Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties

Nine essays examine the nature and future of the increasing involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency, proinsurgency, and antiterrorism campaigns conducted overtly and covertly under the Reagan administration's doctrine of 'low-intensity conflict.' Their analysis notes that a policy of low-intensity conflict represents a strategic reorientation of the United States military establishment and a renewed commitment to use force in a global crusade against Third World revolutionary movements and governments. Individual papers focus on efforts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The analysis concludes that the strategy of intervention is damaging to the United States national security even if no confrontation occurs with the Soviet Union. Intervention results in the loss of credibility and influence, requires a reckless disregard of international law and treaty obligations, and sacrifices the commitment to the economic development of developing nations. It is also harmful to the American economy and threatens democratic institutions in the United States by its reliance on secrecy and lack of public participation.