This book examines unemployment insurance policy through a survey, taking stock of the theoretical work in the field of labor economics. It closely follows and assesses developments in the modelling of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) policies, beginning with the initial analytical findings produced in the second half of the 1970s. A main part of the survey is devoted to the two basic strands of analysis about, respectively, the optimal level of UI benefits and the optimal time profile of UI policy.
The book has two different objectives. The first is to provide an essential summary of the individual models, with the intention of underscoring how a number of specific messages for the policy-maker can be derived from analytical constructions. It further emphasizes and comments on what the models deliver to UI policy-makers. The second objective is to stress the importance and extension of open questions in the field of the theoretical approach to the unemployment insurance issue. The survey discusses the multiplicity of heterogeneities of the labor world in particular as relevant for UI issues on the one side, and on the other hand, the independence of the two basic choices of UI policy, its meaning and its limits, and the possible forms of complementarity between these choices.
The book is a must-read for researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of the field of labor economics in general, as well as unemployment insurance policies in particular.
Author(s): Paola Potestio
Series: Contributions to Economics
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 183
City: Cham
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
References
Chapter 2: The Starting Points
2.1 The Optimal Benefit Level: Martin Neil Baily (1978)
2.2 The Time Sequence of UI Benefits: Shavell and Weiss (1979)
2.3 Job Search Decisions: Dale T. Mortensen (1977)
References
Chapter 3: The Optimal Level of Unemployment Insurance
3.1 Productivity Gains from an Unemployment Insurance System
3.1.1 UI Systems and Productive Efficiency: Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
3.1.2 A Note on the Quantitative Relevance of Productivity Gains from a UI System
3.1.3 More on the Analytical Issue of Productivity Gains from UI Benefits: Daron Acemoglu (2001)
3.1.4 The `Search Subsidy´ Provided by the UI System: Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)
3.2 The Sufficient Statistics Approach to the Analysis of Optimal UI Policy: Chetty´s Contributions
3.2.1 The Generalization of Baily´s Result: Ray Chetty (2006)
3.2.2 Moral Hazard and Liquidity Effects in the Design of the Optimal UI Benefits: Ray Chetty (2008)
3.3 New Issues for the Design of the Optimal Level of Unemployment Insurance
3.3.1 Age-Dependent Structure of the Optimal Unemployment Insurance
3.3.2 Asset Testing and Unemployment Insurance Systems
3.3.3 The Optimal UI Design in the Presence of Biased Beliefs: Spinnewijn (2015)
3.4 Externalities and Corrections of Baily-Chetty Result
3.4.1 A New and Wider Macroeconomic Framework to Designing Optimal UI: Landais et al. (2018a, b)
3.4.2 Unemployment Insurance in the Presence of `Negative Duration Dependence´: Lehr (2017)
References
Chapter 4: The Optimal Time Profile of UI Policy
4.1 The Optimal Time Profile of UI Within a Partial Equilibrium Setting
4.1.1 The Optimal Time Sequence of UI Benefits and a Tax after Re-employment
4.1.2 Human Capital Depreciation
4.1.3 New References and Ideas for UI Policy
4.1.4 New Scenarios in Designing the Time Profile of UI Policy
4.1.5 Returning to the Time Profile of Unemployment Insurance
4.2 The Optimal Time Sequence of UI Within a General Equilibrium Setting
4.2.1 The Time Profile of UI Schema within a General Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment: Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Ho...
4.2.2 Optimal UI with Monitoring and Sanctions within a General Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment: Boone, Fredriksson, ...
4.2.3 Doubts about a Decreasing Time Profile of UI Benefits within a General Equilibrium Search Model: Pierre Cahuc and Etienn...
4.2.4 Strategic Wage Bargaining and Time Profile of UI Benefits: Melvyn Coles and Adrian Masters (2006)
4.3 A New Dynamic Design of an Optimal UI Policy
4.3.1 The ``Optimal Timing´´ of UI Benefits: Kolsrud et al. (2018)
References
Chapter 5: Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycles
5.1 Business Cycles and the Time Sequence of UI Benefits: Juan Sanchez (2008)
5.2 UI and Marginal Welfare Gains Over the Business Cycle: Kory Kroft and Matthew Notowidigdo (2016)
5.3 Business Cycles and Unemployment Insurance within a Static Model: Torben Andersen and Michael Svarer (2011)
5.4 A General Equilibrium Approach to the Unemployment Insurance Policy Over the Business Cycle: Kurt Mitman and Stanislav Rab...
5.5 Busisness Cycles and UI: The Empirical Applications of L-M-S (2018a) Model of Optimal UI
5.6 The Optimal UI Policy in the Face of a Covid-19-type Recession: Kurt Mitman and Stanislav Rabinovich (2021)
References
Chapter 6: Some Further Notes on the Role of the UI System
6.1 Selected Empirical Analyses
6.2 Opposite Forces Driving the Re-employment Job Quality: Nekoei and Weber (2017)
References
Chapter 7: Conclusions
References
