Master Airline Pilot: Applying Human Factors to Reach Peak Performance and Operational Resilience

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
About the Author
Introduction
Chapter 1 The Master Class of Pilots
1.1 How We Learn
1.1.1 How Novice Pilots Learn
1.1.2 How Proficient Pilots Learn
1.1.3 How Master Class Pilots Learn
1.2 How We Learn to Manage Aviation Tasks
1.2.1 Heuristic Development – Learning the Tricks of the Trade
1.2.2 Novice Pilot Heuristics
1.2.3 Proficient Pilot Heuristics
1.2.4 Master Class Pilot Heuristics
Bibliography
Section I: Introduction to Core Concepts
I.1 The Limitations of Commonly Used Terms and Concepts
I.2 Hindsight Bias in Mishap Investigations
I.3 Evaluating Mishaps Using an in-the-Moment Perspective
I.4 Understanding Concepts on a Master Class Level
Chapter 2 Risk Management
2.1 There Is Always Some Risk
2.2 Operations and Risk Management
2.3 Pilots as the Last Defensive Barrier
2.4 Pilots as Separate Barriers
2.4.1 The Flight Crew Team as a Third Barrier
2.4.2 Additional Considerations to Safety Barriers
2.5 Assessing Risk
2.5.1 Risk Management Model
2.5.2 Classification of Pilots by Risk Tolerance
2.5.3 The Gray Zone of Increasing Risk
2.5.4 Changing Conditions within the Gray Zone
2.5.5 The Proficient Pilot’s Path to Failure While in the Gray Zone
2.6 The Recognition Trap
2.6.1 Recognition Primed Decision Making
2.6.2 Recognition Trap and Rationalization
2.6.3 Questioning Our Judgment Replaces Situational Assessment
2.6.4 Pilot Recollection of Risk during Mishap Investigations
2.7 Handling Aviation Threats
2.7.1 Levels of Knowing
2.7.2 Threat Detection, Game Plans, and Confidence Level
2.7.3 Warning Signs
2.7.4 The Difference between Normal Path Deviations and Warning Signs
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 3 Complexity
3.1 Complexity Theory
3.1.1 Six Features of Complex Systems
3.1.2 The Marble Analogy
3.2 Sources of Complexity
3.2.1 External Sources of Complexity
3.2.2 Internal Sources of Complexity
3.3 How Complexity Affects Our Game Plan
3.3.1 Complexity Limits Familiar Game Plans
3.3.2 Unique Situations
3.3.3 Monitoring the Trend of Complexity
3.4 Rising Complexity Model
3.5 The Pushes and Pulls of the System
3.5.1 Factors That Push Us Forward
3.5.2 Factors That Pull Us In
Note
Bibliography
Chapter 4 Decision Making
4.1 Aviation Decision Making
4.2 Three Categories of Aviation Decision Making
4.3 Spontaneous and Standardized Decision Making within Familiar Situations
4.3.1 Spontaneous, Unconscious Decisions
4.3.2 Standard Procedures
4.3.3 Familiarity Breeds Contempt
4.3.4 Latent Vulnerabilities Surface When Something Rare Happens
4.3.5 When Procedures Are Disrupted
4.3.6 The Comfort Zone Trap in Decision Making
4.3.7 Blended Innovation
4.4 Decision Making with Unfamiliar or Nuanced Situations
4.4.1 Conscious Consideration
4.4.2 The Drift Towards “Strong but Wrong”
4.4.3 Equal Choices
4.4.4 Similar Choices with Conflicting Benefits/Penalties
4.4.5 Moving Toward One Choice as the Availability of the Other Decreases
4.5 The Lens of Bias and Experience
4.5.1 How Our Experience Affects Familiar, Spontaneous, and Standardized Decisions
4.5.2 How Our Bias Affects Unfamiliar and Nuanced Decisions
4.5.3 How the Bias Affects Unknown or Rare Situations
4.6 Lens Distortion and Recognition Trap Errors
4.6.1 When Effort Replaces Reassessment – The Frozen Bolt
4.6.2 Feeling That the Plan Is Right Replaces Getting It Right
4.6.3 Exceptional, Novel, and Uncertain Situations
4.7 The Five Stages of a Failing Decision in Recognition Trap Errors
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 5 Situational Awareness
5.1 Understanding and Improving Our SA
5.1.1 Studying How We Form Our SA
5.1.2 Using Stories to Improve Our SA-Building Skills
5.1.3 Understanding Failed SA Transitions in Aviation
5.1.4 The SA Balloon Metaphor
5.2 The Time Frames of SA
5.2.1 SA from Past Planning and Events
5.2.2 SA in the Present Moment
5.2.3 SA that Predicts the Future
5.3 Expanding Our SA at Each Level
5.3.1 Expanding Our Past SA
5.3.2 Expanding Our Present SA
5.3.3 Expanding Our Future SA
5.4 Factors that Degrade SA
5.4.1 Excessive Workload
5.4.2 Complexity and Novelty
5.4.3 Unskillful Monitoring
5.4.4 Rationalization and Goal Shifting
5.4.5 Distractions and Disruptions
5.4.6 Disrupted SA and Crew Resource Management (CRM)
5.4.7 Inadequate Preparation for Future Contingencies
5.4.8 Alpha and Omega Analysis
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 6 Error
6.1 Society’s Perception of Error
6.2 Flaws with the Logical Analysis of Error
6.2.1 Flaw of the Bad Apple Theory
6.2.2 Flaw of Deconstruction Logic
6.2.3 Flaws of Hindsight and Foresight
6.2.4 Flaw of Failure to Follow Rules
6.2.5 Flaw of Deficient Rulemaking
6.3 How Complex Systems Hide the Sources of Errors
6.4 Pilot Contributions to Error
6.4.1 Reliance on Single Pilot Actions within the Crew Environment
6.4.2 The Rush Mentality
6.4.3 Task Management at Inappropriate Times
6.4.4 Lack of Knowledge, Failure to Recall Knowledge, and Poorly Applied Knowledge
6.4.5 Flawed Risk Assessment
6.4.6 Misapplied Personal Priorities
6.4.7 Tolerance of Error
6.4.8 Ineffective Communications Environment
6.4.9 Intentional and Selective Noncompliance
6.5 A Better Way to Evaluate Error – Telling the Second Story
6.6 Studying Errors to Prevent the Next Accident
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 7 Distraction
7.1 Distraction and Workflow
7.2 How We Respond to a Distraction
7.2.1 Handling a Distraction
7.2.2 Recovering from a Distraction
7.3 The Distraction Environment
7.4 How Distraction Affects Us
7.4.1 Startle Reaction
7.4.2 Analyzing the Source of the Distraction
7.4.3 Plan Recovery
7.4.4 Flightpath Management
7.4.5 Time Distortion
7.4.6 PF/PM Role Integrity
7.4.7 Choice or Habit
7.5 External Contributors to Distraction
7.5.1 ATC Radio Calls
7.5.2 Other Distractors from Outside of the Flightdeck
7.6 Internal Contributors to Distraction
7.6.1 Aircraft System Distractors
7.6.2 Automation Distractions
7.6.3 Screen Distractions
7.6.4 Reliance on Automation to Alert Us
7.6.5 Inappropriate Discretionary Choices
7.7 Other Factors that Complicate Distractions
7.7.1 Team Distraction
7.7.2 Distracting Distractions
7.7.3 The Lingering Effects of Earlier Distractions
7.8 Evolving Trends in Distraction Vulnerability
7.8.1 Distraction Vulnerability and Screen-Induced Loss of Mental Rest
7.8.2 Distraction Vulnerability and Multitasking
7.8.3 Pushing Safety Limits
7.8.4 Attention Level and Dynamic Flight
7.9 Self-Inflicted Distractions
7.9.1 Normalization of Deviance and Rationalization
7.9.2 Experience Leads to Relaxing Our Standards for Completing Discretionary Tasks
7.9.3 Sterile Flightdeck Protocols Compared with Discretionary Choices
7.9.4 Prospective Memory Challenges Lead to Discretionary Choice Vulnerabilities
7.9.5 Ill-Timed Diversions of Our Attention
7.9.6 Just One More Thing
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 8 Safety
8.1 What Safety Is Not
8.1.1 Safety Is Not Completely Present or Absent
8.1.2 Safety Is Not a Number or Value
8.1.3 Safety Is Not a Feeling
8.1.4 Safety Is Not Defined by Outcomes
8.1.5 Safety Is Not a Reason (or Excuse) for Unwise Choices
8.2 What Safety Is
8.2.1 Safety Is Probabilistic
8.2.2 Safety Emerges
8.3 Creating Safety
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 9 Time
9.1 How We See Time
9.1.1 The Flight Schedule
9.1.2 Efficiency
9.1.3 Distance
9.1.4 Fuel
9.1.5 Sense of Pacing
9.2 The Side Effects of Feeling Behind
9.2.1 Impatience
9.2.2 Combining Tasks
9.2.3 Shortcutting
9.2.4 Rushing
9.2.5 The Adverse Effects of Time Pressure
9.3 Master Class Perspective of Time
9.3.1 Time Pacing as a Tool
9.3.2 Acknowledging the Existing Conditions
Notes
Bibliography
Section II: Introduction to Techniques
II.1 Procedures
II.1.1 Types of Procedures
II.1.2 Policy/Procedure Intent
II.1.3 Standardization
II.1.4 Procedure Sequences
II.1.5 Initiate – Flow – Verify
II.2 Techniques
II.2.1 Techniques Provide Depth to Procedures
II.2.2 Techniques Fill Engineering Gaps
II.2.3 Techniques Make Sequences Flow Better
II.2.4 Techniques Compensate for Personal Error Vulnerabilities
II.2.5 Techniques Keep Us Grounded within Our Comfort Zone
II.2.6 How Techniques Make Procedures Work Better
II.2.7 The Hidden Vulnerabilities of Techniques
II.3 The Techniques Development Lab
II.3.1 Understand the History Behind the Procedure
II.3.2 Preserve the Protective Features Built into the Procedure
II.3.3 Investigate the Underlying Conditions
II.3.4 Improve the Overall Quality of the Procedure
II.3.5 Build Personal Techniques to Improve Personal Performance
II.3.6 If Unsure, Ask the Experts in Standards or Training Departments
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 10 Risk Management Techniques
10.1 The Risk Management Skillset
10.1.1 Considering the Consequences
10.1.2 Modulating Our Vigilance
10.1.3 Searching for Counterfactuals
10.1.4 Preserving an Escape Option
10.1.5 Communicating a Backup Plan Using “if-then” Language
10.1.6 Rehearsing Contingencies
10.1.7 Evaluating Options Using a Premortem Exercise
10.1.8 Treating Anything Unique as a Warning Sign
10.2 Proactive Risk Management
10.2.1 Avoiding the Deteriorating Spiral
10.2.2 Modulating Vigilance to Match Risk
10.2.3 Managing Priorities and Assumptions
10.2.4 Instilling a Healthy Dose of Caution
10.2.5 Making Continuous Corrections
10.3 The Risk and Resource Management (RRM) Model
10.3.1 The Target and Colors
10.3.2 The Five Resource Blocks
10.3.3 Assess, Balance, Communicate, Do and Debrief (ABCD)
10.3.4 Putting the RRM Process Together
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 11 Decision-Making Techniques
11.1 The Types of Aviation Decisions
11.1.1 Familiar Situations Following Familiar Decisions
11.1.2 Simple Deviations that We Resolve with Quick Decisions
11.1.3 Novel and Unexpected Events
11.2 How We Determine Importance
11.2.1 Severity
11.2.2 Time Available
11.2.3 Deviation from What We Expect to Happen
11.3 Using Our Intuition for Decision Making
11.3.1 Intuition and Problem Solving
11.3.2 Pattern Recognition – The Puzzle Metaphor
11.3.3 Pattern Recognition – Aviation Problems
11.3.4 Maintaining a Cautious Perspective
11.3.5 Assume that There Are Gaps and Counterfactuals
11.3.6 The Risk of Ignoring Counterfactuals
11.4 The Difference between Quick/Common Decisions and Reasoned/Uncommon Decisions
11.4.1 Problems with Making Inappropriately Quick Decisions
11.4.2 The Precedent Set by False Success
11.4.3 Through Experience, the Complex Becomes Easy
11.5 Identifying Complex Problems
11.5.1 Recognizing Wrongness
11.5.2 Recognizing Familiarity
11.5.3 The Uncertain Middle Ground
11.5.4 Practicing Scenarios in the Uncertain Middle Ground
11.6 Making Well-Reasoned Decisions across the Range of Situations
11.6.1 Situations to the Left Side of the Game Plan Decision Graph
11.6.2 Situations in the Middle of Our Game Plan Continuum
11.6.3 Situations to the Far Right of Our Game Plan Continuum
11.7 Master Class Decision-Making Practices
11.7.1 Choosing Instead of Reacting
11.7.2 The Dos and Don’ts of Using Our Intuition
11.8 Useful Decision-Making Techniques
11.8.1 Basic Steps for Deliberative Decision Making
11.8.2 The In All Situations Checklist
11.8.3 Examining Our Mindset
11.8.4 Add a Qualifierto the Game Plan
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 12 Techniques for Building Situational Awareness
12.1 Building the SA Goal of Knowing
12.1.1 Planning As If We Know What Is Going to Happen Ahead of Time
12.1.2 Planning for What Is Likely to Happen
12.1.3 Reaching a Sufficient Level of Confidence with Our Level of Knowing
12.2 Building the SA Goal of Monitoring
12.2.1 Active and Subconscious Monitoring
12.2.2 Expectation, Comfort, and Drift
12.2.3 Task Overload and Single-Parameter Fixation
12.2.4 Developing High-Quality Monitoring
12.3 Building the SA Goal of Anticipating Future Challenges
12.3.1 Detecting Task Saturation, Stress, Bias, or Rising Complexity
12.3.2 When We Recognize Task Saturation/Stress/Bias/Complexity, Search for Counterfactuals
12.3.3 How Perspective Affects Our Detection of Counterfactuals
12.4 Building the SA Goal of Resilience
12.4.1 The Range of Expected Events
12.4.2 SA and Safety Margins
12.4.3 Increasing Our Resilience for Novel or Surprising Events
12.4.4 Building Resilience during Unique Events
12.5 Building the SA Goal of Recovering from Deviations in Our Game Plan
12.5.1 Deciding Whether to Recover or Change Our Game Plan
12.5.2 Power over Force
12.6 Building Team SA
12.6.1 Factors that Degrade Team SA
12.6.2 Factors that Improve Team SA
12.7 Master Class SA-Building Techniques
12.7.1 Building Better SA
12.7.2 The Briefing Better Process
12.7.3 Improving Present Moment SA
12.7.4 Keeping Workload Manageable
12.7.5 Building Future SA
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 13 Time Management Techniques
13.1 When Delays Affect Our Sense of Pacing
13.1.1 Understanding How Timelines Interact
13.1.2 Unavoidable Delays
13.2 Making Up Time Following a Ground Delay
13.2.1 Succumbing to Frustration
13.2.2 Feeling Like We Need to Hurry
13.2.3 Start-Up Lag
13.2.4 Priorities Following Delays
13.3 Making Up Time Inflight
13.4 Making Up Time during Arrival and Taxi-in
13.5 Techniques for Handling Delayed Operations
13.5.1 Use Warning Flags to Slow Down and Investigate Further
13.5.2 Search for Lesser-Included Consequences
13.5.3 There Is Always Time to Do the Right Thing
13.6 Fast-Paced and Emergency Operations
13.6.1 Managing Time during Emergency Situations
13.6.2 Managing Pattern Distance and Location
13.6.3 Refining Our Emergency Mindset
13.6.4 Responding to Quickening
13.6.5 Respecting Limits
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 14 Workload Management Techniques
14.1 Workload Distribution
14.1.1 Workload in-the-Moment – The Micro Perspective
14.1.2 Workload across the Flight Phases – The Macro Perspective
14.2 Managing Workload Using Planning and Briefing
14.2.1 Preflight Planning and Briefing
14.2.2 Handling Distractions during Preflight Preparation
14.2.3 The Planning and Briefing Process
14.2.4 Preflight Planning from the Gate through Departure
14.2.5 Before Top of Descent Planning and Briefing
14.3 Challenges of Workload Management
14.3.1 Effects of Stress on Workload Management
14.3.2 How We Allocate Time
14.3.3 Task Management and Appropriate Behaviors
14.3.4 Managing Tasks and Our Attention Level
14.3.5 Balancing the Scales between Efficiency, Workload, and Risk
14.3.6 Quickening and Rejection Triggers
14.4 Active Flightpath Monitoring, Dynamic Movement, and Sample Rate
14.4.1 Dynamic Movement – Low
14.4.2 Dynamic Movement – Medium
14.4.3 Dynamic Movement – High
14.5 Areas of Vulnerability (AOVs)
14.5.1 AOVs during Taxi Operations
14.5.2 Workload during Taxi
14.5.3 AOVs during Flight
14.5.4 Workload during Flight
14.5.5 Summary of AOV Guidelines
14.6 Master Class Workload Management
14.6.1 Task Management at the Gate
14.6.2 Workload Management in Low AOVs
14.6.3 Workload Management in Medium AOVs
14.6.4 Workload Management in High AOVs
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 15 Distraction Management Techniques
15.1 Isolating the Sources of Distraction
15.1.1 Creating Distraction-Free Bubbles around FOs during Preflight Planning
15.1.2 Creating Distraction-Free Bubbles around Captains during Diversion Planning
15.1.3 Creating Low Distraction Time Windows
15.2 Mitigating the Effects of Distractions
15.2.1 Anticipating Probable Distractions
15.2.2 Recognizing that a Distraction Has Occurred
15.2.3 Understanding the Effects of Distraction on Our Operational Flow
15.2.4 Following AOV (Area of Vulnerability) Protocols to Appropriately Manage Distractions
15.2.5 Avoiding Internal Distractions
15.2.6 Avoiding Habits that Intensify the Adverse Effects of Distraction
15.2.7 Mindfully Managing Distractions
15.2.8 Avoiding Mutual Distractions
15.2.9 Developing Distraction-Resistant Habit Patterns
15.2.10 Studying Our Distraction Encounters
15.3 Recovering from Distractions
15.3.1 Perform Any Immediate Action Steps
15.3.2 Evaluate the Time Available to Resolve the Disruption
15.3.3 Mentally Note What Was Happening as the Distraction Occurred
15.3.4 As a Crew, Determine the Cause and Signicfiance of the Distraction
15.3.5 Determine Tasks Required to Resolve the Distraction
15.3.6 Assign or Maintain Roles
15.3.7 Resolve the Distraction
15.3.8 Restore the Operational Flow
15.3.9 Assess the Residual Effects
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 16 Automation Management Techniques
16.1 Automation Concepts
16.1.1 Direct Control and Supervisory Control
16.1.2 Operating and Managing
16.1.3 The Levels of Monitoring
16.2 Automation Policy
16.2.1 Maintain Automation Proficiency
16.2.2 When Task Saturated, Shift to a Less Demanding Level of Automation
16.2.3 Reengaging Automation When Appropriate
16.2.4 Automation Policy Summary
16.3 Aircraft Automation – Benefit sand Limitations
16.3.1 The Junior Pilot on the Flightdeck
16.3.2 Areas of Strength and Weakness
16.4 Automation-Based Errors
16.4.1 Insufficient Knowledge and Practice
16.4.2 Mismanaging Practice Opportunities
16.4.3 Mismanaged Automation Engagement and Changes
16.4.4 Mismanaged Raising or Lowering the Level of Automation
16.4.5 CRM Breakdown While Making Automation Changes
16.4.6 Automation Application Exceeds Practiced Conditions
16.4.7 Automation Glitches
16.4.8 Changes Made during Mode Transitions
16.4.9 Mis-programmed Values
16.4.10 Misdirected Attention between Automation and the Outside Environment
16.4.11 Selected, but Not Activated
16.4.12 Unexpected Mode Transitions
16.5 Automation Techniques
16.5.1 Selecting and Verifying
16.5.2 The Verified or Verifiable Standard
16.5.3 Verifying Dynamic Changes in the Path
16.5.4 Monitoring Automation Displays
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 17 Communications Techniques
17.1 Communications Environment
17.1.1 Understanding Roles and Communications Protocols
17.1.2 Reducing Unpredictability within the Communications Environment
17.1.3 Opening the Communications Environment
17.2 Communications – Sending
17.2.1 Environmental Conditions
17.2.2 The Tone of Voice Used
17.2.3 Non-Verbal Communication
17.2.4 Clarity of the Message
17.3 Communications – Receiving
17.3.1 Understanding Rapid or Abbreviated Speech
17.3.2 Focusing Our Attention
17.4 Feedback
17.4.1 Feedback between Pilots on the Flightdeck
17.4.2 Feedback to Team Members
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 18 CRM Techniques
18.1 CRM Levels
18.1.1 Essential CRM
18.1.2 Supportive CRM
18.1.3 Enhanced CRM
18.2 Achieving an Effective CRM Environment
18.3 Conflict Resolution
18.3.1 Difference of Opinion
18.3.2 Personality Conflicts
18.3.3 Resolvable Personality Conflicts
18.3.4 Unresolvable Conflicts
18.3.5 Irreconcilable Differences and the Need to Separate
18.4 CRM Case Study – The Irreconcilable Conflict
18.4.1 Call for Outside Expertise
18.4.2 Team Meeting
18.4.3 Guide the Discussion
18.4.4 Clearly State the Facts and Intended Actions
Note
Bibliography
Chapter 19 PM Role Breakdowns, Callouts, and Interventions
19.1 The PM Role
19.2 Causes of PM Role Breakdowns
19.2.1 Quickening Pace
19.2.2 Short-Circuiting the PM Role
19.2.3 Assertively Suppressing Intervention
19.2.4 Reluctance to Intervene
19.2.5 Being Overly Helpful
19.2.6 Rationalization
19.2.7 Informing, but Not Acting
19.2.8 Mismanaging Discretionary Space
19.2.9 Different Mindsets and Perspectives
19.3 Preset Intervention Triggers and Applying Judgment
19.3.1 Preset Triggers
19.3.2 Personal Safety Limits
19.3.3 Applying Judgment
19.4 Scripted Callouts, Deviation Callouts, and Risky Decisions
19.4.1 Scripted Deviation Callouts
19.4.2 Unscripted Deviation Callouts
19.4.3 Risky Decisions
19.5 Interventions
19.6 Intervention Strategies
19.6.1 Due Diligence
19.6.2 Barriers to Making Interventions
19.7 Intervention Trigger Points
19.7.1 Escalation Following Standard and Deviation Callouts
19.7.2 Intervention Trigger Levels
19.7.3 Pilot Incapacitation
19.7.4 Non-Flight Related Interventions
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 20 First Officer Roles and Responsibilities
20.1 The First Officer Perspective
20.1.1 The Cultural Legacy of the First Officer
20.1.2 FO’s Official Roles and Responsibilities
20.1.3 How the FO Role Has Evolved in CRM
20.2 Finding Our Voice
20.2.1 Silence Means Consent
20.2.2 Separate Directive Callouts from Maintaining Team Rapport
20.2.3 Use Humor
20.2.4 Be Sincere
20.3 Staying Out of Synch
20.3.1 Becoming Enmeshed with the Problem
20.3.2 Maintaining a Detached Perspective
20.3.3 Assuming the Flight Instructor Perspective
20.3.4 Looking at the PF
20.3.5 Beware of a PF’s Automatic Responses
20.4 Techniques for Scripted Callouts, Deviation Callouts, Risky Decisions, and Interventions
20.4.1 Making Scripted Callouts
20.4.2 Making Unscripted Deviation Callouts
20.4.3 Making Callouts about Risky Decisions
20.4.4 Making Interventions
20.4.5 Getting an Overly Focused Pilot to Comply
20.5 Case Study – Meeting Resistance from the Captain
Notes
Bibliography
Section III: Introduction to Challenging and Non-Normal Operations
III.1 Challenging and Non-Normal Events
III.1.1 Mishap Rate
III.1.2 Safety Margins
III.1.3 Our Felt-Sense of Safety Margin
III.1.4 How Our Strategies and Mindsets Change
III.1.5 Types of Operations
Note
Chapter 21 Marginal and Deteriorating Conditions
21.1 Operations under Marginal Conditions
21.1.1 Emergence and Extreme Events
21.1.2 Unknown Actions Disguise Trends
21.2 How Deteriorating Conditions Affect Safety Margins
21.2.1 The Gap between Skills and Capability
21.2.2 Ego, Experience, and Expectations
21.2.3 Learning the Wrong Lessons from Simulator Training
21.3 Latent Vulnerabilities and Mishaps
21.3.1 Plan Continuation Bias
21.3.2 Locating the Failure Zone
21.3.3 Optimistic Assessments of Marginal Conditions
21.3.4 The View from Inside the Tunnel
21.4 Managing Risk in Marginal Conditions
21.4.1 Operational and Regulatory Boundaries
21.4.2 Written Guidance
21.4.3 Personal Boundaries
21.4.4 Continuing Operations – The “Go” Mode
21.4.5 Communicating Information Back to Central Operations
21.4.6 Reaching the Stopping Point
21.4.7 Practicing Failure in the Simulator
21.5 Planning and Selecting Game Plans under Marginal Conditions
21.5.1 Select Options that Reverse Rising Stress
21.5.2 Always Preserve an Escape Option
21.5.3 Plan an Approach for the Next Lower Available Minimums
21.5.4 Trust Experience and Intuition
21.5.5 Run Mental Simulations
21.5.6 Look for Leverage Points
21.5.7 Rank Reasonable Goals and Discard Unreasonable Goals
21.5.8 Select the Best Plan for the Current Conditions, Not for Future Consequences
21.6 Monitoring Game Plans under Marginal Conditions
21.6.1 Expand Situational Awareness
21.6.2 Accept Conditions As They Are, Not How We Wish They Would Be
21.6.3 Apply Aircraft Knowledge
21.6.4 Understand the Subtle Details Embedded Within Procedures
21.6.5 Plan Continuation Bias and Gray-Maybe
21.6.6 If We Need to Fly Our “Best Plus”, Then We Shouldn’t Continue
21.6.7 Guard against Reverting Back to Normal Habit Patterns While Still in Marginal Conditions
21.6.8 Search for Counterfactuals
21.6.9 Monitor Abort Triggers
21.6.10 Avoid Bumping against the Limits
21.6.11 Don’t Debrief during the Event
21.7 Marginal Conditions in Winter Operations
21.7.1 Make Braking Action Reports
21.7.2 Monitor Temperatures and Snowfall Rates
21.7.3 Anticipate Uneven Snow Accumulation
21.7.4 The Deformable Runway Surface Problem
21.7.5 The Tire Tread Problem
21.7.6 The Different Aircraft Problem
21.7.7 The Deceleration Problem
21.7.8 What GOOD Braking Action Means to Us
21.7.9 Effective Braking Techniques and Tire Alignment
21.7.10 Pavement Temperature near Freezing
21.7.11 Conga-Lines into High-Volume Airports
21.7.12 Infrequent Flights into Low-Volume Airports
21.8 Marginal Conditions in Summer Operations
21.8.1 Reduced Visibility from Rain
21.8.2 Windshear
21.8.3 Hydroplaning
21.8.4 Heat and Tires
21.9 Balancing Appropriate Operations in Marginal Conditions
21.9.1 Manage Stress and Keep the Pace Deliberate
21.9.2 Actively Manage Risk
21.9.3 Manage Rest for a Potentially Long Day
21.9.4 Follow Procedures to Control Complexity
21.9.5 Detect and Communicate Warning Signs
21.9.6 When Things Go Wrong, Start with the MATM Steps
21.9.7 Ask for Outside Help
21.9.8 Don’t Be Misled by the Success of Others
21.9.9 Ask Questions to Gauge the Appropriateness of Continuing
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 22 Non-Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Events
22.1 How Simulator Training and Line-Flying Emergencies Differ
22.1.1 Non-Normal Events Interrupt Our Operational Flow
22.1.2 Differences between Simulator Events and Line Events
22.1.3 Using Debriefing to Reframe Our Mindset
22.1.4 Advantages of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) Training
22.1.5 Recreating Unexpectedness and Context
22.1.6 How Consequence and Responsibility Affect Our Mindset
22.1.7 The Effects of Noise and Distraction
22.1.8 Recreating Complexity
22.2 Understanding How Exceptional Events Become Mishaps
22.2.1 The View from Inside the Tunnel
22.2.2 Our Subjective Perceptions
22.2.3 Understanding Accident Event Timelines
22.2.4 Calibrating Our Personal Awareness and Abort Triggers
22.2.5 Operational and Personal Priorities
22.2.6 Fatigue
22.2.7 Difficulty Processing Relevant Information While Overloaded
22.3 Emergency Procedure Strategies
22.3.1 Initial Reaction and Maintaining Aircraft Control
22.3.2 Analyze/Assess the Problem
22.3.3 Develop a Game Plan to Resolve the Problem
22.3.4 Take Appropriate Action
22.3.5 Maintain Situational Awareness
22.3.6 Adding Time to Manage an Emergency Event
22.3.7 Unknown Causes
22.3.8 Extreme Complexity
22.3.9 Sharing Our Stress Level with Other Crewmembers
22.3.10 Using QRH Checklists
22.3.11 Temporarily Dividing Workload and Duties
22.3.12 Studying Our Personal Biases
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 23 Time-Critical Emergencies
23.1 Emergencies with Little Time to React
23.2 The Effects of Startle and Surprise
23.2.1 Startle
23.2.2 Surprise
23.2.3 Startle and Surprise Comparison
23.2.4 How Startle and Surprise Affect Our Attention Focus
23.2.5 How Startle and Surprise Adversely Affect Our Decision Making
23.2.6 How Startle and Surprise Increase Our Vulnerability to Distraction
23.3 Recovering from the Effects of Startle and Surprise
23.3.1 Rehearsal
23.3.2 Body Positioning
23.3.3 First Look
23.3.4 First Step
23.4 Time-Critical Emergencies – Example Scenarios
23.4.1 Rejected Takeoff (Immediately Before the V[sub(1)] Callout)
23.4.2 Engine Loss/Fire Immediately Following Liftoff, But Prior to Gear Retraction
23.4.3 Directional Control Problems on the Runway at High Speed
23.4.4 Loud Bang near V[sub(1)]
Notes
Bibliography
Section IV: Introduction to Professionalism
IV.1 Career Progression and Professional Wisdom
IV.1.1 Average Proficient Pilots
IV.1.2 Comfortable Pilots
IV.1.3 Master Class Pilots
IV.1.4 The Professional Aviation Wisdom Gap
IV.1.5 The Pursuit of Resilience
Chapter 24 The Master Class Path
24.1 Establishing Our Master Class Intention
24.1.1 Career Advancement by Time versus Merit
24.1.2 Our Personal Commitment to Sustain Our Master Class Intention
24.2 Engaging in Deliberate or Purposeful Practice
24.2.1 Purposeful Preparation
24.2.2 Purposeful Briefing
24.2.3 Purposeful Execution
24.2.4 Purposeful Feedback and Debriefing
24.3 Committing to Life-Long Learning
24.3.1 Growth Mindset
24.3.2 Pursuing Depth of Knowledge
24.3.3 Integration of Knowledge and Experience
24.4 Embracing a Standard of Excellence
24.4.1 Everyday Excellence
24.5 Pursuing Perfection
24.6 Building Conscious Awareness
24.6.1 Meta-Awareness
24.6.2 Attention Drift
24.6.3 Level of Caring
24.7 Understanding and Overcoming Our Biases
24.7.1 Plan Continuation Bias
24.7.2 Representativeness Bias
24.7.3 Expectation Bias
24.7.4 Confirmation Bias
24.7.5 Specialty Bias
24.7.6 Framing Error Bias
24.7.7 Salience Bias
24.7.8 Fundamental Attribution Error
24.7.9 Distancing through Differencing
24.7.10 Automation Bias
24.7.11 My Biases
24.8 Countering the Forces that Drag Us Back
24.8.1 Countering Cynicism with Proactive Discussion
24.8.2 Reframing the Irritants
24.8.3 Embracing Change
24.8.4 Affirming Ownership
24.9 Continuing Our Aviation Wisdom Trajectory
24.9.1 Keeping Our Eyes on the Prize
24.9.2 Balancing Over and Under-Response
24.9.3 Keeping It Steady
24.9.4 Keeping It Smooth
24.9.5 Keeping Our Professional Aviation Wisdom Moving Upward
24.9.6 Keeping It Interesting
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 25 The Master Class Skillset
25.1 Countering Stagnation and Drift
25.1.1 Countering Declining Interest
25.1.2 Becoming Aware of Our Subconscious Actions
25.1.3 Guarding Against Shortcutting Procedures
25.1.4 Using Drift to Improve Resilience
25.2 Improving Skills by Studying Challenging Events
25.2.1 Managing Operations in the Gray Zone of Increased Risk
25.3 Proactive Debriefing
25.3.1 Characteristics of Effective Debriefs
25.3.2 The Meandering Course of Debriefs
25.3.3 Scheduling a Debrief Opportunity
25.3.4 Creating a Debriefing Habit Pattern
25.3.5 Questions That Encourage Proactive Debriefing
25.3.6 Debriefing a Significant Event
25.3.7 Debriefing Surprising Events
25.3.8 The Master Class Debriefing Perspective
25.4 Improving Our Judgment
25.4.1 Training versus Line Flying
25.4.2 Practicing Judgment during Everyday Line Flying
25.4.3 Imagining Scenarios
25.5 Improving Our Intuition
25.5.1 Our Intuitive Recognition of Risk
25.5.2 Our Intuitive Sense of Time Available
25.5.3 Limits of Intuition
25.5.4 Learning from Stories
25.5.5 Sources of Stories
25.5.6 Making the Story Our Own
25.5.7 Watching, Learning, and Sharing
25.6 Managing Uncertainty
25.6.1 Managing Uncertainty with Awareness
25.6.2 Gauging Trends
25.6.3 Imposing Tighter Criteria on Acceptability
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 26 Professional Attributes
26.1 How FOs Identified the Best Captains
26.1.1 Professional Competence
26.1.2 Personality
26.1.3 Team Building
26.1.4 Instructing/Teaching
26.1.5 Testimonial
26.1.6 Attributes as Ranked by FO Seniority
26.1.7 Relative Importance of Attributes
26.2 Surveying the Best Captains
26.2.1 Creating a Favorable First Impression
26.2.2 Open Communications
26.2.3 Team Building
26.2.4 Instructing/Mentoring
26.2.5 Personality
26.2.6 Professionalism and Standardization
26.2.7 Deliberate and Predictable
26.2.8 CRM/Customer Service
26.2.9 Best Captains Survey Summary
26.3 Master Class Professionalism
26.3.1 Moral Character
26.3.2 Pilots as System Monitors
26.3.3 Captain’s Authority
26.4 Professional Attributes across the Phases of the FO Career
26.4.1 Phase 1 – New-Hire/Probationary FO
26.4.2 Phase 2 – Experienced, Line-Holding FO
26.4.3 Phase 3 – Nearing Upgrade
Notes
Bibliography
Glossary of Commonly Used Airline Terms
Bibliography
Index