Author(s): Peter Danielson
Year: 1998
Language: English
Pages: 480
Acknowledgments......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
Contributors......Page 10
1 Introduction......Page 14
2 Rationality and Rules......Page 24
3 Intention and Deliberation......Page 52
4 Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier......Page 66
5 How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem......Page 78
6 Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background......Page 103
7 Modeling Rationality: Normative or Descriptive?......Page 130
8 Theorem 1......Page 148
9 The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma......Page 172
10 Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-operation......Page 196
11 Beliefs and Co-operation......Page 221
12 The Neural Representation of the Social World......Page 247
13 Moral Dualism......Page 268
14 Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality......Page 293
15 Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory......Page 313
16 Morality's Last Chance......Page 351
17 Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision......Page 390
18 Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution......Page 419
19 Evolutionary Models of Co-operative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming......Page 434
20 Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines......Page 453
