Based on her earlier ground-breaking axiomatization of quantified modal logic, the papers collected here by the distinguished philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus cover much ground in the development of her thought, spanning from 1961 to 1990. The first essay here introduces themes initially viewed as iconoclastic, such as the necessity of identity, the directly referential role of proper names as "tags", the Barcan Formula about the interplay of possibility and existence, and alternative interpretations of quantification. Marcus also addresses the putative puzzles about substitutivity and about essentialism. The collection also includes influential essays on moral conflict, on belief and rationality, and on some historical figures. Many of her views have been incorporated into current theories, while others remain part of a continuing debate.
Author(s): Ruth Barcan Marcus
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 1993
Language: English
Pages: 280
Dedication......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
Acknowledgments......Page 10
Introduction......Page 14
1. Modalities and Intensional Languages......Page 18
Appendix 1A: Discussion......Page 39
Appendix 1B: Smullyan on Modality and Description......Page 51
2. Iterated Deontic Modalities......Page 54
3. Essentialism in Modal Logic......Page 60
4. Essential Attribution......Page 68
Appendix 4A: Strict Implication, Deducibility, and the Deduction Theorem......Page 86
5. Quantification and Ontology......Page 90
6. Classes, Collections, Assortments, and Individuals......Page 104
7. Does the Principle of Substitutivity Rest on a Mistake?......Page 116
8. Nominalism and the Substitutional Quantifier......Page 126
9. Moral Dilemmas and Consistency......Page 140
10. Rationality and Believing the Impossible......Page 158
11. Spinoza and the Ontological Proof......Page 178
12. On Some Post-1920s Views of Russell on Particularity, Identity, and Individuation......Page 192
13. Possibilia and Possible Worlds......Page 204
14. A Backward Look at Quine's Animadversions on Modalities......Page 230
15. Some Revisionary Proposals about Belief and Believing......Page 248
Index......Page 272
