This book explores the form, dynamics, and main reasons for media capture and conspiracy between editors and executive politicians in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 2000. Situated in the literatures on Europeanization, democratization, party studies, and media studies, the book aims to connect these fields by showing that internal party dynamics play an important role in motivating executive politicians to hijack or collaborate with media. Against this backdrop, the book tells the story of Croatian journalism in the context of media-mafia conglomerates, political corruption, and media hijacking, and examines how "traditional" democratic drivers that the literature frequently cites, such as Europeanization and party competition, failed to prevent systematic transgressions by politicians. Methodologically, the book takes a two-pronged approach. First, nearly 50 interviews were conducted with Croatian investigative journalists, from which the narratives about the relationships between government politicians and editors over 15 years were reconstructed. In a second step, a sample of 40,000 media articles was subjected to a computational sentiment analysis, covering the same 15-year period and showing high levels of cooperation between corrupt politicians and corrupt media outlets.
Author(s): Tomislav Maršić
Series: St Antony's Series
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 331
City: Cham
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 The Main Argument in the Wider CEE Context
1.1.1 Unprecedented Attack on Press Freedom Since Accession to the EU
1.2 Introduction of the Dependent Variable: Levels of Horizontal Accountability
1.2.1 Conceptualizing the Axes of the Typology
1.2.2 Specification of Actors and Time Frame
1.3 Alternative Explanations
1.3.1 Strong Civil Society and Whistle Blowers
1.3.2 Economic Crises and Advertisement Spending
1.3.3 Media Pluralism and Market Competition
1.3.4 Regime Change
1.3.5 Europeanization
1.3.6 Inter-Party Competition
1.4 Developing the Argument
1.4.1 Definition of Media Capture of Media Capture and Collusion
1.4.2 The Principal-Agent Perspective on Party Leadership Selection
1.4.3 Explaining Media Capture with Intra-Party Dynamics
Embedding the Explanation in the Literature
Three Steps: Rootedness, Contestation and Institutionalization of Rules
Actor’s Resources
Scope Conditions of the Explanation
1.5 Conclusion
References
2 Measurement and Methods of Data Collection
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Case Study Method
2.3 Measuring Media Capture
2.3.1 Operationalizing Horizontal Accountability
2.3.2 Interviews
Approach: Semi-Structured Interviews
Sampling of Interviewees
Time Frame
Managing the Left—right Divide
No-Response Issues
Other Sources of Possible Bias
Analysis of Interview Data
2.3.3 Sentiment Analysis
Measurement of Media Politicization and Media Bias
Data Collection
Availability and Quality of the Archives
Data Analysis: Slavomjer
2.4 Measuring the Independent Variable: Intra-Party Dynamics
2.4.1 Dimensions of Intra-Party Accountability
2.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
3 Historical Overview—Establishment of Formal Particularism and the First Transition in the 1990s
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The General Context of the First Transition
3.2.1 Prologue to Democratic Change (1980–1989)
3.2.2 The War and the Setup of Presidential-Parliamentarism
Institutional Level
Behavioural Level
3.2.3 Sweeping Replacement of the Elite
3.3 Transition in the Media
3.3.1 Putting the Mainstream Media Under State Control
3.3.2 Limiting Freedom for the Private Press
3.3.3 The HDZ Controls the Judiciary
3.3.4 Tudjman Used Formal Particularism to Control the Media
3.4 The HDZ Loses Popular Support After 1995
3.4.1 The Moderates and the Hardliners Use the Media for Their Infighting
3.4.2 Run-Up to the 2000 Elections
3.5 Conclusions
References
4 Ivica Račan and Jadranka Kosor: Steps to Universalism
4.1 Ivica Račan, 12.1999–12.2003
4.1.1 The Media Scene at the Outset of the “Second Transformation”
4.1.2 The Grupo Contract and Its Impact on the Croatian Media Scene
Interlinked Media Empires and a “Pacified” Market: Evidence for the Links Between Jutarnji List, Večernji List and Slobodna Dalmacija
4.1.3 The Media-Mafia Conglomerate Around Nacional
4.1.4 PM Račan: Careful Universalism
Račan Did Not Tackle the Grupo Cartel and EPH’s Role in It
The New Administration Stopped Formal Particularism
Developments of Universalism
4.1.5 President Mesić and Nacional
4.1.6 Summarizing the Roles of Račan and Mesić
4.1.7 The Effects of Traditional Drivers
4.2 Jadranka Kosor, 07.2009–12.2011
4.2.1 Kosor’s Relations to Ninoslav Pavić and EPH
4.2.2 The Effects of Traditional Drivers
4.3 Conclusions
References
5 Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanović: Regression to Particularism
5.1 Formal and Informal Particularism
5.2 Ivo Sanader, 12.2003–07.2009
5.2.1 Capturing Media Using Informal Particularism
Capturing Novi List
Colluding with Ninoslav Pavić
Capturing Journalists: The Case of Helena Puljiz
Boycotting Media Through Advertisement Oligopolies
5.2.2 The Effects of Europeanization
5.3 Zoran Milanović, 12.2011–12.2015
5.3.1 Informal Particularism
Milanović Established a System of Trading Information for Objectivity
Milanović Uses Informal Particularism in Infighting Over EPH
5.3.2 Formal Particularism: Dispensing Rewards and Sanctions via Formal Policies
Media Harassment Using the Tax Police
Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
Formal Economic Pressures
5.3.3 Ivo Josipović 2011–2015: Informal Particularism and Collusion
Ivo Josipović Tries to Remove “Novosti” from the Market
The Mainstream Press: Jutarnji and Večernji List
The Relationship of Josipović and Milanović to the Public Prosecutor Mladen Bajić
5.3.4 The Effects of Europeanization
5.4 Conclusions
References
6 Quantitative Text Analysis
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Brief Description of Method and Data
6.2.1 Method
6.2.2 Data
6.3 Testing the Hypotheses
6.3.1 Media Capture
Is There Evidence for Media Capture in Election years?
Who Organizes Media Capture?
Capture of Public Media
The Role of So-Called “Untouchables”
6.4 Summary of the Reliability Assessment
6.4.1 Limitations of Method and Data
6.5 Conclusions
Bibliography
7 What Motivated the Shifts Between Particularism and Universalism?
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Summary of the Argument
7.3 Rootedness Relaxes the Need for Media Control
7.3.1 Summary
7.3.2 The Way Račan Acquired Party Leadership
7.3.3 Contestation Was Not Personal But Over Ideological Questions
7.3.4 Permitted Contestation
Decentralized the Party and Allowed Factions
7.3.5 Required Comparatively Little Media Support from Pavić
7.4 Party-Internal Contestation and the Need to Control Media
7.4.1 Jadranka Kosor—Weakly Rooted and Highly Contested
Jadranka Kosor Is Appointed to Party Leadership
Kosor Fails to Contain Contestation
Kosor Tried to Fight Competitors But Was Not Supported by EPH
7.4.2 Sanader and Milanović—Controlling Contestation for the Leadership
Mode of Acquiring Power Within the Party
The Path of Non-Rooted Politicians—Eliminating Intra-Party Competition
Eliminating Contestation Allows the Party Leaders to Make Use of Particularism
7.5 Conclusions
References
8 Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Synthesis of Empirical Findings
8.2.1 Shape and Dynamics of Media Capture and Collusion
(Informal) Universalism 2000—2003
Informal Particularism 2004—2009
Universalism 2009–2011
Formal Particularism 2011—2015
8.2.2 Why Did Traditional Drivers Fail and What Has Been Driving Media Capture Instead?
8.3 Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Implications
8.3.1 Party Leadership Selection
8.3.2 Particularism
8.3.3 Sentiment Analysis
8.4 Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research
8.4.1 Better Measures for Media Independence
8.4.2 Testing the Intra-Party Competition Hypothesis on a Larger N
8.4.3 Empirical Research on Informal Rules
8.5 Final Remarks
References
Bibliography
Index
