Of Risks and Normative Responses : Unleashing the Potential of Disaster Risk Reduction in Relation to Natural Hazards

Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Exploring the Problem
1.1.1 The Potential for Disaster Risk Reduction in Europe
1.1.2 The Implications of Distorted Risk Perception for Risk Management
1.1.3 The Need for a Bottom-Up Approach to Increase Disaster Risk Reduction
1.2 Research Focus and Aims of the Book
1.3 Research Methodology
1.4 Structure of the Book
1.5 Terminology
1.5.1 The Term of ‘Natural Hazards’
1.5.2 The Disaster (Risk) Conceptualisation in Modern Disaster Studies
1.5.3 The Current Disaster Risk Reduction Terminology
1.5.4 Risk Governance and Risk Evaluation
1.6 Scope of the Book
1.7 Contextualising the Problem in Terms of Competing Schools of Thought
1.7.1 Common Rationales for Public Risk Regulation
1.7.1.1 The Rationale of Protecting the Individuals’ Interests
1.7.1.2 The Rationale of Realising the Individual’s Authentic Self
1.7.1.3 The Rationale of Protecting the Collective Against Harm
1.7.2 Competing Proposals on the Design of Political Decision-Making Processes
1.8 Significance of the Book
1.9 Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: The Ability to Reduce a Natural Hazard’s Impact and Its Perception
2.1 Taxonomy of People’s Risk Perception
2.1.1 The Probability Neglect
2.1.2 The Hindsight Bias
2.1.3 The ‘Dread’ Factor in Risk Perception of Natural Hazards
2.1.4 Semantic Risk Patterns
2.1.5 The Faith in the Effectiveness of Risk Determination and Reduction
2.1.6 The Factor of Herd Mentality
2.2 Historical Overview of the Shifts in the Disaster Narrative
2.2.1 Individual Blame Under the Sin-Centred Narrative
2.2.2 The Dominant Hazard Disaster Paradigm
2.2.3 The Emergence of System Blame
2.2.3.1 The Relevance of Social Risk Factors for a Hazard’s Impact
2.2.3.2 From ‘Disaster Management’ to ‘Risk Management’ in Political Discourse
2.3 The Factual Ability and Challenges to Reduce Risk
2.3.1 The Conditions of Risk Determination
2.3.1.1 The Sources of Knowledge for Probability Calculation
2.3.1.2 The Unequal Challenges in Risk Analyses
2.3.1.3 The Consequences for the Risk Concept
2.3.1.4 The Limitations of Knowledge
2.3.1.4.1 The Epistemological Limitations of Knowledge
2.3.1.4.2 Types of Black Swan Events
2.3.2 The Certainty of Predicting Natural Hazards
2.3.2.1 Hydrometeorological Hazards
2.3.2.2 Geophysical Hazards
2.3.2.3 Potential for Improving the Certainty of Predictions
2.3.3 The Ability to Protect Individuals and Assets Against Natural Hazards
2.3.3.1 Protection Against Earthquakes
2.3.3.2 Protection Against Floods
2.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: The International Obligations in the Context of Natural Hazards
3.1 Overview of the International Law Landscape Relating to Natural Hazards
3.1.1 International Law
3.1.2 The Council of Europe
3.1.3 The European Union
3.2 The Positive Obligations Under the ECHR in the Context of Natural Hazards
3.2.1 The General Principles on the Failure to Implement DRR Under the ECHR
3.2.1.1 The ‘Disaster’-Term in the General Principles and Case Law
3.2.1.2 The Developed General Principles Relating to the Right to Life
3.2.1.3 The Developed General Principles Relating to the Right to Property
3.2.1.4 Assessment of the Developed General Principles
3.2.2 The Goal of Effective Protection Under the ECHR
3.2.2.1 The Legal Basis of the Principle of Effectiveness
3.2.2.2 The Inherent Principle of Fair Balance with Communal Interests
3.2.2.3 The Margin of Appreciation
3.2.3 The Relevant Factors for Determining the Loss of Autonomy
3.2.3.1 The Protection of Autonomy Against Paternalistic Interference
3.2.3.2 Factors Decreasing Autonomous Decision-Making
3.2.3.3 The Consequent Impact of Biases and Heuristics on the Scope of Obligation
3.2.4 The Legal Relevance of the Ability to Reduce the Impact of a Natural Hazard
3.2.4.1 The Role of Foreseeability and Susceptibility to Mitigation
3.2.4.2 The Different Standards of Protection Depending on the Disaster’s ‘Origin’
3.2.4.3 The Reasoning for the Differing Standards of Protection
3.2.4.4 Case Law Examples in the Context of Natural Hazards
3.2.5 The Determination of the ‘Origin of the Threat’ Under the ECHR
3.2.5.1 The Determination of a Factual Causal Nexus
3.2.5.2 The Determination of the ‘Decisive Cause’
3.3 Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: The Limitation to Disaster Risk Reduction by Fundamental Rights
4.1 DRR Instruments and Their Relationship to Fundamental Rights
4.1.1 Disaster Risk Communication
4.1.2 Nudging
4.1.2.1 ‘Framing’ as Example for Nudging
4.1.2.2 Nudging as Infringement of Personal Autonomy
4.1.3 Financial Incentives
4.1.4 The Regulation of Risk-Taking
4.1.4.1 The Ban on Erecting New Buildings in Certain Zones
4.1.4.2 Forced Resettlement from Certain Zones
4.1.4.3 Regulations to Reinforce Buildings Retrospectively
4.2 The Justifiability of Interfering DRR Measures
4.2.1 Overview of the Justification Requirements Under the ECHR
4.2.1.1 The Principle of Lawfulness and Legitimate Aims
4.2.1.2 The Proportionality Principle
4.2.2 Justifiability Based on Paternalistic Aims
4.2.2.1 Permitted Paternalism in Moral and Political Philosophy
4.2.2.2 Justifications for Paternalistic Interferences Under the ECHR
4.2.3 Justifiability Based on Non-Paternalistic Aims
4.2.3.1 General Remarks on the Justifiability of Interferences in the Context of Spatial Planning and Controlled Urban Development
4.2.3.2 The Justification of Forced Resettlement from Certain Zones
4.2.3.3 The Justification of Bans on Erecting New Buildings in Certain Zones
4.2.3.4 The Justification of Regulations to Reinforce Buildings Retrospectively
4.3 Conclusion
References
Untitled
Chapter 5: The ‘Better Argument’ in Legitimate Risk Governance
5.1 The Benefit of Deliberation for the ‘Authenticity’ of Risk Evaluations
5.1.1 The Respect for the Fact of Pluralism Under the Deliberative Ideal
5.1.1.1 The Reference Point for ‘Reasoned’ Arguments
5.1.1.2 Risk Perception Patterns Through the Lens of the Deliberative Ideal
5.1.1.2.1 Contextualising the Competing Proposal in Academic and Public Debates
5.1.1.2.2 The Hidden (and Flawed) Value Judgment Behind the Competing Proposals
5.1.2 The Requirement of an Appropriate Structure of Deliberative Processes
5.1.2.1 Demands on Risk Communication
5.1.2.2 Communicating and ‘Translating’ (Un)Certainty and Confidence
5.1.3 The Empirical Effectiveness of Deliberative Fora
5.2 The Strength of Deliberative Democracy Under Normative Political Theory
5.2.1 The Source of Political Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy
5.2.2 The Strength of the ‘Responsiveness’-Concept of Deliberative Democracy
5.2.3 The Compatibility of a Pragmatic Approach with Deliberative Theory
5.2.3.1 Compatibility of Representative Democracy and Deliberative Democracy
5.2.3.2 Demands on Democratic Accountability of Experts
5.3 The Compatibility with the Member States’ Democratic Systems
5.4 The Flaws of Competing Proposals to Respond to Distorted Risk Perception
5.4.1 The Competing Arguments for Objectively Rational Risk Management
5.4.1.1 Examples in the Literature on Risk Management
5.4.1.2 Overview of Knowledge-Based Normative Political Theories
5.4.1.2.1 Non-Democratic Governance Systems
5.4.1.2.2 Elitist Theory of Representative Democracy
5.4.1.3 Discussion of Positivist Argument for Knowledge-Based Governance
5.4.1.3.1 Philosophical Objections to the Concept of Objective Rationality
5.4.1.3.2 Scepticism Concerning Practical Implementation
5.4.2 The Competing Argument for Subjectively Rational Risk Management
5.4.2.1 The ‘Democratic-Enhancement’ Argument
5.4.2.2 Practical Restraints of Extrapolation Proposal
5.4.2.2.1 Doubts About the Reliable Determination of People’s ‘Authentic’ Values
5.4.2.2.2 Doubts About the Reliable Extrapolation to Other Contexts
5.4.2.3 The Threat of Eroding the Foundation of Democratic Theory
5.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Summary of the Analysed Political Reasons for the Neglect of DRR
6.1.1 The Benefits of DRR for Member States as Identified by Experts
6.1.2 Legitimacy of Recommended DRR Measures
6.1.3 Linking the Lack of Political Will to the Collective Neglect of Probability
6.2 Weaknesses of Paternalistic Arguments to Justify DRR Enforcement
6.2.1 The Autonomy Concept Excludes ‘Objectively Rational Risk Evaluations’
6.2.2 Explanation for Limited Scope of Positive Obligations
6.3 Strengthening DRR from the Bottom Up: Summary of Suggestions and Merits
6.3.1 Adjusting the Institutional Design of Collective Decision-Making Processes
6.3.2 Promoting Bias-Sensitive and Laypeople-Friendly Risk Communication
6.3.3 Reflecting on Strengths and Weaknesses of the Bottom-Up Approach
6.4 Future Research
6.5 Final Observations
References