Mechanisms of Exploitation: Economic and Social Changes in Syria During the Conict

The report adopts a comprehensive approach to understanding the economic and social situation and the dynamics in Syria during the conflict by analyzing a number of socio-economic variables at both the macro and micro levels. The macro analysis examines the general situation and the impact of the conflict, while the micro analysis provides a reflection of the total variables on the living situation of families in all Syrian regions, which helps develop an accurate comparative analysis among these regions. The research provides an understanding of the mechanisms of exploitation adopted by the various de facto forces in Syria and links between these mechanisms and the authoritarian nature of these forces. It also focuses on the mechanisms of the authoritarian regime in Syria before the conflict and how they prevailed post-conflict. Since 1963, the Baathist regime in Syria has worked to create identification between the Baath and state institutions to exploit the country’s resources and put them in the service of the party’s interests and ideology. However, the party’s authoritarianism was gradually replaced by individual authoritarianism with Hafez al-Assad’s assumption of power, who continued to invest in populist policies based on anti-Israel and social justice. He implemented open-economy policies that benefited those closely affiliated with his regime, who expanded the process of exploiting the country’s resources and citizens under the protection of the dominant security networks based on pre-state loyalties and affiliations. Upon Bashar al-Assad’s assumption of power in 2000, Syrians expected the new president to adopt a different governance methodology that included radical political and economic reforms. Indeed, the first months of his rule witnessed an expansion in the civil society movement, but soon the president returned to adopting the ironclad security approach and arresting dozens of activists. As for the economic aspect, the regime adopted neoliberal decisions that included partial liberalization of the prices of several major commodities and issued laws to encourage private investment. However, this was not accompanied by an increase in the productivity of the Syrian economy, as most private investments went to rentier sectors such as real estate. Thus, wealth was concentrated among the regime’s affiliates and relatives, and the mechanisms of exploitation took root with the emergence of people who own major projects in all economic sectors, with protection from and coordination with the security apparatus. In March 2011, the Syrian regime tried to absorb popular anger through the duality of authoritarian regimes represented by bargaining and violence. It raised the bar for bargaining with society through its apparent approval of some popular demands, but this was accompanied by the intensification of violence, which led to the deterioration of the security situation and the breakout of armed conflicts in all Syrian regions. With the continuation of the conflict, the depletion of available resources and the need to finance security and military services, the regime began implementing new exploitation mechanisms related to the conflict. Most of the de facto authorities in Syria have also resorted to using exploitation mechanisms similar to those used by the regime, with different sizes and tools, which has led to a deterioration in the living conditions of most families in various Syrian regions.