Markets Constitutions and Inequality

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Contributors
Introduction
Part 1 The Constitutional Embeddedness of Markets
Chapter 1 The Constitutional Disembeddedness of Markets?: A Discussion of Competing Accounts
1.1 The Constitutional Embeddedness of Markets: A Recap
1.2 From Law’s ‘Constitutive’ Role in the Market to the ‘Constitutional Embeddedness’ of Markets?
1.3 Constitutional Disembeddedness: Competing Accounts of the Problem
1.3.1 Dixon and Suk: Economic Inequality and the Limits of Liberal Constitutionalism
1.3.2 Alviar García: Constitutional Capture and the Economic Constitution
1.3.3 Constitutional Fragmentation: The Great Societal Constitutionalism Debate
1.4 Concluding Thoughts
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 2 Law of Nature, Law of Man: Economic Theories of Constitutions and the Normative Question
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Buchanan
2.2.2 Commons
2.2.3 North
2.2.4 Posner
2.3 Discussion
2.4 Conclusions
References
Part 2 Markets, Constitutions, and Inequality: Legal Regimes
Chapter 3 The Law and Political Economy of Healthcare in the United States
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Rise and Relevance of Law and Political Economy (LPE) Scholarship
3.3 The Legal and Political Codes of Healthcare Market Economies
3.4 Why LPE of U.S. Healthcare?
3.5 Why Is There a Growing Private Power in the Healthcare Sector and Why Is It a Problem?
3.5.1 Big Pharma
3.5.2 Hospital Consolidation
3.5.3 COVID-19 Vaccination12
3.6 Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Chapter 4 Fiscal Sustainability and Its Jurisprudential Evolution: The Fraught Dialogue between the Economy and the Law
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Approach to Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Impact Incident: The Much-Needed Dialogue between Economy and Law
4.2.1 Fiscal Sustainability
4.2.2 The Fiscal Impact Incident
4.3 Some Specific Cases of the Application of Fiscal Sustainability and/or the Fiscal Impact Incident
4.3.1 Social Security: Health and Pension
4.3.2 Victims of the Armed Conflict
4.3.3 Community Mothers
4.3.4 Taxes
4.4 Conclusions and Recommendation
Notes
References
Chapter 5 The Paradoxes of a Progressive Constitution and Neoliberal Food Regime
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Some Norms of the Constitution and International Treaties
5.3 The Functioning of the Market
5.4 The Constitutions and the Land Market
5.5 Land Grabbing
5.5.1 The Case of Land and Indigenous Territories
5.6 Market, Poverty, and the Constitutional System in Paraguay
5.7 Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 6 Protecting Property: Crime Control, Constitutional Organization and Neoliberal Governance in Colombia
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Constitutional Design of Private Property Protection in Colombia
6.3 Neoliberal Governance and Protection of Property
6.4 Constitutional Reform and Criminal Prosecution Market: The New Form of Protecting Private Property in Colombia
6.5 Conclusions
Notes
References
Chapter 7 Market Efficiency as a Directive Principle of E.U. Monetary Policy
7.1 Introduction: Markey Neutrality, Market Efficiency, and the Climate Emergency
7.2 Dissection of the Efficient Markets Principle
7.3 The Legal Nature of the Efficient Markets Principle
7.3.1 Directive Principles
7.3.2 The Efficient Markets Principle as a Directive Principle
7.4 Implications for the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy
7.5 The Programmatic Role of Constitutions in Financial Systems
Notes
References
Chapter 8 Rethinking the Historic Models of the Role of Constitutions in Shaping Patterns of Inequality: Iberian Constitutionalism, Common Property, and Colonialism
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Historical Models of Inequality
8.3 Constitutions and Inequality: New Institutional Economics and the Ghost of Liberalism
8.3.1 The Constitutional Tradition and Inequality Trends in the Iberian World
8.3.2 Medieval Foundations
8.4 Constitutional Changes in the Early Modern Period
8.5 Constitutions and Inequality in the Spanish Empire
8.6 Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 9 The Three Globalizations of Law and the Constitutional Protection of Property Rights over Land in Colombia and China
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The First Globalization, the Civil Code, and the Roman Concept of Private Property
9.2.1 Colombia
9.2.2 China
9.3 The Second Globalization and the Backlash against Private Property
9.3.1 Colombia
9.3.2 China
9.4 The Third Globalization and the Fundamental Right to Private Property
9.4.1 Colombia
9.4.2 China
9.5 Conclusions
Notes
References
Chapter 10 Private Property, Popular Sovereignty, and the Constitutional Foundations of Economic Regulation in the Americas
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Tension between the Constitutional Protection of Private Property and Popular Sovereignty
10.3 The Constitutional Protection of Private Property in the United States of America and the Origins of Antitrust Law (1770s–1830s)
10.4 The Constitutional Protection of Private Property and the Dawn of Competition Law Regimes in Latin America (1820s–1950s)
10.5 Conclusions
Note
References
Chapter 11 Multinationals, Inequality, and a Competition Law Response: Lessons from the East India Company
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Economic Constitution
11.2.1 The Internal and External Dimensions of an Economic Constitution
11.2.2 The Constitutionality of Competition Law
11.2.3 Economic Constitutions of India and Pakistan
11.3 Multinationals, Economic Constitutions, and Inequality
11.3.1 The Unprecedented Power of the East India Company
11.3.2 The EIC and Modern AI-powered Multinationals – The Knowledge-Based Corporations
11.3.3 Enforcing Rights under Modern Economic Constitutions
11.4 Inequality and the Competition Law Response
11.4.1 The Underlying Ideology
11.4.2 Multinationals and Competition Regulation in India and Pakistan
11.4.3 Crafting a Competition Law Response
11.5 Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 12 Afterword: Markets, Constitutions, and Inequality in the Twenty-First Century
12.1 The Constitutions, Markets, and Inequality Nexus
12.2 Further Developments
Notes
References
Index