Author(s): Richard McElreath, Robert Boyd
Publisher: Chicago
Year: 2007
Cover
Title page
Preface
1 Theoretician's Laboratory
1.1 The structure of evolutionary theory
1.2 The utility of simple models
1.3 Why not just simulate?
1.4 A model of viability selection
1.5 Determining long-term consequenees
1.6 Nongenetic replication
2 Animal Conflict
2.1 The Hawk-Dove game
2.2 Retaliation
2.3 Continuous stable strategies
2.4 Ownership, an asymmetry
2.5 Resource holding power
2.6 Sequential play
3 Altruism & Inclusive Fitness
3.1 The prisoner's dilemma
3.2 Positive assortment
3.3 Common descent and inclusive fitness
3.4 Rediscovering Hamilton's rule
3.5 Justifying Hamilton's rule
3.6 Using Hamilton's rule
4 Reciprocity
4.1 The Axelrod-Hamilton model
4.2 Mutants and mistakes
4.3 Partner choiee
4.4 Indirect reciprocity
4.5 Reciprocity and collective action
5 Animal Communication
5.1 Costly signaling theory
5.2 Cheap, honest signals
5.3 Signaling and altruism
5.4 Social learning
6 Selection among Groups
6.1 Three views of selection
6.2 Deriving the Price equation
6.3 Selection within and between groups
6.4 Dispersal
7 Sex Allocation
7.1 Fisher's theory of sex allocation
7.2 Reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios
7.3 Using the Shaw-Mohler theorem
7.4 Biased sex ratios
7.5 Breaking the eigen barrier
8 Sexual Selection
8.1 Quantitative genetic models
8.2 Fisher's runaway process
8.3 Costly choice and sensory bias
8.4 Good genes and sexy sons
Appendixes
A Facts about Derivatives
B Facts about Random Variables
C Calculating Binomial Expectations
D Numerical Solution of the Kokko et al. Model
E Solutions to Problems
Bibliography
Index
