10.4 Deterrence breakdowns, limited conflicts, and escalation spirals......Page 325
10.5 Nuclear weapons and deterrence......Page 327
10.6 Coda......Page 331
Appendices......Page 333
Appendix 1 Deterrence models......Page 335
A1.1 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game......Page 337
A1.2 Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game......Page 339
A1.4 Asymmetric Escalation Game......Page 341
A2.1 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game......Page 347
A2.3 Unilateral Deterrence Game......Page 348
A2.4 Asymmetric Escalation Game......Page 349
A2.5 Standard strategy functions......Page 350
Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game......Page 352
Appendix 4 Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game......Page 355
Appendix 5 Unilateral Deterrence Game......Page 363
Appendix 6 Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Massive Retaliation'' version......Page 371
Appendix 7: Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Flexible Response'' version......Page 378
Appendix 8 Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version......Page 389
References......Page 408
Index......Page 429
