Nature's Metaphysics argues that a satisfactory philosophy of science requires a metaphysics that is based on the understanding that causal properties are essentially dispositional properties. Alexander Bird develops and defends a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, and also examines dispositional accounts of explanation, causation, ceteris paribus laws, substances and kinds. Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
Author(s): Alexander Bird
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 200
Contents......Page 12
1.1 Laws of nature and natural properties......Page 16
1.2 An outline of this book......Page 20
2.1.1 Natural properties......Page 24
2.1.2 Nominalism and realism......Page 30
2.2 Dispositions......Page 33
2.2.1 Multi-track dispositions......Page 36
2.2.2 The conditional analysis of dispositions......Page 39
2.2.3 Finkish dispositions......Page 40
2.2.4 Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis......Page 41
2.2.5 Antidotes......Page 42
2.2.6 The intrinsic dispositions thesis......Page 44
2.2.7 Defending Lewis’s Reformed Conditional Analysis?......Page 46
2.2.8 Repairs to the Conditional Analysis?......Page 51
2.2.9 The Conditional Analysis revisited......Page 53
2.3 Conclusion......Page 56
3.1.1 Dispositional essentialism and potencies......Page 58
3.1.2 Deriving the laws of nature from dispositional essentialism......Page 61
3.1.3 The laws of nature are necessary......Page 63
3.2 Strong necessitarianism......Page 65
3.2.2 The instantiation condition......Page 66
3.2.3 Strong necessitarianism with instantiated properties......Page 71
3.2.4 Evaluating strong necessitarianism......Page 73
3.3.1 Dispositional essentialism and ceteris paribus laws......Page 74
3.3.2 Finks at the fundamental level?......Page 75
3.3.3 Antidotes at the fundamental level?......Page 77
3.4 Conclusion......Page 79
4.1 Categoricalism about properties and laws......Page 81
4.2.1 Quidditism......Page 85
4.2.2 Against quidditism—(QA1)......Page 88
4.2.3 Against quidditism—(QB1)......Page 91
4.3.1 The regularity view of laws and Humean Supervenience......Page 96
4.3.2 The regularity view of laws and explanation......Page 101
4.4 What is wrong with categoricalism about laws—nomic necessitation......Page 106
4.4.1 Does necessitation entail regularity?......Page 107
4.4.2 Does necessitation merely imply regularity?......Page 108
4.4.3 Simple universals and Independence......Page 109
4.4.4 Nomic necessitation contradicts categoricalism......Page 111
4.5 Conclusion......Page 112
5.1 Potency and its being......Page 114
5.2 Too little actuality......Page 115
5.3 Too much potentiality......Page 119
5.3.1 No possibility in, no possibility out......Page 120
5.3.3 The type-level response......Page 121
5.4 Armstrong, modal realism, and actualism......Page 123
5.5 There are unrealized possibilities......Page 126
5.6 Dispositional essentialism and intentionality......Page 129
5.6.1 Do potencies explain intentionality?......Page 130
5.6.2 Compositional properties......Page 131
5.6.3 Intentionality is non-compositional......Page 132
5.7 Are potencies intentional?......Page 133
5.7.1 The marks of intentionality......Page 134
5.7.2 Does intentionality* have the marks of intentionality?......Page 135
5.8 The manifest image......Page 141
5.9 Conclusion......Page 144
6.1.1 Incoherence......Page 147
6.1.2 Swinburne’s epistemological argument......Page 148
6.2 Regress, circularity, and identity......Page 150
6.3 Responding to the regress objection......Page 153
6.3.1 Reflexive potencies and the asymmetric manifestation relation—loops and digraphs......Page 156
6.3.2 Further constraints......Page 158
6.3.3 Essential stimuli......Page 159
6.4 Conclusion......Page 160
7 Structural properties......Page 162
7.1 The Mellor–Prior debate......Page 163
7.1.1 Testing for potency......Page 164
7.1.2 Complications for the conditional test for potency......Page 165
7.1.3 Rules of the debate......Page 168
7.2 The case of triangularity......Page 169
7.2.1 Locating dispositions......Page 171
7.2.2 Properties and geometries......Page 173
7.3.1 Displacement as a multi-track disposition......Page 176
7.3.2 Background structures and substantivalism versus relationalism......Page 177
7.3.3 Dispositional essences and background-free physical theories......Page 179
7.4 Extrinsic structural properties?......Page 181
7.5 Conclusion......Page 182
8 The illusion of nomic contingency......Page 184
8.1.1 Imagining necessary falsehoods......Page 187
8.1.2 Epistemic possibility......Page 190
8.2 The unreliability of our intuitions concerning the contingency of laws of nature......Page 191
8.3.1 Kripke’s strategy for identity generalized......Page 194
8.3.2 The strategy applied to laws of nature......Page 196
8.3.3 Modifying Kripke’s strategy......Page 197
8.4 Imagination and possibility......Page 201
8.5 Conclusion......Page 202
9 Are there any laws, and if so what are they?......Page 204
9.1.1 Mumford’s lawlessness argument in summary......Page 205
9.1.2 Must laws govern?......Page 206
9.1.3 Could laws be or supervene on potencies?......Page 210
9.1.4 Conclusion—are there laws?......Page 212
9.2 Does science use laws?......Page 213
9.3 What laws are......Page 215
9.4 Conclusion......Page 217
10.1 Review......Page 219
10.2 Further work—natural kinds......Page 223
10.3 Further work—problems from physics......Page 226
10.3.1 The problem of fundamental constants......Page 227
10.3.2 The problem of conservation and symmetry laws......Page 228
10.3.3 The problem of least-action principles......Page 229
10.4 Final comments......Page 230
References......Page 234
D......Page 241
I......Page 242
L......Page 243
P......Page 244
S......Page 245
Z......Page 246
